The Problem of Moral Luck Some reflections on Michael Moore’s view

Nagel and Williams have identified the problem of moral luck as arising from a tension between the control principle and our moral practices. Some believed that there is a real and unsettling problem has been stated in contemporary philosophy. Not all agree, however. Michael Moore has claimed that the problem of moral luck is not a genuine problem in its own right, but that it boils down to the classic problem of free will. The second claim of Moore is about Nagel’s notion of control; Nagel is wrong about his idea of control – to control a result is to control all factors necessary to that result. This incompatibilist notion of control, according to Moore, has no usage in the ordinary activity of moral assessment. The aim of the first section of this paper is to formulate and discuss the problem of moral luck, thereby dealing with the question: ‘how to understand the problem of moral luck?”. The second section deals with the analysis and examination of the compatibilist concept of control as presented by Moore. In this study, these two claims have been separated and concluded that the first is right and the second is wrong.