نشریه جستارهایی در فلسفه و کلام
سال پنجاه و پنجم شماره 1 (پیاپی 110، بهار و تابستان 1402)

Meaning is the truth realized in one's mind and conveyed to them after perceiving the levels or the appearance of reality. The question of the meaningfulness of theological propositions and especially those related to divine attributes is one of the most important topics that forms the foundation of every religious system and, due to God's transcendence and the negation of His likeness to creation, it has been the matter of conflict between philosophers of religion and theologians. In this article, the opinion of Mu‘tazila, as one of the most rationalist movements in Islamic theology, has been explored with a descriptive-analytical method. According to them, with the criterion of correspondence of propositions with reality, knowledge of God's intent is achieved after knowledge of God's Attributes. The inspiration of guiding messages of revelation to the prophets is for the ordinary people, and therefore it is possible for them to understand God's intention and divine attributes. Mu‘tazila explained the semantics of God's Essential Attributes with different theories such as aḥwāl (states), representation of His Essence by the Divine Attributes and the negative meaning theory, none of which gives us positive knowledge. Also, they resolved the conflicts of religious texts, including narrated attributes (khabariyya) or attributes of similarity which implies the corporeality of God and His resemblance to mankind, by using esoteric interpretation, metaphor, paying attention to lexical issues and referring to rare recitations, which in some cases led to neglecting the apparent meaning of the Qur'an.

This article seeks to show the changes in issues related to knowledge based on Mullā Sadrā's three philosophical evolutions and graded approaches: the quidditative view, the ontological primacy of the existence in the graded unity framework, and the ontological primacy of the existence in the individual unity framework. The main question is, what changes have happened in the problems related to knowledge according to the three mentioned Sadrian tendencies? In this article, we have examined four such issues: "the truth of abstraction", "the way of subsistence of forms in the soul", "the unification or non-unification of the intellect with the intelligible", and "the knowledge of material beings". The result is that these issues are differently dealt with in each of the three approaches; For example, in the first approach, abstraction is in the form of "losing material accidents" in order for the perception to occur, while according to the second approach, abstraction is manifested as "the soul's journey in its existential degrees" and in the third approach, either it is not raised at all or can be discussed as "the soul's journey in its existential manifestations". The way of subsistence of forms in the soul according to the first approach is a kind of subsistence of inherence, and according to the second and third is subsistence of issuing and subsistence of manifesting respectively. The unification of the intellect with the intelligible has no place in the first Sadrian framework, but it is proved in the second approach as the unification of the knower and the known, and in the third, the unification is promoted to absolute unity. Regarding the knowledge of material entities, in the first approach, material entities do not have knowledge of themselves, nor knowledge of others, nor are they objects of knowledge; while according to the second and third frameworks and with the support of principles such as the concomitance of knowledge and existence, the predication of the "true reality" (ḥaqīqa) and the "intangible reality" (raqīqa), the fact that the divisions of existence are its very gradations, and the principle of simple truth, they both know themselves and others, and are objects of knowledge.

Imamate is a theological teaching that all the Islamic sects and denominations agree on its necessity and each of them has dealt with it considering some characteristics and aspects. From the beginning of the debate of imamate until now, in addition to the common features, Shiites have emphasized three specific features (appointment by text, infallibility and knowledge) and in this sense, they have made imamate in their belief system different from other Islamic schools, and associated their identity of Shiism with the imamate characterized by these features; Therefore, it can be seen that a significant part of the scholarly efforts of Imamiyya theologians in the discussion of Imamate has been devoted to these three characteristics in order of priority. Regardless of the researches that have mostly explained, justified and defended the mentioned teachings considering the stated order, this article, with a descriptive-analytical method, aims to a deal with the role of Imam's knowledge, its importance and underlying position compared to the other two features by presenting the proofs and pieces of evidence. Also, it will lead to more attention of theologians to the teaching of the Imam's knowledge in the system of compiling and teaching theology.

