زهرا خزاعی

By accepting the role of human will in accepting and forming, maintaining, and using belief-forming procedures, John Heil emphasizes the responsibility of man towards beliefs. Despite Heil's defense of indirect doxastic voluntarism, he follows a graded process from the directness of the will's role in the procedure of forming and maintaining belief to the indirect influence of accepting and forming belief. In the formation of beliefs, Heil does not accept the direct will to believe, which is based on the famous idea of Cartesian. However, by distinguishing between direct doxastic voluntarism and indirect doxastic voluntarism, explaining the concept of basic and non-basic acts, and expressing procedures and techniques such as behavioral change, he tries to interpret the acceptance and formation of beliefs under the voluntary but indirect control of people. In this research, by using the analytical-critical method, we aim to show that by modifying Heil's view, accepting epistemic responsibility based on the view of indirect doxastic voluntarism is meaningful.

Jesse Prinz is known as one of the serious defenders of moral sentimentalism. Usually, sentimentalists give little role to moral reasoning in the process of producing moral judgment. But Prinz, unlike others, believes that moral reasoning and emotions both play a role in morality.In this article, after examining Prinz's view on the nature of reasoning, by examining his answers to the following questions, his view on the nature of moral reasoning is extracted:What is the relationship between moral reasoning and the traditional division of theoretical/practical reasoning? Does moral reasoning fit into this division? If so, which of the two types is it?Does moral reasoning have a deductive structure or not? If its structure is inference, which is the type of inference?What is the relationship between moral reasoning and moral generalism and particularism? Does moral reasoning require the use of general principles or not?Can moral reasoning be motivating?What is the purpose of moral reasoning? In other words, what is its function? Literature Review:In his various works, Prinz has written about moral reasoning. But it has not considered the nature of moral reasoning in a coherent way and in an integrated framework. Therefore, it can be claimed that our article is the first writing for a coherent examination of the nature of moral reasoning from Prinz's point of view.

In this article, Prinz's answers to the mentioned questions are extracted from his various writings, then each of these answers will be analyzed and finally, some criticisms that may be made to these answers will be given.

After analyzing Prinz's point of view, we believe that:He considers moral reasoning as a type of theoretical reasoning. Because he believes that moral reasoning is formed to justify moral judgment. So it is not like practical reasoning that leads to action/intention.Like Jonathan Haight, he believes that moral reasoning is presented after moral judgment and to justify it, but he believes that moral reasoning has another function: resolving moral disagreement.According to our analysis, he must have considered the structure of justification in moral reasoning as foundationalism. Because he believes that moral reasoning ultimately ends with fundamental norms that cannot be argued for.We think Prinz considers moral reasoning in the form of allegorical inference or case reasoning. Because he explains the process of justifying a moral judgment by comparing it to a specific example of a category.Prinz seemed not to believe that moral reasoning is based on general rules and principles. Because he does not believe in general moral rules according to the point of view of moral relativism. On the other hand, his view that moral reasoning is case reasoning is consistent with the view of moral particularists.Since Prinz is a moral sentimentalist, then, like David Hume, he must believe that moral reasoning has no motivational effect on action. Because in Prinz's view, since moral judgments are the product of emotions, they are motivating in themselves and do not require moral reasoning.Finally, unlike evolutionary ethics, he does not believe we have an innate capacity for moral reasoning. 

Contrary to what is obtained from the analysis of Prinz's view on moral reasoning, some psychological results indicate that moral agents, at least in some situations, do not use moral reasoning only to resolve moral disagreements, but use moral reasoning to create moral judgments. If this research is true, and these actors act according to this moral reasoning, then moral reasoning is sometimes motivating. On the other hand, according to Prinz's moral relativism point of view, in situations where two moral actors disagree with each other in a fundamental judgment, moral reasoning has practically no function. So, what Prinz has introduced as the function of moral reasoning is a weak function. If these criticisms are true, they suggest, Prinz's analysis of moral reasoning is not entirely without fault. Therefore, either Prinz should start to modify some of his views on moral reasoning or give stronger reasons for his claim.

