فصلنامه مطالعات حقوقی
سال پانزدهم شماره 4 (زمستان 1402)

The occurrence of any damage within the agricultural industry can have severe ramifications for national and food security. Addressing this insecurity necessitates international cooperation, foresight, and effective organization among countries. This article explores the potential of employing diplomatic strategies to establish response models for agricultural bioterrorism through bilateral or multilateral agreements and treaties. The central question addressed in this study is whether the Islamic Republic of Iran possesses a specific response model for addressing agricultural bioterrorism, akin to other nations. The examination reveals that Iran lacks a comprehensive risk management model within its criminal policy to prevent or mitigate agricultural bioterrorism and provide timely emergency responses. In contrast, countries like the United States, England, and Australia have recognized the significance of this threat for years, incorporating it into their national security frameworks. This descriptive study draws upon extensive document reviews, referencing numerous sources and articles. The dynamic global landscape, characterized by political, economic, and social transformations, underscores the critical importance of agriculture, which serves as a vital source of employment, self-sufficiency, and food security for nations. Consequently, one of the  most economically impactful strategies that can be employed by malicious actors is targeting a country's agricultural and food supply. Terrorism, as a subject of criminal law and policy, encompasses various forms, with bioterrorism being particularly significant, as it encompasses a wide array of potential threats. An intentional biological attack on the agricultural sector can lead to extensive consequences, giving rise to the phenomenon known as agricultural bioterrorism or agroterrorism. Agricultural bioterrorism involves the deliberate release of pathogenic agents affecting animals or plants with the intent to instill fear, inflict economic damage, and disrupt a nation's stability. The discussion surrounding agricultural bioterrorism is multifaceted and fundamental, posing risks to agricultural products, livestock populations, and human health. Furthermore, it poses a threat to ecosystems and can facilitate the introduction of pests through contaminated seeds, infected livestock, novel fertilizers altering soil structure, tainted meat imports, and biodiversity concerns. In the context of threats to the agricultural industry, the emergence of "bio-agricultural warfare" or "bio-terrorism" as a contemporary phenomenon is not inconceivable.The threats associated with agricultural bioterrorism primarily stem from three factors: a lack of awareness among citizens and agriculture professionals, weak legal frameworks, and inadequate infrastructure to combat agricultural bioterrorism. In recent decades, these threats have undergone significant and complex developments on both domestic and international fronts due to factors such as the ease of transferring and storing biological agents, their ability to reproduce, the difficulty of attributing attacks to specific perpetrators, and the involvement of organized criminal groups. The economic and national security repercussions of an agricultural bioterrorism attack far surpass those of a conventional war, making it a pressing concern in the contemporary global landscape. The globalization of terrorism has allowed perpetrators to operate across international borders without restraint, making no region, government, or nation immune to their actions. Consequently, addressing the multifaceted challenges and threats posed by agricultural bioterrorism demands international cooperation among governments and international organizations.Models serve as valuable tools for navigating the complexity of the criminal process, similar to how natural science models offer coherent plans for experimentation. Within the criminal justice context, models simplify details while highlighting common themes and trends. A comprehensive criminal justice system can incorporate multiple models rather than adhering to a single, isolated model. In light of the interconnectedness of legal systems, it is imperative for contemporary legal systems to draw from the successes of others. Therefore, embracing various models and adopting an optimal criminal policy, in collaboration between government and social systems, offers a promising avenue for preventing and mitigating threats associated with agricultural bioterrorism, both domestically and internationally. This study underscores the importance of localized international regulations, swift and accurate methods for identifying dangerous biological agents, education initiatives, and the enactment of necessary legislation to address agricultural bioterrorism effectively.

The evolution of natural law within jurisprudence has profoundly shaped legal philosophies throughout history. Its foundations intertwine theology, religious ethics, and the belief in fixed, eternal laws governing the world's nature, rooted in divine order. The origins of natural rights can be traced back to the Stoics, whose philosophy emphasized the intrinsic relationship between nature, reason, and law.Early proponents of natural law, influential until the 18th century, contested the credibility of man-made laws, advocating for objective limitations on sovereign lawmaking. They asserted that man-made laws ought to align with natural law, grounded in reason. However, societal progression prompted a shift, acknowledging the necessity of man-made laws.In the modern era, the rise of positivism and the belief in the separation of law and ethics posed challenges to traditional natural law theory. Some thinkers contended that despite these changes, natural law could still address modern ethical needs by modifying classical perspectives.John Stuart Mill's "On Liberty" in 1859 introduced the Harm principle, challenging the government's role in morality enforcement. Subsequently, James Fitzjames Stephen opposed this notion in "Liberty, Equality and Fraternity" in 1873. The 20th-centur y "Wolfenden Committee" report to the British House of Representatives triggered debates such as the "Hart and Devlin" debate, centering on the principle of harm, becoming pivotal in Anglo-American legal philosophy and across legal systems globally.This article aims to assess the relationship between law and morality within the context of natural law jurisprudence. It contends that while classical natural law comprehension may be inadequate, a rational understanding of legal ethics can withstand positivist criticisms. Moreover, it argues that modern natural law, despite its theoretical advancements, faces practical challenges. Notably, references will be drawn from prominent natural law thinkers such as LON Fuller, Mark Murphy, John Finnis, and Robert George.An essential conclusion drawn from these evaluations is the centrality of reason in moral legislation. While classical natural law emphasized the superiority of morality over law, modern natural law theories focus on the formal conditions of legal morality, relying on formal, rational, and verifiable criteria.The transformation also extends to the approach toward law and ethics, altering the concept of duty towards unjust norms and leading to changing standards of legal morality. Furthermore, the origins of legal validity have shifted from moral principles rooted in broader maxims to the predominance of reason and rationality in legitimizing political and legal orders.

