سید محمدحسن رضوی

The People's Republic of China is regarded as the biggest importer of crude oil and the second-largest producer of petroleum and petrochemical products. The Chinese oil market consists of two main players, with Chinese state oil companies being the primary actors. Companies such as China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC), National Petrochemical Corporation (SINOPEC), and China National Chemical Import and Export Corporation (SINOCHEM) are the most prominent among them.Since the re-imposition of US sanctions against Iran, commercial relations between these corporations and the Islamic Republic of Iran, including oil trade, have been halted. This challenge is primarily attributed to the transformation of Chinese state oil companies from National Oil Companies (NOCs) to International Oil Companies (IOCs).Today, Chinese state oil companies have made significant investments in oil-rich countries and established numerous subsidiaries worldwide to facilitate their commercial activities. As China requires substantial amounts of crude oil for its economic growth, state companies often acquire oil through their foreign investments and transfer it to China via their subsidiaries. Moreover, these companies are highly active in major financial markets, having raised capital through listings on the Hong Kong, New York, and Shanghai stock exchanges.Within the Chinese oil industry, state companies have formed partnerships with renowned international oil corporations. This trend emerged after China's accession to the World Trade Organization, which allowed foreign investment in the upstream, midstream, and downstream sectors of the Chinese oil industry, making it an attractive destination for international oil companies. Consequently, Chinese state oil companies are no longer merely national entities with limited partners and duties. They now resemble other global international oil corporations.This article also examines the legal standards of designation within the US sanctions regime, which include ownership links (direct and indirect) and control links.Direct ownership links enable the United States to easily designate any company where 50% or more of its shares are owned by sanctioned entities or individuals.Indirect ownership links are designed to prevent sanctions circumvention by subsidiaries. Under this framework, all subsidiaries of a company in which sanctioned entities or individuals own 50% or more of the shares are subject to designation.Besides ownership, the United States utilizes the "control" standard to determine which person or entity exerts dominant influence over a company. One key indicator of control is the ability of sanctioned shareholders to appoint directors and/or managers. Therefore, if directors have any business, professional, or family ties to sanctioned entities, the company may be sanctioned regardless of its ownership status.This article analyzes Chinese state oil companies and US sanctions standards, concluding that the current structure of these companies makes them highly susceptible to the devastating consequences of US sanctions. Due to their extensive global operations and numerous subsidiaries, they cannot risk purchasing Iranian sanctioned crude oil. Their corporate governance often involves 50% or more ownership of subsidiaries and intermediaries, and many directors in subsidiaries previously held significant positions within state oil companies. Consequently, purchasing Iranian sanctioned crude could expose state oil companies to financial sanctions that could easily extend to their global subsidiaries, severely impacting China's oil imports. It is crucial to note that more than three-quarters of China's refining and petrochemical capacity belongs to complexes owned by state oil companies. Therefore, any disruption in crude oil imports would not only result in significant financial losses but also pose a national security challenge for the Chinese government.Finally, the article critiques the current policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran, which relies heavily on Chinese independent refineries for oil trade due to the reluctance of state oil companies. While these independent refineries are currently the primary buyers of Iranian crude, this reliance presents several challenges:Import Quotas: Independent refineries are subject to crude oil import quotas announced four times a year by the central government, making their purchasing patterns unpredictable and unreliable for oil producers like Iran.Spot Market Reliance: Independent refineries primarily purchase crude oil through spot market contracts, which lack a price formula based on international benchmarks. This exposes Iranian oil sales to significant price fluctuations.Therefore, it is concluded that Chinese independent refineries cannot effectively substitute Chinese state oil companies as long-term and predictable partners for oil trade.

Based on the definition of foreign investment and its elements in law, it is contended that the investor should contribute to the economic development of the host state so that the latter’s action is considered an investment. In recent decades, with the growing importance of subject-areas like human, environmental, and labor rights, the act of investing has gone beyond the mere economic/financial concept and, has developed in line with the concept of sustainable development. In this regard, some commentators have considered it permissible and necessary to limit the scope of the permitted activities of the foreign investors within the frame of the concept of sustainable development. So much so that in recent arbitral decisions and international investment agreements, creating a platform for the development of the host state is considered a new component of foreign investment in line with the requirements of human rights, labor and environment rights.