Sensational perception, reason, testimony and introspection are the fundamental sources of knowledge. It has been much debated that memory is one of the basic sources of knowledge. This article aims to apply the perspective of Frise and Allameh Tabatabai about the epistemological status of memory with an analytical approach. In this essay, we try to answer the questions raised such as, is the memory one of the sources of belief production? Do memory beliefs justify other beliefs? Are memory beliefs self-justified or do they need justification? This article shows that by relying on the epistemological function of memory, Frise considered it as a source of belief production, by which those beliefs can be used in the structure of reasoning. While unifying memory and imagination, relying on the reductionist approach of powers, Allameh Tabatabi has considered imagination as the source of partial beliefs, so that it performs this action with the cooperation of common sense and communication with the outside world. Both philosophers believe that memory is just like a repository whose epistemological status is meaningful in preserving the justified beliefs. Also, from the view point of Frise and Allameh Tabatabai, memory beliefs are among self-justified and basic beliefs that are used to justify non-memory beliefs. Therefore, the view point of these two thinkers can be closed to the reformed foundationalism approach.

Allamah Tabatabaei is one of the theorist philosophers in Transcendent Philosophy, whose viewpoint of the soul, including the human personal identity, has not been discussed. This article deals with Allamah Tabatabaei’s viewpoint of monism or dualism about the human personal identity. In this case, we should discuss on the relationship between the soul and body, and their mutual influence on each other, and the personal identity resulting from that. It seems that those who believe in the causal relationship between soul and body, including Allamah Tabatabaei, should believe in dualism about the soul and the body. But, according to the ontological foundations of Allamah Tabatabaei and his acceptance of substantial movement, it is concluded that the soul and the body are two levels of one gradual and fluid reality. Allamah’s ontological view of the human personal identity is the main characteristic of the structure of debate and differentiates it from other views of the way of the relationship between soul and body in the philosophy of mind. In this article, it will be clarified that Allamah’s viewpoint, in spite of its fundamental difference from other viewpoints, is nearer to substantial monism and quality-dualism.

The problem of epistemic luck arises when a person has a true belief that is only true by luck. Before Gettier, it was believed that the element of justification would be sufficient for knowledge; but he showed that it is possible to have a justified true belief that is not an example of knowledge because of the intrusion of luck. Duncan Pritchard has examined epistemic luck in an extensive and detailed manner. He offers a modal account of luck based on two elements: a possible-worlds analysis of counterfactual conditions and a significance condition for the factors that make the truth of the belief lucky. Pritchard argues for the superiority of this account to those that focus on whether the truth of the belief is “accidental” and on whether the believer has sufficient control over the belief. Epistemic luck may be “reflective” or “veritic”. Both undermine knowledge claims, although Pritchard gives the central role to veritic luck in his anti-luck epistemology, which is based on two elements: a safety principle and a condition to ensure that the cognitive faculties of the agent are not impaired. In this article, we will describe, analyze, and subsequently, evaluate the viewpoint of Pritchard. In addition to the critiques offered by others, ambiguities in his counterfactual account of luck and other components of his theory detract from his theory.

Despite the importance of trust in epistemology, there is no consensus about its nature and issues. Some consider it a cognitive attitude and some think it an emotional attitude. The combination of cognitive and emotional elements is another point of view chosen by Linda Zagzebski. The combination of the two elements of belief and feeling, plus the element of behavior and its explanation in the context of virtue theory, distinguishes Zagzeski's view from the rest. This article focuses on Zagzebski's point of view and analyzes the nature, scope, and applications of epistemic trust. While accepting two types of self-trust and trust to others, she established a special commitment between these two and extended the scope of cognitive self-trust as a pre-reflective feature, according to the principle of equality, to trust others. Validity of testimony in justifying beliefs, exemplarist theory, and a new interpretation of the Consensus Gentium argument is among the applications of epistemic trust discussed in the article. Despite Zagzebski's effort to provide a more accurate explanation of epistemic trust and its application in various fields of epistemology, philosophy of religion, and moral philosophy, there are still ambiguities and weaknesses in her view that make it difficult to justify the role of epistemic trust.