The deep connection between revelatory and philosophical propositions has been accepted by Muslim philosophers; however, there has not been much consensus regarding the adoption of revelatory propositions derived from prophetic intuition as a philosophical criterion for measuring the truth of other propositions, as well as a valid source for producing propositions and using them as premises of the philosophical argument. Considering Mullā Sadrā's attempt to use revelational statements in his transcendent system of philosophy, the present research has dealt with this important concern with an analytical-argumentative method. The results will show that not only is it possible to benefit from revelatory intuition and propositions derived from it in the process of philosophizing but also, according to some of Sadrian principles such as "the ontological primacy of existence", "restriction of knowledge of the truth of existence to intuition", "the primacy of presential knowledge in the Transcendent philosophy" and "the epistemological validity of revelatory statements as infallible intuitions", it is possible to provide a rational mechanism for the establishment of a philosophical system based on revelatory statements. The establishment of such a system of philosophy, which can be called "revelational philosophy", will bring about remarkable achievements for the Islamic intellectual tradition including diversity in methods of philosophizing, providing a new approach in the harmony of reason and revelation, expansion and diversity in philosophical issues and providing a suitable ground for the realization of a comparative philosophy of religion and the transcendent philosophy of religion.

The issue of efficiency of religion is one of the most important current theological topics. Since this concept does not require complex philosophical and scientific grounds, it can easily engage the general public, and for this reason, it has been used by atheists like Richard Dawkins. Following the pragmatic approach to religion, Dawkins has discussed the relationship between religion and morality in some chapters of the The God Delusion, but not in the usual way, rather, he tries to deny religion by denying the moral efficacy of religion. It is not that simply Dawkins declares that ethics is separate from religion and that religion can enter other fields such as issues related to belief, rather he attempts to undermine the authenticity of religion through showing its inefficiency. In denying religious ethics, Dawkins presents his argument in two ways. First, he explains human ethics from a scientific and evolutionary point of view, and in the next stage, he criticizes religious ethics, and then, by proving human ethics and negating religious ethics, he concludes the negation of religion and God with a pragmatic approach. This article examines Dawkins' pragmatic approach with descriptive-analytical method, regardless of his scientific-evolutionary arguments which have been criticized in other articles. The following results have been achieved: 1. fallacy in his pragmatic approach, 2. imperfection of the human ethics claimed by him, and 3. criticizing his perspective toward religious ethics and presenting the rational-scriptural model of religious ethics.

Ibn Sīnā believes that the divine wisdom requires every being to reach the perfection it wishes for and is worthy of, and every state of human states also requires perfection that leads them to a goal. Ibn Sīnā considers perfection, like thinking and reasoning, as one of the essential constituent features of the human existence and as the common goal of all fields of knowledge and states that, compared to the concepts of goodness and happiness, the concept of perfection is desirable for itself. He has expressed the definition of perfection in different ways: 1. while defining the intellective soul, he has explained the definition of perfection, 2. for defining philosophy, he has used the concept of perfection and maintains that the seeker of philosophy should learn philosophy to achieve perfection, and 3. he has used the concept of perfection to explain the concepts of goodness, happiness and pleasure. Through examining what perfection is and the relationship it has with the concepts of good, pleasure, and happiness, it becomes clear that the realization of good and happiness depends on the occurrence and acquisition of perfection, and it can be said that perfection has a kind of priority in terms of essence and rank over them. This article uses a kind of text-based phenomenology along with the descriptive-analytical method to deal with the collected information.

The argument from divine hiddenness has been proposed by Western theologians and philosophers as a proof against the existence of God. According to this argument, God's attributes of perfection require Him to reveal Himself to man in a mutual relationship. But since at least some people are not in such a relationship and are not able to know God in any other way, then it concludes that there is no God. Bānū Amīn refers to the concept of divine hiddenness in her works. By examining her works, it is possible to criticize the divine hiddenness argument from two aspects. Firstly, one of the clear and undeniable signs of God's existence is sending forth the messengers and their communication with God and their consensual call unto the One God, which clearly proves that the traces and signs belong to Him. Secondly, if it becomes clear what it means to know God, it will be plausible to reach to the highest extent of such knowledge, that is, where God is understood in a completely clear way. This, however, cannot be achieved only by reflection and thinking, rather, it requires faithful action.