The maritime transportation industry has undergone significant transformations with the widespread adoption of tanker charter party contracts, especially in the bulk transportation of oil and petroleum products. These contracts serve as vital instruments governing the intricate relationship between ship owners and Charterers, aiming to safeguard the interests of all parties involved. Although standardized forms are available, parties retain the flexibility to define specific terms and conditions. In practice, prefabricated standard contracts are often preferred due to their efficiency and familiarity within the industry.In recent decades, the landscape of maritime transportation has been reshaped by economic and commercial sanctions. The fear of inadvertently violating sanctions laws has compelled parties to incorporate meticulous terms and clauses into their contracts. These terms serve as a shield, enabling parties to mitigate and manage risks associated with economic sanctions effectively. A focal point within these contracts is the inclusion of sanctions clauses, widely recognized standards established by reputable institutions such as BIMCO and Intertanko. These clauses encompass a spectrum of provisions, including explicit definitions of key concepts, assurances against sanctions imposition, guidelines for handling sanctions-related issues, protocols for refusing voyage orders that may contravene sanctions, procedures for contract termination, and avenues for claiming damages. Notably, it is mandatory to include sanctions clauses in sub-charters and issued bills of lading.However, a critical inquiry arises: do these standardized sanctions clauses truly serve as robust risk management mechanisms for economic sanctions? Upon meticulous examination, it becomes apparent that these clauses are not without their limitations. Ambiguities within the language and criteria employed in these clauses create room for varied interpretations during judicial proceedings. The broad terminology and ambiguous phrasing often lean in favor of ship owners, leaving other involved parties at a disadvantage.This article delves into a comprehensive evaluation of the sanctions clauses established by esteemed international institutions such as BIMCO and Intertanko, as well as major oil corporations like BP and Shell. These clauses, subject to regular updates, are subjected to meticulous scrutiny, highlighting both their strengths and inherent weaknesses. Through this analysis, the article aims to provide a nuanced understanding, considering the viewpoints of legal scholars and interpretations derived from judicial decisions.In conclusion, the incorporation of sanctions clauses into oil tanker charter party contracts has become an industry standard, reflecting the necessity to navigate the complex waters of economic sanctions. However, the key lies in meticulous drafting. Precise definitions, avoidance of ambiguous language, and transparent criteria are essential to establish fairness and equity between ship owners and charterers. Despite being developed by esteemed international institutions and major corporations, these standard clauses are not binding and can be modified by the involved parties. Hence, it is imperative that these clauses are tailored to strike a balance, aligning with the interests of all parties involved and adopting an optimal approach to risk management, especially for countries like ours, continually exposed to foreign sanctions. This article serves as a valuable resource for economic stakeholders, offering insights to aid in the formulation of effective sanctions clauses.

