The role of values in conceptualization; Reconstruction of the methodology of Max Weber's ideal type

The logic of conceptualization in the social sciences is one of the epistemological and methodological controversies of the social sciences. One of the main disputes over the relationship between knowledge and value is whether it is necessary and possible for the social scientist to avoid the introduction of cultural values in the construction of concepts or are values an integral and logical element of conceptualization? In this case, how can conceptualization imbued with the values of the researcher not hinder objectivity? In answer to this question, Durkheim's positivist and naturalistic approach argues that the concepts of the social sciences are value-laden and that the involvement of researcher values in conceptualization is detrimental to objectivity. Based on Weber's post-positivist approach, which is based on the epistemology of Kant's idealism, neo-Kantians, and Nietzschean's perspectivism , the present study argues that the concepts of the social sciences are value-laden, and that value-laden of social concepts is not only an obstacle to objectivity, it is also a subjective condition of objectivity. Based on Weber's separation of Value Relation from Value Judgment, the author shows to what extent the interference of social researcher values in conceptualization is permissible and to what extent it is impermissible and detrimental to the neutrality of science and objectivity.