Philosophers of the mind, based on various approaches to the problem of the mind, have proposed different criteria about human personality, "person" or "I". One of these criteria is having a first-person perspective. One of the proponents of this criteria is Lynne Rudder Baker, a non-reductionist materialist philosopher who considers human personality neither as an immaterial soul nor as reducing it over to physical things. According to her, a robust first-person perspective is sufficient and necessary condition for being a person. A being is a person if and only if it has the capacity for a first-person perspective. The robust first-person perspective is the ability to conceive of oneself as oneself, without the use of any name or description. It is same self-consciousness that distinguishes a person from other beings. In contrast, there is a rudimentary first-person perspective, which is specific to beings who, despite having consciousness, lack the self-consciousness feature. The present article has evaluated and criticized the Baker's point of view on first-person perspective with analytical and critical methodology. Ambiguity in the nature of the first-person perspective and being a person, an absence of argument for some claims and lack adequately clarity on some preconditions and presuppositions are some criticisms that were propounded on the acceptability and coherence of Baker's view.

In an effort to investigate the nature of faith, Robert Audi, the famous contemporary philosopher, discusses various types of faith that are internally interrelated and whose common component is the entailment of cognitive propositions. In addition to accepting the various types of faith, he sets the propositional, attitudinal, and universal faith as the basis and takes faith as a positive attitude to the truthfulness of religious propositions that is accompanied by the tendency to believe in the propositions, one that brings about action. Moreover, he puts emphasis on the non-doxastic propositional faith in which faith is not necessarily belief, but rather, it is only the potential for belief and in fact is a type of trust in religious propositions. For Audi, faith – with all of its components – agrees with his intended rationality. In his epistemic system, faith has a very important role in the justification of religious beliefs. In fact, religious obligations – such as belief, faith, and act – justify belief in God if they are rational. The present study analyzes the nature of faith from the viewpoint of Audi; examines its relationship with belief, rationality, and action; and finally evaluates it. Audi’s view to the nature of faith faces some problems, especially the non-doxastic propositional faith to which he attaches great importance and by which he justifies to a great deal the religious belief, such that it be not confirmed by the divine religions and believers in a religion, though it is a way to consider people whose views are not at the belief level as faithful.

Immaterial spiritual life for animals and their possession of mental capabilities have always been a controversial topic for debate among philosophers. The existence of certain similarities between animals and human beings, irrespective of all their differences, has made it difficult to provide an accurate explanation of the quality of animal life. Given his belief in the existence of two corporeal and immaterial intellectual substances for human beings, Descartes negates the existence of thought and intellection in animals for three reasons: lack of language, lack of creativity, and lack of awareness in animals. In other words, he only accepts the existence of corporeal life for animals and, thus, views animals as complex machines that lack mental life. This idea of Descartes is known as the “animal machine” notion. However, Mullā Ṣadrā analyzes animals in relation to the three material, Ideal, and intellectual levels of the world. Accordingly, he believes in the ideal immateriality of animal souls and explains mindfulness at the animal level based on this belief. Descartes’ animal machine hypothesis and the related three reasons are rejected based on the Ideal immateriality that Mullā Ṣadrā proves for animal souls.

Ethnopharmacology is a very diverse approach to drug discovery that involves the observation, description, and experimental study of native drugs and their biological activities based on botany, chemistry, biochemistry, pharmacology, and other disciplines such as anthropology, archeology, history, and linguistics that helps discovering of natural products with biological activity. The aim of this study was to identify medicinal plants that have a traditional use in the north and west of Dashtestan county, Bushehr in the north of Persian Gulf.

The medical uses of medicinal plants were gathered from 25 local informants by face-to-face interviews. The relative frequency of citation (FRC) and cultural importance (CI) indices were calculated.