The examination of Iranians' writings on tort law reveals that a significant number of jurists adhere to the maxim known as "the principle of compensating all damages." This principle holds that if the other two requirements of liability, namely causation and harmful act, are satisfied, all damages, regardless of their nature, should be compensated without the need for a specific law explicitly prescribing such compensation. In essence, unless there is a law expressly prohibiting compensation, any damage ought to be duly compensated. The authors of this essay embark on an examination of the rule that mandates the payment of compensation for all damages and its connection to the pluralistic philosophical foundations of tort law. In pursuing this objective, it is crucial to establish that tort law encompasses more than merely compensating damages. By employing a more comprehensive definition, tort law can be understood as a legal discipline that bears the responsibility of responding to the phenomenon of loss. This response,  however, does not always manifest as an obligation to provide monetary compensation for the harm suffered. In the subsequent section of the article, we delve into the various interpretations of the principle of compensating all damages within Iranian legal doctrines. Through extensive research and analysis of relevant legal literature, we identify at least two distinct interpretations: the maximal and minimal interpretations. The maximal interpretation posits that the mere occurrence of a loss is sufficient for the legal system to demand compensation. Even in cases where the causes of the loss are unknown or the tortfeasor is bankrupt, the government is deemed responsible for compensating the damage. In this interpretation, responsibility is not contingent upon fault, thereby implying that individuals may be required to compensate for damages even if they have not committed any wrongdoing. On the other hand, the minimal interpretation maintains the principle of compensating all damages while incorporating fault as the criterion for establishing responsibility. However, we shed light on the unsolvable paradoxes that arise from this interpretation. One such paradox emerges from the fact that while the goal is to compensate all damages, responsibility remains dependent on fault, adhering to the general principle of tort law: no fault, no compensation. Consequently, in situations where no explicit statute mandates compensation, damages would go uncompensated, contradicting the aim purported by this interpretation. Despite the disparities between the maximal and minimal interpretations, the underlying essence of the principle can be summarized as follows: "the principle of compensating all damages when no express law exists." Although the phrase "when no express law exists" is not explicitly stated within the principle, it can be inferred from the explanations provided by proponents of this principle and the situations in which they apply it. In order to substantiate this interpretation of the principle, it becomes necessary to delve into the philosophical foundations of tort law. For the sake of brevity, we refer to this interpretation as a "foundational concept." This concept asserts that in the absence of specific legislation, an assumption must be made, calling for compensation for any type of damages. However, despite the absence of an express law endorsing such a broadly applicable theory within our legal system, some highly respected experts subscribe to this notion. Nevertheless, case law remains uncertain regarding how to respond to this principle, underscoring the ongoing debate and lack of consensus. Contrary to this prevailing belief, our exploration of the philosophical (both monistic and pluralistic theories) and juridical foundations of tort law reveals that no theory unequivocally supports the idea of compensating all kinds of damages in all circumstances while remaining impervious to strong criticism. The findings of this study unequivocally demonstrate that the belief in such a principle—compensating all damages—is not tenable either practically or theoretically. It is unfeasible in reality, as it hampers the efficacy of tort law in organizing and regulating various social activities, and it lacks theoretical justification. Therefore, in this article, we propose that jurists and courts should refrain from invoking this principle. Instead, we advocate for a flexible, binary, and pluralistic tort system that takes into account factors such as the scale of activity, economic power, or income of the actors involved. This proposed system would enhance fairness and tailor the compensation process to specific circumstances, striking a balance between societal needs and individual responsibility. In forthcoming articles, we intend to present a detailed outline and mechanism for implementing such a system, underscoring the need for a paradigm shift in the approach to compensating damages within the realm of tort law.

In the realm of financial transactions, the customary exchange of money serves as the foundation, aiming to satisfy the needs and requirements of each party involved. In this context, the mastery of rights by both buyers and sellers becomes imperative. However, situations may arise where, before the property is handed over to the buyer, it is destroyed due to unforeseeable events beyond the seller's control. In such cases, the transaction deviates from the parties' intentions and customary practices. If, during this transaction, the seller has already received payment, Article 387 of the Civil Code mandates the return of the funds to the buyer. This reimbursement is contingent on the non-transfer of the property that was originally part of the sale. Moreover, the goods being traded might possess inherent interests separate from the primary property, complicating the status of these additional interests. Article 387 of the Civil Code only addresses the seller's obligation to refund the transaction funds to the buyer, revolving around the concept of the "destruction of the object of sale before delivery." Nevertheless, this legal provision does not explicitly delineate the consequences of such annulment. As a result, a degree of ambiguity emerges when dealing with this scenario. Jurists, recognizing this gap in the law, have delved into this issue, seeking clarity and resolution. This matter has spurred extensive debates in both Imamiyyah and Sunni jurisprudence, leading to varying interpretations. Some scholars, in their attempt to explain the effects of annulment, have created an alternative rule known as "advantages and interests of an object follows the risk." This rule aims to mitigate the ambiguity surrounding the annulment of pledge agreements. Additionally, some scholars have posited that property ownership temporarily reverts to the seller, highlighting that during this brief period, the seller is obligated to refund the transaction amount. However, all these perspectives converge on the idea that the property ultimately belongs to the buyer, with the benefits and interests inextricably tied to the buyer's claim. This viewpoint contradicts the Shariah rule of "advantages and interests of an object follows the risk," a principle upheld by the Prophet of Islam, which places the responsibility for benefits and interests on both the buyer and the seller. It is important to note that the rule of "advantages and interests of an object follows the risk" is divinely ordained, whereas the rule of the "destruction of the object of sale before delivery" stems from scholarly interpretation. This stark contrast highlights a fundamental conflict in unassigned law: the ownership status of benefits. The preference for the sharia rule of "advantages and interests of an object follows the risk" over the rule of "destruction of the object of sale before delivery" dictates that the benefits continue to belong to the seller, aligned with the remaining property's ownership status. Furthermore, the acceptance of the rule of "advantages and interests of an object follows the risk" in relation to "commandite" has been acknowledged in civil law through extensive jurisprudential studies. Consequently, it has been established that adhering to the benefits guaranteed to each party in a properly executed agreement, where both parties maintain control over the property involved, is considered legally valid and representative. In conclusion, this research underscores the necessity of upholding the benefits guaranteed by the law, as clarified in articles 387 and 558 of the Civil Code. It establishes that the determination of benefits for each party in a contract hinges on the guarantee bestowed upon them, as defined by the explicit language of the law and jurisprudence. This theory posits that one benefits from the guarantee and bears the responsibility for any loss incurred in connection with the property. This novel theory, developed through extensive analysis of the Civil Code's articles, provides a unique perspective that has not been explored in previous legal studies.

