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The Russian army is developing some reconnaissance and interceptor vehicles such as the S.300 systems to defend strategic areas belonging to some of its allied countries. Another defensive shield system was also produced on a regional scale, such as the S-400 which is more capable than the S-300 system. During this process, the Russian military began production of the S-500 defense system. Production sites of S-300 and S-400 missile systems were established in some vital regions of Russia (in Kaliningrad and Crimea) and the territory of some allied countries. However, the Russian defense shield is technically weaker and more limited compared to the Western countries defense shield, but without a doubt, this plan will not remain at these levels.  The development of Russia's defense shield means that Russian leaders intend to defend their country against the threat of Western ballistic missiles. Of course, these equipments increase the offensive power of Western countries, especially by carrying tools and increasing missile defense systems. One of the main tools of Russia's defense shield is the S-300 missile system.The PMU S-300 model is capable of countering an attack missile with a speed of Mach 2-8 and a range of 1000 km. This system was established in Armenia, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Belarus. The S-400 system is also capable of shooting down stealth aircraft, ballistic missiles, hypersonic missiles and drones with a range of 400 km. But two tools only work on atmosphere.The S-500 system is also in the final stage of production with a range of 600 km and a speed of Mach 7, which is capable of shooting down hypersonic missiles and spy satellites. It is expected to be fulfilled by 2025. In addition, the Russian military has developed some ground-based early warning radars called Voronezh.The Voronezh MD model has an inspection area of 6000 km and has the capacity to detect 500 targets. Of course, this radar is only an early warning system and is not compatible with any interceptor device. Reconnaissance satellite technology has also been used for defense. Currently, several Cosmos class satellites are in service and will be deployed in outer space for this purpose. The Russian military plans to upgrade this technology and surveillance. The plan to deploy Russian missile defense systems appears not as a tactical plan, but as a strategic plan. This plan is simultaneously qualitative and quantitative in the development of detection and interception systems as well as early warning systems.Research Question: “Why is Russia thinking of creating a missile defense shield?

The hypothesis of the article is that "the concern of Russian leaders about the Western plan to create a missile defense shield has led to the development of their own missile defense tools."

This is a historical and descriptive method with an emphasis on monitoring Russia's anti-ballistic systems, as well as examining the country's official doctrine in the field of security and foreign policy.  This research also deals with the situation of the Russian authorities.   

The research results show that the US and NATO defense shield was the main motivation of the Russian authorities to create missile defense systems. The US and NATO missile defense shields consists of SM3 interceptors, Aegis radars and early warning satellites. However, each part is separated but they are connected by all. They will be deployed in four stages in the mentioned areas, which can defend the American forces and its allies. Those regions are American homeland, Alaska, Greenland, South Persian Gulf and South Korea. They are also carried by destroyers in the Mediterranean and the Pacific. In parallel, NATO is building its own defense shields in some places in the center and east of the continent, which are: The radar station in Turkey, the Aegis radar system in Poland and the THAAD system in Romania and the command section in Germany. The four Aegis radar systems installed on the ships they command are in the port of Rota (Spain). Some say that the third and fourth parts of the defense shield are capable of targeting Russian intercontinental ballistic missiles. The defensive shield also protects Western countries that have developed their offensive capacity in conjunction with defensive tools. Due to the withdrawal from the INF Treaty, there are no restrictions against the West. Putin’s opposition to Trump’s extension of the New Start Treaty without any conditions and Trump’s insistence on concluding a comprehensive agreement annoyed Russian authorities. In addition, Russian authorities are not happy about the establishment of a Western defensive shield near the country’s western borders. These actions cause Russia to react in the same way.

Russia's action in the development of defense systems is one of the main factors of change in the military doctrine of this country. Previously, the Russian military organized its strategic tools around the doctrine of nuclear deterrence and parity. But Russia is trying in the same direction in response to the deployment of Western missile defense elements in some strategic parts of the continent. As a result, Russia's new doctrine is based on an offensive and defensive strategy. Nevertheless, the current interactions between the West and Russia have created a new round of arms competition, especially in strategic defense tools. Russian defense systems are not at the level of their Western counterparts either in terms of content or technical quality. But these are accompanied by offensive tools that have been developed in strategic areas to pose the same threats against the West. According to this emerging trend, the Russian missile defense zone will also cover more strategic areas in the future.