A total of 117 medicinal plants related to 63 families were identified in the north and west of Dashtestan region. Zataria multiflora, Cuminum cyminum, Aloe vera, Achillea eriophora DC, Matricario chamomilla, Echium amoenum, Trachyspermum copticum, Foeniculum vulgare, Plantago psyllium,
Fumaria parviflora and Nigella sativa had the highest cultural importance index. The highest medical uses were for gastrointestinal discomforts, infectious diseases, respiratory diseases, pediatric problems, kidney and urinary tract diseases, OB & Gyn problems, psychiatric and neurological diseases, dermatologic and the metabolic disorders, respectively. The native people used some of these medicinal plants for some diseases which these usages were unique for this region. For example, they used Achillea eriophora DC for ulcers, abscesses, and carbuncles, Matricario chamomilla for fever and abdominal discomfort, Echium amoenum for promotion of labor pain, Plantago psyllium for purulent infections, Fumaria parviflora for neonatal jaundice and Nigella sativa for musculoskeletal pains.

There is a vast variety of medicinal plants in the north and west of Dashtestan region. Although most of the therapeutic applications of these plants in this area are the same as Iran’s traditional medicine, the people in this region use some of these plants for some diseases which these usages are unique for this region. Thus, investigation about these plants should be initiated to discover novel drugs for clinical applications.

Direct Doxastic Voluntarism claims that all or some of the states associated with our beliefs, that is, the formation, maintenance, justification, and suspension of our judgments, are under our direct voluntary control. The followers of this view emphasize the important role of the will according to their own intellectual principles and in a way insist on the agent’s activity from an epistemological point of view. The present study, while analyzing the views of some epistemologists who believe Direct Doxastic Voluntarism seeks to answer the question of whether our beliefs and judgments are formed under the direct control of the will. Evaluating Direct Doxastic Voluntarism shows that although this approach is not very justified, due to the extreme role of the will for the formation of all kinds of beliefs, and confirmation and suspension of judgment. This has led to a global version of this thesis that may not be acceptable for most epistemologists. Yet by limiting its scope, it can be defended about some beliefs because of its compatibility with individuals’ cognitive experiences. By accepting a less global version of this doctrine, the present article examines the views of some direct voluntariors while denying the extreme scope of the will and emphasizes its position and reasonable role in the subject.

The relationship between life and knowledge in the view of Plotinus and Sadr ol-Mote’allehin and the comparison between their perspectives are of importance due to the fact that the ontological connection between life and knowledge in the opinion of the two philosophers conveys their intellectual affinity. Contemplation in the view of Plotinus is a sort of general and pervasive knowledge that exists in all the stages of being; the idea or knowledge that is recognized as the sameness of life by Plotinus. In Sadr ol-Mote’allehin’s view, knowledge as well as life are not only subordinate to being but also its exact sameness. Therefore, knowledge and life have unity in existence. Belief in the sameness of life and knowledge as well as the creatures’ living and knowledgeable existence, Reduction of life into knowledge, and the common foundations of the ontological relationship between life and knowledge -sameness of their origin and end, their graded reality, their common source in nature, and the world’s living and knowledgeable existence- in the view of the two above philosophers, have paved the way for a comparison between their perspectives. The result of this comparison is finding intellectual affinity and consensus between the two philosophers about the type of relationship between life and knowledge.

Patrick Grim has presented an argument against the compatibility of Divine Omniscience. Citing Cantor's Theorem and using the accepted definition of omniscience -knowledge of all true propositions- Grim denies the existence of an Omniscient due to the impossibility of a set that includes all true propositions. Grim's argument raised many answers by Christian philosophers. For example, Plantinga has objected to this argument by showing its self-contradictoriness. Although there are fundamental differences between Islamic and Christian theology in explaining the nature of omniscience, considering the capacity of Sadra's transcendent wisdom, by citing issues such as the definition and nature of collection as well as the conditions of impossible sequence, addition to refuting Grim's argument that there are more facts than the set of all facts, the possibility of the knowledge of Omniscient to an infinite series of sets of facts can be proved.

One of the topics in the philosophy of mind is the discussion of "I", which philosophers have referred to in various interpretations as "The self", "personal identity", "ego", "soul" and "spirit". Philosophers' different theories about the existence and even the nature of this seemingly simple and obvious have turned it into a philosophical problem. Galen Strawson is a physicalist who has addressed this issue by interpreting “The self”. On the one hand, he believes in the existence of the "empirical self", but on the other hand, he denies such qualities as Long-term persistence, personality, and agency, which seem to be essential to the meaning of the "I". The present paper tries to address, by an analythical-critical method, the question of how Strawson believed in the existence of the "I" despite the non-acceptance of these three characteristics. In this regard, first Strawson's view on the nature and existence of the "I" is analyzed, and after evaluating his view, it is concluded that the elimination of these three characteristics is due to weaknesses such as adopting a physicalist basis, a phenomenological method, and a purely mental view of the "I", confusion of the two positions of Truth and proof and his weakness in explaining the nature of unity over time.