The realm of insurance is intricately intertwined with the protection of societal interests, particularly evident in the context of traffic accidents. Recognizing the significance of this intersection, legislators have transformed insurance contracts from mere agreements into legal-contractual frameworks. The Compulsory Insurance Law of 2016 introduced numerous provisions and judgments that defy easy justification solely based on the principles of free will. Among these provisions is Article 19, which stipulates that "Any negligence or fault of the insurer or their representative in issuing the insurance policy does not remove the liability of the insurer." This article explores the unique civil responsibility imposed upon insurers when they fail to issue a valid insurance policy, transcending conventional contractual boundaries. Beyond its apparent simplicity, this research delves into the foundational aspects of insurer liability arising from negligence or fault in issuing insurance policies and assesses the extent of such liability when breaches occur. A review of existing literature reveals that Article 19 of the Compulsory Insurance Law (2016) has not received significant attention in legal debates. Researchers have not provided a clear definition of the implications of insurer errors in policy issuance or the underlying basis and scope of insurer responsibility. This lack of comprehensive analysis is partly attributed to the article's apparent straightforwardness, which conceals the complexity of the assumptions it entails. Consequently, this study addresses these gaps by examining various assumptions surrounding insurer behavior. This research aims to answer critical questions concerning insurer liability in cases of non-issuance of insurance policies, including whether punitive measures can be imposed on negligent insurers in addition to compensation. It also delves into the choice between pursuing compensation for insured losses under legal or contractual obligations of the insurer. Preliminary findings suggest that insurer responsibility, in cases of non-issuance or violations in policy issuance, extends beyond mere compensation and may include punitive measures against the insurer found at fault. Moreover, the compensation for damages resulting from negligence or fault in issuing insurance policies can be argued within both contractual and legal frameworks, depending on the specific circumstances. This study primarily aims to identify the behaviors leading to insurer liability as outlined in Article 19 of the Compulsory Insurance Law (2016) and analyze the rationale behind this liability in accordance with the legislative intent. It further evaluates the nature and extent of responsibility envisaged by the legislator, drawing insights from Article 19. The research findings underscore that Article 19 of the Compulsory Insurance Law (2016) represents a novel approach aimed at safeguarding policyholders acting in good faith. This provision not only obligates insurers to provide the requested insurance coverage but also distinguishes between third-party and driver insurance policies in assigning liability to erring insurers. Importantly, the scope of default liability under this article extends beyond mere compensation to encompass disciplinary consequences for insurers. While the phrase "does not remove the liability of the insurer" may appear simplistic, the study reveals the nuanced nature of insurer liability. In instances where an oral agreement between the insurer and the insured remains confined to preliminary negotiations without forming a binding contract, the insurer's civil liability is restricted to damages incurred during these negotiations. Conversely, when a contract is established with flawed elements, legal obligations can be imposed on the insurer, with legal remedies available to address any shortcomings in the agreement. Negligence in incorporating the legal privileges of the insured and injured parties within the insurance policy can trigger legislative consequences, filling voids in contractual conditions with the insurer's responsibility to compensate injured parties according to the minimum requirements of the compulsory insurance law.

In recent decades, Muslim thinkers have grappled with the crises facing the Islamic world, especially in Arab countries such as Egypt, Libya, Yemen, and Syria. The persistent conflicts and the contradiction between the rights of Muslims and non-Muslims have led to the realization among Muslim intellectuals that political and legal structures need reformation. These structures, often incompatible with modern Western legal norms and democratic ideals, have posed significant challenges to the concept of "citizenship," a cornerstone of democratic societies. In response to these challenges, neo-Mutazilites, including thinkers like Nasr Hamed Abu Zaid, Mohammed Abed al-Jabri, and Hassan Hanafi, have utilized modern methodologies such as linguistic analysis and philosophical hermeneutics to re-examine Quranic texts.This research focuses on Nasr Hamed Abu Zaid's perspective on citizenship rights, exploring how he proposed a theory of citizenship in Islamic societies by employing modern human sciences methodologies like linguistics and hermeneutics. Abu Zaid argues that citizenship rights are rooted in humanism, emphasizing that the concept of citizenship has not been fully realized in most Islamic societies due to the lack of freedom of opinion and expression. He asserts that to establish citizenship rights, fundamental components of human rights such as freedom must be acknowledged. Abu Zaid aligns his views with the first article of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, emphasizing the inherent freedom and equality of all human beings. In his perspective, every individual possesses the power of reason, granting them the right to participate as active citizens.Abu Zaid challenges traditional notions of identity in Islamic societies, asserting that identity is often solely related to religion, neglecting other aspects. He connects this discussion to the concept of pluralism, highlighting the need for a broader understanding of identity in the discourse of citizenship. Additionally, Abu Zaid employs hermeneutics to contextualize the Quranic texts within historical and cultural frameworks. He argues that religious texts, including the Quran, are influenced by their cultural and historical contexts, requiring linguistic analysis to interpret them in accordance with contemporary conditions.Critics have questioned Abu Zaid's approach, particularly concerning the definition of "text" and the use of modern humanities methods to interpret divine matters. Despite these criticisms, Abu Zaid's vision aligns with Western thinkers like John Locke and Jean-Jacques Rousseau, emphasizing that rulers cannot arbitrate all religious matters for citizens. He advocates for freedom of opinion as the foundational principle for achieving citizenship, believing that human rationality should guide the roadmap for the post-prophetic era. Abu Zaid's unique interpretation of Sharia focuses on creating a citizenship custom where religious morals replace mere legalities, emphasizing the symbiotic relationship between the rule of law and citizenship.

