The Discourse of Development in Saudi Arabia (2015-2022); Institution of Political Power versus Institution of Religious Legitimacy

Although the idea of development in Saudi Arabia has been discussed over the past few decades due to the rich oil revenues and the consolidation of relations with the West after the geopolitical change in the region, and the civilisational and concrete manifestations of this development are evident in this country, due to the hardening of religious thought, the ruler of this country and his entanglement with the ruling political family has strengthened the position of the Sunnah in Saudi Arabia. With the arrival of the new generation of Saudi leaders and their efforts to strengthen Saudi Arabia's position in the world, as well as the country's move away from oil dependency, we are witnessing reforms that are sometimes disruptive and in conflict with the prevailing traditions in the conservative and textual religious culture that governs this country.

This research uses the method of stratified causal analysis to answer the question of what is the relationship between the actions of the new Saudi elites in the field of development policy and the thought of Salafi and Wahhabi Islamists. The results of this research suggest that the force of modernisation in Saudi Arabia is influenced by the will of the country's political leadership, and that Wahhabi-Salafism is fundamentally incapable of planning and pursuing the idea of development in a conventional way, and in a sense cannot be a producer of development thought from a discourse point of view. Therefore, the continuation of the modernisation policies of the ruling elites requires that the institution of religious legitimacy maintains its conservative approach and acts in the direction of approving and legitimising the decrees of the institution of power. Consequently, this issue may lead to an increase in the dissatisfaction of the protesting Wahhabis and especially the Jihadi Wahhabis, and we can expect an increase in tensions between this section of Wahhabis, the conservative Wahhabis and the royal court in the near future.