The theory of “knowledge by presence” has a special place in the Sadra system. “Knowledge by presence” is both a theory of knowledge in Sadra's philosophy and a theory for explaining self-knowledge. Reflecting on this important theory will immediately make us realize its complex and mysterious nature. The present paper intends to provide an accurate and clear reading of this theory in a clearer language in the form of a comparative approach between this theory and one of the most important theories of self-knowledge in the analytic philosophy, namely the theory of “Knowledge by acquaintance”. At first glance, Russell's theory of “Knowledge by acquaintance” is one of the most similar to Sadra's theory. Such characteristics as the condition of presence, immediacy, and infallibility are examples of the similarity of these two theories. But the discussion of “unity of the knower and the known” in Sadra's theory is the point of separation between the two theories, and in fact, it is a place that will seriously challenge the claim of closeness between these theories. Finally, perhaps with some tolerance, Russell's theory is a primitive and incomplete picture of Sadra's theory. Furthermore, it should be noted that understanding these two theories in the context of the different philosophical systems of these two philosophers -namely Sadra's theory of Unity and originality of existence and Russel's theory of Knowledge by Acquaintance- makes it more difficult to claim the deep closeness between these two theories.

Philosophers have defined wisdom in different ways. Most definitions refer to knowledge, but they do not agree that knowledge includes or is limited to both theoretical and practical knowledge. The definition of wisdom to understanding or to justified beliefs instead of justified true belief, that is knowledge, is another difference. In addition to all this, the definition of wisdom to virtue, due to its variety and complexity, is another thing that makes the definition of wisdom more difficult. The present article, while analyzing the various definitions offered by contemporary analytical philosophers on the nature of wisdom, explains first the relationship between wisdom and knowledge; knowledge as a necessary and sufficient condition for wisdom, a necessary but not sufficient condition, and neither necessary nor sufficient condition. Then considers wisdom as a rational or epistemic virtue and a necessary condition for acquiring knowledge. Finally, it emphasizes the importance and necessity of a more accurate explanation of this phenomenon.

The present article analyzes the nature and the function of epistemological virtue in Ernest Sosa’s view. In Sosa’s epistemic system, virtues are defined as trustable faculties that play a basic role in producing, justifying and explaining knowledge. Perceptive faculties along with intellection, deduction, and introspection are among the epistemic faculties that would lead, if working rightly, to knowledge, and add features of deservingness, skillfulness, and soundness to belief. Recently, Sosa mentions character virtues and agentive virtues which play a role in creating knowledge, but do not produce belief. Even the agentive virtues do, despite being necessary, produce judgment, not belief. Sosa considers having an epistemic view as the distinctive factor between animal cognition and speculative cognition; and although he attempts to explain why, how and to what extent each of the virtues play a role in the process of producing and justifying belief, his narrow look at the limit and nature of the virtues necessary for creating knowledge makes his view face, despite all its attractions, with difficulties that we deal with in the final section of the article.

Akrasia, or moral weakness, for Aristotle and many contemporaries, including Alfred Mele, means the freely, intentionally action contrary to one's decisive better judgment, which occurs due to the weakness of the will and lack of self-control of the actor. Alfred Mele equates Akrasia with a weakness of will and Aristotle with a moral weakness. In addition to the fact that both philosophers consider Akrasia to be a carnal phenomenon. from both perspectives, the cause of Akrasia is the extreme influence of the demands of the emotional part on the reasoning. It is considered to strengthen the argumentative part of the soul versus the emotional part, so that in order to have the strength of will, strengthening the moral factor in three areas of knowledge, emotion and behavior is necessary. The present article intends to study Akrasia in a descriptive-analytical way in the field of practice from the point of view of Alfred Mele and compare it with Aristotle. In the end, it turns out that despite the many similarities, the two do not completely agree on the factors of the realization of Akrasia