The concept of the last clear chance doctrine, rooted in common law, originally emerged as a refinement of the joint fault theory. Its objective was to adapt and modify the joint fault theory within the context of causation relationships based on proximate cause. This modification involved distinguishing between real causes and non-real causes, identifying the effective cause based on a standard, and isolating the legal causes from the real ones through the application of the proximate cause rule. This, in turn, paved the way for identifying the responsible cause by employing either the principle of common fault or the principle of last clear chance to prevent loss. The last clear chance doctrine comes into play when an individual creates a perilous situation, both legally and causally, but finds themselves unable to extricate themselves from the resulting danger or remains oblivious to it. In such circumstances, another person, who possesses knowledge of the impending danger along with the capability to avert it, seizes the opportunity  to prevent the loss. Failure to utilize this chance to prevent harm results in the imposition of full compensation respo nsibility upon this second individual. The emergence of the low-cost theory in the latter half of the 20th century significantly influenced the last clear chance doctrine. This economic approach emphasized that, among the factors contributing to accidents and losses, if both the victim and the party responsible for the loss can prevent such losses through precautionary measures, the entity that could have averted the loss at the lowest cost, but failed to do so, would assume the liability for damages or compensation. This economic perspective added a fresh dimension to the doctrine, aligning it with principles of economic deterrence. Within the jurisprudential framework, when victim and wrongdoer errors are characterized by a shared cause and agency (regardless of whether the victim is the agent or the cause), applying either the proximate cause rule or the last clear chance rule yields comparable outcomes. If the agent incurs loss, the rule of action grants them the last opportunity to prevent that loss, which they fail to exploit. Conversely, if the agent is the cause, they are held accountable due to their possession of the last chance to avert the loss in temporal terms. However, complications arise when the errors of the victim and the wrongdoer assume an indirect cause relationship without agency (managerial responsibility). The application of the first cause rule diverges from the last clear chance rule in jurisprudence. In numerous instances, the last opportunity to prevent loss is held by the delayed cause rather than the primary cause. In situations where victim and wrongdoer are simultaneously affected in a steward-like capacity, without temporal priority or delay, identifying the last clear chance is unfeasible. In such scenarios, the rule of joint fault dictates that both parties share equal compensation responsibility due to their simultaneous contributory roles in the accident. However, the determination of the degree of each party's fault impact in causing the accident and damages remains unexplored within the jurisprudential system, leaving room for further contemplation. In Iranian law, analogous to the jurisprudential system, the application of the last clear chance rule serves as the final sieve through which real and legal causes sift to identify the responsible cause. The stewardship of the victim in circumstances allowing loss avoidance, despite the existence of a real cause and legal cause, absolves the responsible cause. The rationale is that attributing loss to the responsible party necessitates assigning some or all of the loss to an entity other than the victim. The victim, having had the final opportunity to prevent the loss and having chosen not to, bears the loss personally. Notably, a discrepancy between the theory of the first cause and the last clear chance doctrine arises within the community of indirect causes, wherein the former theory imposes responsibility on the second cause despite awareness of the influence of the first cause and the potential for avoidance. Article 536 of the Islamic Civil Code underscores the legislator's inclination toward a delayed cause perspective and a deviation from the antecedent cause theory, in favor of the last clear chance criterion for loss avoidance.

