Critical analysis of the President's Authorization in the Turkish's 2017 Constitution

From the time that it took political authority in Turkey, the AKP constantly raised the issue of changing Turkey's political system from the parliamentary to the presidential system. Under Erdogan's leadership, after the coup in April 15, 2016, the party was able to reach its goal thanks to the political support of parties and social accompaniment through 2017's referendum. The purpose of this article is to examine the President's powers as the head of state and the relationship between the president and the legislative and judiciary forces as well as to criticize and evaluate these changes. In this regard, it has been dealt with the changes in the constitutional material, specifically those that are related to the executive body, through a comparative study comparing the new and previous constitution in order to examine the types of political regimes based on the key concept of the separation theory, and explain the Legal and political consequences. The present paper seeks to find out how much the President's powers in the new constitution have changed in Turkey and to which model of political systems the Turkish political system has been approached? The claim of this article is that with the increase of the powers of the Turkish presidential powers, the Turkish system is approaching the presidential system. The findings of this paper, which have been found analytically and descriptively through a documentary method, show that the constitutional changes increase the powers and scope of the president's authority. This may destabilize the border of the separation of powers in Turkey's new political system. The documents of this claim show the increase in mutual eligibility of the President in dissolving the parliament and holding early elections, holding the parliamentary and presidential elections simultaneously, the extension of the term of parliamentary and presidency periods, the president's ability to be the secretary-general of the party during the presidential period, the authority to select the majority of the members of the Council of Judges and Prosecutors, as well as the Constitutional Court and the election of senior government officials without parliamentary approval, and the tightening the process of monitoring the ministers.