One of the complicated topics of philosophy is how to achieve certainty. This article tries to address one of the controversial issues among philosophers, especially Allameh Tabataba'i, about how to achieve certainty in philosophical issues. According to Allameh Tabataba'i, only a posteriori argument from the concomitant can bring forth certainty in philosophy, and other types of proof lack this feature. He did not consider a priori argument able to result in certainty because it is impossible to find a cause for existence in philosophy.  Based on the principle "the effects cannot be perceived except through their causes", he argues that a priori argument, absolute (muṭlaq) a posteriori argument, and a posteriori argument of reason (dalīl) cannot bring forth certainty in philosophical issues. On the other side, some of his critics have tried to prove the validity of these arguments in philosophy by arguing through analytical causality and exclusive causality. With a descriptive-analytical method, this article argues that a priori argument can be applied to the two-sided issues of existence like unity and multiplicity.

The main concern of this research is the comparative study between philosophical ethics and monotheistic ethics with a case study of Allameh Tabatabai's views. The findings of this research– written in a library research method in collecting information and rationally analyzing and describing the data– is that the philosophical ethics is based on considering man regardless of ontological issues and of the relationship between man and the system of existence and God, and the most fundamental notion in this ethics is equilibrium. The monotheistic ethics, however, is based on the relationship of man with the system of existence and especially with God and the most crucial concept in here is absolute monotheism meaning that God's existence has such an absoluteness that it leaves no room for anything else. As a result, there is no ground for moral vices to appear, and upon reaching this degree of monotheistic knowledge, a monotheist is adorned with all moral virtues, without there being any anteriority and posteriority between the occurrence of virtues.

For a long time, the question of God's quiddity has been discussed in the words of philosophers and theologians. Most of the theologians have been positive about God's having a quiddity and most of the philosophers have opposed it. Both groups have presented several proofs for their claims, some of which are based on specific foundations. Examining these arguments shows that the interpretation and explanation of the truth of the existence and essence of the Necessary can be so decisive in this debate. Noticing the concomitants of quiddity can also help to reach a conclusion in the discussion. If we consider quiddity to be completely dependent on existence or if we consider the limitation as one of its concomitants, then we must negate quiddity from the Necessary, but if both of these are refuted, then we cannot negate quiddity from Him. In this article, the first claim is proven to be true and the second to be incomplete. The evidence supporting the necessity of quiddity for God is not sufficient, and therefore, because quiddity is essentially dependent on existence and cannot precede existence in any way, quiddity is negated from God.

Comparing the intuitions and thoughts of Muslim mystics and Suhrawardī regarding the existence of God and the Light of lights and extracting the differences and commonalities of their views provide the ground for promoting their thoughts and also the optimal use of their works. This article, with a descriptive-analytical method, tries to prove the states of inclusive unity (wāḥidiyya) and exclusive unity (aḥadiyya) in the essence of the Light of lights and argue for the ontological primacy of existence in the Illuminationist philosophy of Suhrawardī. Two questions are dealt with in this article. The first is whether, despite his lack of explication, the intuitive divine states of inclusive and exclusive unity of mystics' God can be ascribed to Suhrawardī's Light of lights, too. The second issue is whether according to Suhrawardī's implicit endorsement of the primacy of existence, the existence of Suhrawardī's God is the same as the existence of mystics' God, and according to his endorsement of the primacy of quiddity, they are not the same. The result is that Suhrawardī has implicitly accepts the mystic states of inclusive and exclusive unity of God and renders the existence of God and the Light of lights identical, not their quiddities.

Glamorizing a false behavior in the mind and vision of an individual is one of Satan's strategies to deceive and mislead us. The fundamental question is, what happens in the human cognitive system so that something ugly and unpleasant looks to them as beautiful, attractive and correct? The answer to this question should be sought in the stimulation of man's intrinsic faculties and the stimulation of his overwhelming emotions by Satan. The role of the two faculties of "estimation" and "imagination", one of which has a perceptive function and the other an acting function, is prominent. The estimation, as the king of animal powers, by conquering the creative faculty, plays the main role in glamorizing falsehood. Satan, as an external enemy, uses seven methods to deceive and seduce people, in all of which the two powers of estimation and imagination are abused. These seven methods are as follows: considering ostensible causes independent from the Real Cause, exciting emotions and feelings, stimulating desire and the sense of pleasure-seeking in human, justifying and making excuses for unworthy deeds, disrupting the cognitive system with sophistry and fallacy, taking advantage of psychological deficiencies and disorders, showing falsehood as insignificant. These techniques are also used by the external enemy in cognitive warfare. In this research, the role of the two forces of estimation and imagination in Satan's glamorization has been explored with a rational analytical method, analyzing the Quranic examples.