In the realm of civil procedures, the right to bring a lawsuit traditionally hinges upon the claim of the injured party seeking compensation for harm caused by the actions of the defendant. According to this conventional perspective, the initiation of a lawsuit by a third party, without the consent of the injured party, has been deemed inconceivable and lacking legal rationale. This article challenges the fundamentals of this prevailing approach, demonstrating that in specific cases where the beneficiary faces difficulties or is unwilling to engage in legal proceedings, the involvement of a third party as the instigator of the claim can be legally justifiable and desirable. This alternative perspective calls for a reevaluation of existing laws and regulations regarding third-party claims, ultimately enhancing the societal function of liability law and facilitating access to legal procedures for resolving disputes. In addition to addressing the issues and ambiguities associated with this approach, the article also explores potential challenges and solutions for resolving them. In some legal systems, formalizing third-party claims can enhance the effectiveness of the legal framework, better protect citizens, and establish behavioral norms within society. When determining the responsible party in civil liability claims, legal rules have undergone significant changes, resulting in multiple criteria and interpretations for assessing the scope of an individual's responsibility for  harmful actions. Today, causation is not solely based on identifying the closest cause, and individuals may consider themselves defendants if they can demonstrate a more reasonable position in preventing harm. Furthermore, the pursuit of damages against individuals with financial advantages or superior risk management capabilities has been defended. Conversely, the criteria for identifying the plaintiff have been less contentious. Despite minimal legal debate regarding the concept of loss and its sustainable forms, civil procedures universally emphasize the requirement of the injured party to initiate a claim. The only accepted basis for determining the plaintiff is that the individual suffered harm due to the defendant's injurious act. The intersection of civil procedures and civil liability is where third-party lawsuits for compensation come into play. Traditionally, the purpose of civil procedures has been to facilitate the compensation of damages through the law of liability, with the injured party serving as the initiator of the legal process and claimant for compensation. Consequently, the initiation of a claim for compensation by a third party has lacked legal rationale and practical viability. However, a reinterpretation of the essentials acknowledges the victim's desire to file a lawsuit. This approach revitalizes the societal role of law and recognizes that, beyond individual-centered aspects of proceedings, third parties may bring claims if the failure of the injured party to do so disrupts social order. Such an approach can deter reckless behavior and the violation of societal norms. While the criterion for identifying the claimant remains fundamental in litigation, it acquires a broader interpretation. Claimant status is extended to any individual who, by informing the legal framework about the occurrence of harm, requests legal proceedings and the sanctioning of the injuring party. Implementing this approach, which offers numerous advantages, necessitates legislative amendments to regulate its use. Based on the arguments presented, it is recommended that legal reforms clarify that the primary rule for seeking compensation is for the injured party to initiate the action. However, if a third party initiates the action, and after verifying the accuracy of the information provided, the court hears the claim by notifying the injured party. Upon confirming the claim's validity, a portion of the compensation will be awarded to the third party. If the victim declines to accept the remainder, it can be allocated to a fund aimed at reducing similar losses in the future. This article explores the possibility of third-party claims for damages as an exceptional and conditional approach with legal advantages. Key questions addressed in this article include the justification of third-party lawsuits based on general principles and rules, their advantages and disadvantages, their validity within Iran's legal system, and potential solutions for harnessing their benefits while mitigating their drawbacks.

Articles 660 and 661 of the Iranian Civil Code, borrowed from the French Civil Code, provide insights into agency matters, particularly focusing on the nature of general agency and acts of administration. However, these articles, directly transposed into the Iranian Civil Code from their French counterparts in 1987 and 1988, haven't been extensively explored in legal discourse. The prevailing opinion either dismisses their relevance or doesn't delve into their nuances, undermining their potential significance within civil law. Yet, general agency offers advantages, especially for individuals residing abroad or those unable to manage their affairs due to extended illness, leading to legal ambiguities and inefficiencies due to lack of comprehensive research. Central questions arise regarding the nature and extent of authority delineated in Article 661. Clarification is sought on the scope of property administration, the adminator's authority, and the distinctions between general agency, acts of administration, and special agency. Furthermore, similarities and disparities concerning the termination and revocation of general versus special agency warrant examination. Articles 660 and 661 might not encapsulate the full jurisprudential concept of agency intended by the Iranian Civil Law authors. While aligned in terms of authority limitations with jurisprudential general agency, their effects differ. Jurisprudentially, the agent becomes a substitute for the princi pal in general agency, bound to the principal's interests, unlike the property administration effect in Article 661. This article clarifies that Article 661 doesn't correspond to unconditional agency in jurisprudence, limiting representation to specific, unconstrained conditions and time frames. General agency, entailing "acts of administration," indicates authority within defined parameters. Actions by the adminator must maintain property reasonably, adhering to prudent practices to preserve the property's usual use per the principal's request. The adminator under general agency can execute contracts, collect receivables, and make risk-free investments, safeguarding the owner's funds, but cannot sell or mortgage immovable property without explicit permission. Moreover, providing accounts of management, delivering gains to the owner, completing undertaken acts, and compensating losses due to mismanagement are incumbent on the adminator. Unlike special agency, general agency can be terminated but isn't revoked by the owner's death or incapacity, as it primarily revolves around property administration and continues unless the heir assumes management responsibilities.