Over the past two decades, the Russian military has upgraded certain categories of its military equipment (e.g., nuclear warheads). As part of this military modernization strategy, some of the old types of missiles are replaced with the new ones  including new submarine-launched and ground-launched intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). Additionally, the Russian military has begun new weapon research and development that had previously little place in the country's defense structure. The new program which started in the mid-2000s, include the production of cruise missiles, hypersonic missiles, and unmanned submarines. The evidence now shows that this program will be continued in the coming years.
The main research question is as follows: Why has Russia decided to modernize its nuclear warheads in recent years? In the hypothesis, it is asserted that among all factors which have prompted Russia to upgrade its nuclear warheads, the United States and NATO policy of deploying missile defense shields has had the greatest impact on Russia’s military modernization program. Since Russian leaders consider the establishment of missile defense systems by the NATO allies as an existential threat to their country, it comes as no surprise that they have been investing in a program with the aim of acquiring new nuclear capability for deterrence as well as for defense. The new weapon systems are developed to enhance Russia’s ability to retaliate in response to any aggressive actions including a nuclear attack by the US and NATO.
In order to find suitable answers to the research question, the authors, with a descriptive-explanatory approach, rely on qualitative conceptual content analysis of government documents (such as national security strategy document) and the  statements made by the high-ranking Russian officials. Furthermore, the views of international relations scholars, security specialists, and experts on Russian military affairs are explored for the purpose of descriptive data collection and analysis.
Two factors have contributed more than any other variables to the strategic culture of the Russian politicians and people: 1. The peoples’ experiences of the recent decades; 2. The leaders’ belief system which is influenced and shaped by geostrategic factors, military technology, and military organizations. Hostile and rival pawers’ d
eployment of the defense shields throughout Europe deprives Russia of the advantage of nuclear retaliation, thus giving the West the advantage of a first strike. This situation might shift the geopolitical balance to the disadvantage of Russia. Given the past history of Russia as a great power, it is basically inconceivable for the Russiansto accept the role of a minor power or a subordinate partner in the international system. Despite all itsshortcomings (e.g., a relatively low economic and technological development in the Global North), USSR(and later Russia as its leadingsuccessor state) has been regarded as amilitarily dominantstate in the post-WWII  international system.
From the point of view of the Russian leaders, the West's claims about the need for the missile defense shield to counter Iran's missile threats are exaggerated. Russia has hundreds of nuclear warheads that enable its leaders to deal a fatal blow to any enemy in any part of the world. The missile defense shield deprives Russia of this advantage. Even if the US and NATO missile defense shield poses no direct threat to the Russians, Moscow considers its deployment in Europe psychologically a negative, detrimental, and debilitating political move by Russia’s adversaries.
In response to the missile defense shield, Russian leaders initially sought security guarantees from the West, but Western leaders refused to accommodate Moscow’s request. They did not even accept Russia's offer to cooperate in NATO's missile defense shield plan in Europe, or even to grant Moscow access to the Qibla radar station in Azerbaijan. In response, Russia first suspended its membership in the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, and subsequently developed new delivery systems including the following ICBMS: a) the Sarmat  ICBM with a speed of 25,000 km per hour, a range of 10,000 km, and carrying 10 to 25 warheads; b) Yars ICBM, with a range of 11,000 km which can carry 6 to 30 nuclear warheads; c) Avangard rockets, reportedly with a record speed of 20 times the speed of sound, which means that no missile defense shield can destroy it; d) Burustenik cruise missile, which can be hidden from missile defense shield radars due to its low altitude flight; e) Alexander nuclear missile, with a speed of up to 2600 meters per second, which can  neutralize missile defense shield; f) advanced Borya-2 submarines capable of carrying sea-based Bulava ballistic missiles, which have a range of 8,000 km; g) Poseidon nuclear unmanned submarine, which was designed to destroy coastal areas. With these initiatives, Russian leaders modernized their nuclear warheads and were able to maintain their nuclear balance with the West and maintain their position as one of the world's two leading nuclear powers. Russia's military innovation includes the production of missiles that the missile defense shields of the US and its western allies cannot intercept and destroy. The deployment of these offensive systems has increased Russia's ability to deter and defend against the West.

The aim of the present paper is to explain the Russian intervention in the Syrian crisis. The crisis is the most critical crisis within the Arab uprisings. Russia supported the Syrian government in the crisis, and was able to prevent it from being overthrown. The axial question of the document is that “Why has Russia intervened in favor of the Syrian government in this crisis?” The original answer to the document is that “Concern of diluting and eliminate of Russia’s sphere of influence in Syria and Middle East have caused Russia to intervene in the Syrian crisis in favor of the Syrian government.” The review of Russia’s foreign policy in the Middle East shows that it has sought to renew its influence since the early 2000s. But the developments in the region regularly took place against the interests of Moscow, as a result, its influence on the region was limited. With the overthrow of Saddam's government in 2003 and the Gaddafi government in 2011, only Syria remained as the Russian sphere of influence in the region. As a result, if the Baathist government of Syria was overthrown, not only would Russia lose its geopolitical interests in this country, but there would have been no influence in the Middle East; as a result, it would become a marginal power. Therefore, Russia's intervention in the Syria crisis was inevitable for the territory of the geopolitical influence of the regions.

