Examining the rule of consequent negation in Avicennian logic within the context of the discussion of the nature of singular conditional hypothetical propositions

In the tradition of Avicennian logic, there is a rule according to which there is a equivalence between two conditional hypothetical propositions that have the same quantity, different quality, the same antecedent, and the opposite consequent. This rule is called consequent negation. Avicennian logicians disagree about this rule. Some of these logicians have proved this rule and some have rejected these proofs. In this article, we have tried to show the disagreements about these proofs are connected with the ambiguities in the tradition of Avicennian logic about the nature of singular conditional hypothetical propositions. Some of the evidences in Avicennian logic indicate that the appropriate connective for formulating the relationship between the antecedent and the consequent in connected Singular conditional hypotheticals are inflectional, and some evidences show this relationship as conditional. In this article, we have shown that this issue has had a serious impact on the existing disputes about the consequent negation rule