In the global landscape of commerce, trademarks and trade names stand as pivotal identifiers, distinguishing products, services, and their origins. This study immerses itself in the intricate web of conflicts stemming from trademark and trade name rights, shedding light on the nuanced judicial procedures that underpin these disputes. Trademarks, tangible or invisible symbols, serve as commercial identity markers employed by entities across borders. Simultaneously, trade names, representing individuals or legal entities, introduce them to the societal framework. The convergence of these identifiers, often within similar or identical fields of operation, gives rise to complex conflicts, prompting a profound exploration into their origins, interpretations, and resolutions.Understanding the Foundation: Trademarks and Trade NamesTrademarks and trade names, although seemingly distinct, share an underlying purpose – establishing identity. Trademarks, visible or otherwise, serve to distinguish goods and services, acting as symbols of quality, reliability, and origin. In contrast, trade names introduce the individuals or entities behind the products, forging a personal connection with the consumer base. The crux of the issue lies in discerning the intent behind their usage: is the purpose to differentiate goods and services or to familiarize consumers with entrepreneurs and econom  ic entities?The Intricacies of Conflict FormationAt the heart of the matter lies the genesis of conflict. When trademarks and trade names intersect due to overlapping activities, discerning the cause becomes pivotal. Why do these conflicts emerge, and how are they perpetuated? Judicial analyses and consumer perceptions play a central role in deciphering the nature of trademarks and brand names, offering insights into conflict resolution mechanisms. Consumer Perspective: A Key to Conflict ResolutionIn the realm of trademarks and trade names, consumer perception is paramount. How do consumers differentiate between trademarks and trade names? Judges and experts must adopt a consumer-centric viewpoint to unravel the complexities. Analyzing consumer behavior forms the bedrock of conflict resolution strategies. When consumers encounter identical or similar marks and trade names, what factors influence their decision-making processes? Age, gender, and expertise serve as lenses through which consumers perceive these identifiers, adding layers of complexity to the analysis. Judicial Challenges and InterpretationsJudicial interpretations shape the trajectory of conflicts. Examining past cases, this study delves into the nuances of judicial decisions, shedding light on the factors influencing outcomes. Addressing challenges faced by business owners, who invest years of effort and capital into their trade names, becomes imperative. This research scrutinizes at least twenty judicial decisions and incorporates expert opinions from three ongoing cases, offering a comprehensive understanding of the legal landscape. Resolving Conflict: A Multifaceted ApproachResolving conflicts arising from trademarks and trade names demands a multifaceted strategy. Registration office procedures and court interpretations form the foundation of conflict origins. However, the crux lies in comprehending the issue from a consumer's perspective, transcending expert and judicial analyses. Distinguishing trade names from trademarks emerges as a pivotal task, demanding a nuanced understanding of the essential differences. While canceling trademarks or mandating non-use of trade names are potential solutions, simultaneous usage can be considered, especially in cases where distinct geographical regions ensure consumer differentiation. Conclusion and Future ImplicationsIn conclusion, this comprehensive analysis illuminates the intricate dynamics of trademark and trade name conflicts. By delving into consumer perceptions, judicial interpretations, and the underlying intent behind these identifiers, this study paves the way for nuanced conflict resolution strategies. Acknowledging the multifaceted nature of these conflicts and embracing a consumer-centric approach remain fundamental in navigating the complex terrain of trademarks and trade names.

Contracts and agreements have historically underpinned myriad transactions, shaping human interactions on diverse issues. The intricate relationship between contracts and the conditions they entail has been a focal point for legal scholars and practitioners throughout history. This study delves into the nuanced dichotomy of convergent and divergent perspectives, providing a profound exploration of the fundamental connection between contracts and their accompanying conditions. In the convergent paradigm, conditions are intrinsically interwoven within the fabric of contracts, constituting their vital components. In this view, the condition assumes a primary role, and any deviation, violation, or non-observance can severely weaken or even invalidate the contract. Conversely, divergent viewpoints present conditions as entities parallel yet intricately connected to contracts. Here, conditions are viewed as secondary, existing as distinct yet symbiotic elements. This perspective posits that contracts and conditions are two interrelated yet separate compromises, each integral to the other. This discourse extends into civil law, where prevailing views underscore the divergence between the contract and its conditions. According to Article 233, the nullity of a condition does not necessarily  impede the validity of the entire contract, unless it damages the contract's fundamental elements. This study critically examines existing views, identifying their inherent flaws and limitations. Through rigorous data analysis and logical reasoning, it becomes evident that both divergent and convergent perspectives fall short in providing adequate justifications for the comprehensive connection between various conditions and contracts. Sovereignty of will, often cited as the defining criterion for justifying the independence of conditions from contracts, proves insufficient. This inadequacy becomes apparent when considering stipulated conditions and their substantive relationships with the original contract. Additionally, examples of independent conditions extend beyond the confines of existing classifications, encompassing a wide array of valid conditions, including those that pass under specific circumstances. To address these complexities, this research endeavors to establish a contemporary and nuanced criterion for distinguishing the relationship between contracts and conditions. It delves into the core question: Is the relationship between conditions and contracts entirely subordinate and dependent, or can scenarios be imagined where conditions exist independently, even in cases of contract nullity? The study navigates the intricacies of dependent and independent conditions, drawing comparisons with established jurisprudential references. Recognizing independence based solely on a condition's ability to survive without a contract proves inadequate. The study delves deep into the exact meanings of converging and diverging contracts and conditions, exploring their scopes, effects, and underlying beliefs. In conclusion, the research posits that the substantive degree of connection between conditions desired by parties and the fundamental elements of a contract serves as the pivotal criterion. Independent conditions, possessing inherent binding identities, maintain their validity even in the event of nullified contracts, exemplifying their indispensable role in governing various contractual facets. Dependent conditions, on the other hand, find their purpose within the broader contractual framework, tethered to the exchange's quantity, quality, or specific transactional aspects. This dichotomy elucidates the diverse landscape of contractual relationships, underscoring the need for a nuanced understanding of conditions within the framework of contracts.