The conflicting perspectives of the United States and China in relation to the choice of the optimal economic model have resulted in international economic lawfare, which can be defined as resorting to law as an instrument to win the transnational US-China trade war. One of the prime areas of lawfare between the United States and China in the trade war is the question of whether China’s State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) should be deemed as "public bodies.” This affects the applicability of WTO’s multilateral disciplines to government subsidies to China’s SOEs. The main question of the present research is the analysis of the defining criteria of the term “public body” in the interpretation of the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Body (DSB).

The present study was carried out using a descriptive-analytical method.

Three criteria for interpreting the term “public body” are discernable: a) The US favors the “government control” criteria, b) China defines its criteria based on the government's responsibility towards "government organs,” and c) the dispute settlement body has found that the criteria of “government function” based on “exercise of government authority" to be appropriate. The interpretation of the term “public body” offered by the Dispute Settlement Body has achieved a balance between the perspectives of the United States and China. Although China has complied with the Dispute Settlement Body’s interpretation in developing its national legislation, the conflict between the two economic powers has not subsided.

The maritime transportation industry has undergone significant transformations with the widespread adoption of tanker charter party contracts, especially in the bulk transportation of oil and petroleum products. These contracts serve as vital instruments governing the intricate relationship between ship owners and Charterers, aiming to safeguard the interests of all parties involved. Although standardized forms are available, parties retain the flexibility to define specific terms and conditions. In practice, prefabricated standard contracts are often preferred due to their efficiency and familiarity within the industry.In recent decades, the landscape of maritime transportation has been reshaped by economic and commercial sanctions. The fear of inadvertently violating sanctions laws has compelled parties to incorporate meticulous terms and clauses into their contracts. These terms serve as a shield, enabling parties to mitigate and manage risks associated with economic sanctions effectively. A focal point within these contracts is the inclusion of sanctions clauses, widely recognized standards established by reputable institutions such as BIMCO and Intertanko. These clauses encompass a spectrum of provisions, including explicit definitions of key concepts, assurances against sanctions imposition, guidelines for handling sanctions-related issues, protocols for refusing voyage orders that may contravene sanctions, procedures for contract termination, and avenues for claiming damages. Notably, it is mandatory to include sanctions clauses in sub-charters and issued bills of lading.However, a critical inquiry arises: do these standardized sanctions clauses truly serve as robust risk management mechanisms for economic sanctions? Upon meticulous examination, it becomes apparent that these clauses are not without their limitations. Ambiguities within the language and criteria employed in these clauses create room for varied interpretations during judicial proceedings. The broad terminology and ambiguous phrasing often lean in favor of ship owners, leaving other involved parties at a disadvantage.This article delves into a comprehensive evaluation of the sanctions clauses established by esteemed international institutions such as BIMCO and Intertanko, as well as major oil corporations like BP and Shell. These clauses, subject to regular updates, are subjected to meticulous scrutiny, highlighting both their strengths and inherent weaknesses. Through this analysis, the article aims to provide a nuanced understanding, considering the viewpoints of legal scholars and interpretations derived from judicial decisions.In conclusion, the incorporation of sanctions clauses into oil tanker charter party contracts has become an industry standard, reflecting the necessity to navigate the complex waters of economic sanctions. However, the key lies in meticulous drafting. Precise definitions, avoidance of ambiguous language, and transparent criteria are essential to establish fairness and equity between ship owners and charterers. Despite being developed by esteemed international institutions and major corporations, these standard clauses are not binding and can be modified by the involved parties. Hence, it is imperative that these clauses are tailored to strike a balance, aligning with the interests of all parties involved and adopting an optimal approach to risk management, especially for countries like ours, continually exposed to foreign sanctions. This article serves as a valuable resource for economic stakeholders, offering insights to aid in the formulation of effective sanctions clauses.