This paper seeks to explain and evaluate, by an analytic method, the conflict between determinism and free will from the viewpoint of two physicalist reductionist philosophers, namely, Daniel Dennett and Sam Harris. Dennett is a compatibilist philosopher who tries to show compatibility between determinism and free will, while Sam Harris is a non-compatibilist philosopher who turns to determinism with the thesis that our thoughts and actions have been pre-determined by the neurobiological events associated with them, and thus, considers free will to be an illusion. Therefore according to him, we are not the authors of our thoughts and actions.  However, Dennett tries to establish the existence of free will through the use of concepts like control and deliberation and defends ‘free will worth wanting’. Therefore, if we take the agency of the agent and the absence of determinism as two criteria for free will, Dennett accepts both and Harris denies them; since there is neurobiological determinism, and all of Dennett's deliberations, etc. are also determined neurobiologically. Between the two conditions of free will, Dennett accepts that the origin of action must be in the agent; however, he refutes the condition of alternate possibilities, establishing his view based on a causal theory. As a Neo-Darwinist, he explains human beings’ physical and mental phenomena based on evolution theory and despite accepting causal determinism, he shows how the agent can still have agency in decisions and actions. As a result, he does not consider determinism to requisite compulsion. In his philosophical system, one can change the future that has not yet taken place. This decision-making regarding the future takes place through the process of deliberation, which has a special place in Dennett’s view. On the other hand, by adhering to Libet’s neurological experiments, Harris refutes both conditions of free will and considers the cause of all human being actions to arise from activities of the brain and concludes that one cannot have any conscious control over one’s actions. As a result, he emerges as a non-compatibilist determinist. In both his works, The Moral Landscape and Free Will, Harris addresses the topic of free will. In Free Will, he criticizes the view of compatibilists like Dennett, who responds to those criticisms in his article, ‘Reflections on Free Will, Review of Sam Harris’ Free Will’. Like Harris, Dennett too addresses free will in his two important books, Elbow Room and Freedom Evolves. Following an analysis of the views of Dennett and Harris and explaining the criticisms of the two regarding each other, the present article will show that neither Dennett, considering the rest of the elements of his philosophical views in philosophy of mind and philosophy of action can well justify compatibilism, nor can Harris, considering his neurological approach defend his determinist idea. The conflict that is present in Dennett’s views causes his explanation of the agent being the origin of his action to also be indefensible. Furthermore, due to the incompatibility of the different elements of his view and the vagueness of his idea regarding the effect of unconscious intentions on action, Harris too is placed in a weak position. In contrast to Harris’ supposition, a human is not “a puppet [who] is free as long as he loves his strings”; rather, a human chooses, makes decisions and acts according to his own will. As a result, despite the objections that apply to both philosophers, Dennett’s view is more acceptable than Harris’ in terms of the effort to justify free will; even though neither have been apparently successful in defending their own ideas.

The present paper analyzes and evaluates Michael J. Zimmermann's view on the relationship between moral luck and moral responsibility. In moral philosophy, this relationship is considered from conceptual and subjective aspects. Conceptually, in moral luck, people’s moral judgments about each other are based on involuntary and chancy actions while the moral responsibility of these judgments are based on free actions. Moral luck, concerning its subject, faces a problem that involves old discussions about the conflict between determinism and free will and moral responsibility that goes beyond that problem. By accepting freedom as having volition and desire in action and initiating a difference between the degree and scope of moral responsibility, Zimmermann, a well-known philosopher, denies moral luck and defends moral responsibility. He also claims to have solved the problems of moral luck and moral responsibility. This paper, after exploring the meaning and relationship between responsibility and moral luck, explains Zimmerman's view on moral responsibility, freedom, and rejection of moral luck. Ultimately, an assessment of this view will show that, despite Zimmerman's innovations, his extremism in defending moral responsibility has made it difficult to accept his view.