Breach of contract, a fundamental concept in legal systems worldwide, leads to the obligor's contractual liability. This liability obliges them to compensate the obligee for losses incurred due to the breach. Whether the breach is intentional or unintentional, it raises complex questions about the extent of the obligor's responsibility and the compensatory measures available to the injured party. This research delves into the intricate nuances of intentional breach of contract, exploring the relationship between intentional breach, foreseeability of damages, and the intensification of contractual liability. In legal systems globally, the principle of full compensation prevails, emphasizing the obligor's obligation to compensate all losses caused by the breach. However, exceptions exist, such as the non-claimability of damages that were not reasonably foreseeable at the time of contract formation. This exception raises questions about the compensatory rights of the injured party and the moral and ethical implications of intentional wrongdoing. Intentional breach of contract represents the most severe form of breach, occurring when the obligor refrains from fulfilling the contract with the intention of gaining undue benefits, avoiding losses, or causing harm to the obligee. This deliberate action raises profound legal and ethical questions. Does the intentional nature of the breach warrant an intensified response in terms of contractual liability and compensatory measures? The hypothesis of this research asserts that intentional breach signifies bad faith, justifying a heightened response. Ethically, intentional wrongdoing deserves a more significant degree of accountability compared to unintentional actions. This moral principle aligns with established legal doctrines, custom, reason, and the wisdom of jurisprudence. When a person intentionally commits an abnormal act, their actions should be treated differently from those of an unintentional person. In the context of contractual liability, this differentiation translates into an intensified liability for intentional breaches. To validate this proposition, the research employs a descriptive-analytical approach coupled with a comparative study of legal systems, including French law, international legal documents (PECL, DCFR, and CESL), Iranian law, and jurisprudential foundations. By meticulously examining these legal frameworks, the research investigates whether intentional breach of contract justifies claiming unforeseeable damages, a right typically restricted in cases of unintentional breaches. The findings of the research demonstrate that intentional breach of contract results in an escalation of the obligor's contractual liability. In situations of intentional breach, the injured party can claim unforeseeable damages that would otherwise be unclaimable in cases of normal, unintentional breaches. This legal possibility is unequivocally recognized in various legal systems, including Article 1231-3 of the New French Civil Code, Article III.3:703 DCFR, and Article 9:503 PECL. While the principle of foreseeability of damages generally serves as an exception to the principle of full compensation, intentional breach of contract transcends this limitation. Consequently, the injured party in cases of intentional breach is entitled to claim unforeseeable damages, thus reviving the principle of full compensation. Furthermore, the ability to claim unforeseeable damages in cases of intentional breach underscores the multifaceted nature of contractual liability. Beyond its primary function of compensating damages arising from breach of contract, contractual liability assumes secondary roles, such as punishment and deterrence. It serves as a form of private punishment, discouraging intentional misconduct and promoting ethical behavior in contractual relationships. In the realm of Iranian law and Imamyah jurisprudence, while there may be no explicit and universal rule permitting additional damages for intentional breach, specific legal and jurisprudential branches exist where intentional misconduct heightens liability. By adopting the criteria of these branches, it becomes evident that intensifying liability for intentional breaches harmonizes with jurisprudence and legal foundations, thereby ensuring a just and equitable legal response to intentional wrongdoing. In conclusion, the research establishes a compelling argument for the intensification of contractual liability in cases of intentional breach of contract. By recognizing the distinctive nature of intentional breaches and the moral principles that underpin legal doctrines, legal systems can uphold justice, accountability, and fairness in contractual relationships. The ability to claim unforeseeable damages in cases of intentional breach not only ensures full compensation for the injured party but also serves as a powerful deterrent against intentional misconduct, reinforcing the integrity of contractual agreements and promoting ethical conduct in the realm of commerce and law.