Today, the chartering of oil tankers for the purpose of transporting oil cargo, oil products and liquid natural gas plays an important role in this industry. With the intensification of economic sanctions in recent decades, we have witnessed the seizure and confiscation of ships due to the carrying of sanctioned cargoes or going to the ports of the sanctioned governments, which raises various questions regarding the legal aspects of the challenges facing these contracts.In search of obtaining a theoretical basis for analyzing the effect of economic sanctions on the performance of oil tanker charter party contracts, regardless of the general rules of contract law such as force majeure, frustration and economic hardship and the like, we come across the obligation of the charterers towards the safe port, which in short, its purpose is that the charterer does not allow the tanker to go to unsafe ports. The basic question is whether economic sanctions can be considered a risk that can be placed in the framework of the charterer's obligation to the safe port? If this is the case, what remedy is there to protect the rights of the owners of the tankers based on the violation of the safe port guarantee by the charterer?As a preliminary answer, it may be said that the safe port guarantee, due to the background of its formation, includes the physical and purely inherent risks of ports and refrains from economic sanctions. In this article, by inductively examining scientific sources, judicial practices, and standard charter party contracts of oil tankers, it is briefly concluded that economic sanctions as a political risk can cause port unsafety, as a result of which the charterer is considered responsible to the ship owner.

The article studies the legal elements which US Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) shall use to assess the delisting application of entities listed in the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List (SDN). This article studies the delisting of three Russian-owned and controlled entities; EN+, Rusal and Euro Sib Energo and examines OFAC's approach to the concept of indirect control and ownership and how an entity could establish its control or ownership disconnection, with a sanctioned person or entity.

US economic sanctions on the Iran's banking sector have made Iran's oil industry more vulnerable than any other industry. In fact, US secondary sanctions, such as extraterritorial sanctions, not only bar non-US banks from any banking transactions with Iran, but also ban Iranian entities from access to strong currencies. The present article reviews, from a practical point of view, certain methods that Iran has used in the face of US banking sanctions to access its most important source of income; i.e., the oil revenues and examines the banking and non-banking solutions and alternatives that has been used by Iran to receive the proceeds of sale of crude oil and oil products.

The emergency which occurs following the imposition of economic sanctions, necessitates the business transactions to be conducted through non-standard and irregular methods. Using front companies, and intermediaries, and non-transparent ways of doing banking payments have become the necessary part of Iran's foreign trade regime following the imposition of economic sanctions. Disputes raised before Iranian courts in relation to sale of Iranian crude oil through these unusual means proves the specific features of oil transactions which using these irregular methods of foreign trade may not corresponds to these specific features, This Article studies the different types of new commercial disputes which are created due to imposition of economic sanctions on sale of oil and oil products and proposes contractual solutions to mitigate the likelihood of these disputes.

legal regimes differ in outlining the method of contribution to the household, financial maintenance, and the division of property after separation/divorce. Some legal regimes, following the CEDAW’s regime, look for an egalitarian regime which rules for similar rights and responsibilities for both parties and partial community of properties between spouses through which economic advantages and disadvantages related to marriage and dissolution of marriage should be born equally by both parties. Another group of legal regimes establishes separation of properties as the guiding principle for marital economic relationship in which the expenses should be borne by men as the heads of the household and women should be compensated for her unpaid contribution to the household. This research will focus on Iran’s legal system, which follows Sharia (Islamic law) in separation of properties and ruling for compensation of unpaid contribution of women to household. The research compares Iran’s legal system and Quebec’s laws as an example of egalitarian regime and evaluate if Iran’s family law could integrate community regime in its family law with regard to the Sharia principles and its Islamic family law. And which criteria should be considered by Iranian legislator if desire to adopt community regime.

The study of legal regime of imposition of unilateral economic sanctions can have a vital role in operation of companies being designated as sanctioned entity. One of the powerful and complex regime of economic sanctions are the restrictive measures imposed by European Union. This article studies the theory of piercing the corporate veil as one of the important theories n EU law and the EU applicable laws and regulations in sanctioning entities and corporations. Finally it provides solutions for Iranian oil companies active in EU jurisdiction to structure themselves in a way to reduce the chance of being considered as a sanctioned entity.