The Humean theory of motivation is remarkably attractive in virtue of its ability to explain intentional actions. The theory accounts for an agent’s intentional actions in terms of a previous desire of hers and a belief concerning how to fulfil the desire. The Humean theory of motivation can be formulated as follows: an agent, A, is motivated to do an action Φ only if, and only because, A has a previous desire for Ψ and a belief that by doing Φ the previous desire for Ψ will be satisfied. According to this formulation, having a desire-belief pair as characterized above is not only a necessary condition, but also a cause, of being motivated. The argument from direction of fit is an important argument for the Humean theory of motivation. On this argument, the fundamental distinguishing feature of beliefs and desires is their directions of fit; that is, if there is a mismatch between the world and a belief, then the belief should change in order to match the world, while if there is a mismatch between the world and a desire, then it is the world that should change in order to match the desire. The paper seeks to provide Michael Smith’s version of the argument from direction of fit in favor of the Humean theory, explicating the worries and objections to it.

Unlike virtue ethicistswho emphasize the existence of robust character traits in individuals, philosophical situationists argue that character traits do not exist. Based on the findings of social psychologists, situationists claim that the virtue ethicist's view of character traits is false. Arguments presented by situationists such as Harman, Doris, and Flanagan are grounded in empirical evidence provided by social psychologists; the empirical findings that lead to serious concerns and tensions for virtue ethics. In response to situationists, virtue ethicists, including Christian Miller, strived to defend the existence of character traits. The present paper is an attempt to introduce a novel and multidimensional viewpoint about the role of character traits and situations. First, the paper reviews Miller’s responses to situationists while elaborating on the situationists’ questions and arguments. Second, both stands are critically analyzed and evaluated and a novel viewpoint is suggested as a better alternative for understanding the basis of individual’s moral thoughts and actions. The paper proposes that the reality of individuals' moral thoughts and actions are neither solely based on situations, nor exclusively determined by robust character traits. Rather, it is a dual-aspect unit of character and situation that determines an individual’s moral thoughts and actions.

In this paper, we look at the epistemological role of memory in aanalytical view. Among the sources of knowledge and justification, one can refer to sensory perception, introspection, testimony, reasoning, and deduction. There is a lot of debate about whether memory is a basic source of knowledge or not. There has long been proponents and opponents for this issue. Thus, in this article, we try to answer the following questions: Is memory part of epistemic resources? If we consider memory as a resource of knowledge, can it independently be a source of knowledge? Or is it merely a source of protection and preservation? In this essay, we first briefly consider the metaphysics of memory, and then we look at the epistemological role and its place in epistemology. This paper shows that memory is not only productive, but also does not seem to play a role in Preservationism. Nevertheless, conservationist theory seems more acceptable than other competing theories.

Based on a revision of virtue ethics, an act is right if and only if performed by a virtuous agent under those circumstances. Of the semantic critiques placed on that view is the problem of “right but non-virtuous” since, on that basis, it is erroneous to define a right act depending on the action of a virtuous agent. This is because sometimes a non-virtuous agent is in a condition that is never experienced by a virtuous agent. The present article aimed to first grapple with this problem and show that the aforesaid problem is the result of mixing the realm of determining the duties and proffering the practical guidance with the scope of appraising the acts. As a consequence, in “guidance of actions” an act is right if and only if a virtuous agent decides in that condition whereas in “appraisal of actions” this decision might not be “admirable”. Correspondingly, there are cases that an agent “should” do an act, yet their act cannot be counted as “right” meaning “virtuous” and “admirable”. Finally, a number of pragmatic approaches were presented to solve this problem.

Moral dilemmas are situations in which the agents are provided by two conflicting moral judgments but it's not possible for them to act upon both judgments at the same time. Proponents of moral dilemmas say that agents in conflicting situations, have to act in a way that it is morally wrong. Agents will experience negative feelings such as guilt, regret and remorse, no matter which alternative is chosen by them. Opponents, on the other hand, argue in contrary and say that these situations don't avoid incoherence in a moral theory. They claim that although a good moral theory should be action guiding in any situation, it shouldn’t provide the agent with two conflicting moral judgments. Moral dilemmas violate the principle of being action guiding in a moral theory. Proponents often argue in virtue ethics framework and believe that virtue ethic theory is coherent and action guiding and it provides an appropriate explanation for moral dilemmas.