Undoubtedly the Syrian crisis is one of the most important current issues in the international system. This has paved the way for the presence of regional and trans-regional powers in the territory of this country. One of these powers, Russia, has intervened in this crisis in the interest of the Syrian government. Russia’s support in terms of political, economic and military-intelligence was carried out. Of course, the most important aspect of Russia's intervention in the Syrian crisis is direct military involvement in the crisis in the late summer of 2015. Under the influence of Russia's help and assistance, the positions of the Syrian army and its regional allies were strengthened and they were able to regain the control of a significant portion of the areas occupied by oppositions and extremists. In any case, Russia's actions in the Syrian crisis are of a special and unique nature. The question arisen here is “why Russia has intervened in the Syrian crisis, while it has not intervened in any of the Middle East crises so far?” The hypothesis is that “Geopolitical obligations have led Russia to intervene in the interests of the government in the Syrian crisis.” The research was conducted in an exploratory and empirical way, and is thus loyal to the positivist tradition. To measure the hypothesis, the research used a model of three concepts of “Geopolitical Feature”, “Geopolitical Territorialization” and, finally, “Geopolitical transition”. The geopolitical feature of the Middle East and Syria is so remarkable for Russia that Russia cannot be indifferent to their weight. Additionally, Syria was a part of Russia's influence in the Middle East since the 1970s. Therefore, Russia is interested in preserving this geopolitical condition as it faces the West and terrorism’s geopolitical constraints. From the geopolitical point of view, the Middle East has been in transition since the collapse of the Soviet Union. But the developments in this region have generally been against Russia's interests. The emergence of Arab revolutions in the countries of the region have led to the overthrow of authoritarian governments and the replacement of democratic regimes (pro-western) and sectarian ones (extremists). This situation has endangered the geopolitical interests of Russia in this region. In particular, the Middle East is located in the adjacent of the Central Asian and Caucasian lands and the instability caused by the Arab revolutions, as a result, could have caused a wave of instability in these areas as well. The aforementioned provisions required Russia to intervene in the Syrian crisis. One of the most important requirements of Russia in the Syrian crisis was to compete with the United States and the West. The competition of two major powers is geostrategic so that in Eastern Europe the Balkans, Central Asia and the Caucasus, the Middle East, Afghanistan and the Far East are visible. Moscow has seen US policies in the Middle East diminishing its influence in the region. In line with this policy, the West has also intervened in the interest of the opposition in the Syrian crisis and for the benefit of extremist groups in secret. So, Syria became one of the geopolitical areas of competition for the two superpowers. Hence, Moscow did not have any choice except to intervene in the crisis of this country. Confronting terrorism, extremism and separatism was also one of the most important requirements for Russia's intervention in the Syrian crisis. In documents of Russian foreign and security policy, terrorism has been described as one of the most important security problems of the Country. During the terrorist attacks, hundreds of Russian citizens died and more were injured. Terrorism, which grew up in the context of the Caucasus separatism, generally emerged in the form of an extremist ideology and evolved. Hence, the crisis of terrorism in Russia has coincided with extremism and separatism. Regarding the Russian government's serious policies, the terrorists were restrained and suppressed.  But the atmosphere of insecurity from the civil war in Syria was a good environment for the growth of the terrorists. As a result, a significant number of citizens from Russia and Central Asia and the Caucasus regions participated in Syria. Getting power of the terrorists in this Country and their empowerment in their territory (in Russia, Central Asia and Caucasus) caused the emergence of a new wave of insecurity and assassination in the territory of the Soviet Union. This could re-ignite the controlled crisis of separatism in the Caucasus. Therefore, Russia's intervention in the Syrian crisis was necessary to confront them. Syria has been a part of Russia's influence in the Middle East and the Mediterranean since the 1970s. This country, along with Iraq, ensured Russia's presence in the Middle East and therefore it has been important from the geopolitical point of view. In the context of competing with the United States, Russia developed its relations with Syria not only in terms of military and strategic dimensions, but also in economic terms in order to maintain its influence in this country. The Syrian government was a geopolitical asset for Russia; As it guarantees the access to the Russian military to strategic spots in the Middle East, North Africa, and eventually South and South-East Europe. So the overthrow of the Syrian government by the opposition and extremists would have led to the loss of this geopolitical advantage. Instability in the periphery of Russia was generally in line with the interests of the West and against the interests of Russia. The occupation of Iraq by the US-led coalition, colored revolutions in the Soviet Union, the implementation of the Great Middle East Plan, the NATO intervention in the Middle East security processes, and similar occurrences have made the atmosphere of turbulence and, hence, brought about changes that often put Russia's interests in jeopardy. Therefore, Russian leaders are worried about any instability in the areas. The most serious worries in the Middle East were the Arabian uprising or sectarian states prone to extremism. So, Russia's intervention in the Syrian crisis sought to control instability in the country and the Middle East. In particular, the Russian leaders were confident that due to the proximity of the land, these instabilities would be broadened to the Soviet area from the Middle East and they will endanger their country’s interests in this area.

We are Looking for analysis of al Qaeda and Isis media strategies with descriptive, comparative and analytical methods. More than any other terrorist organizations, isis and al-Qaeda use social networks and the Internet as media tools. Both of them have had Specified and defined media strategies. In these strategies, tools, goals, audience, as well as tactics of communicating with them, has been revealed. They compete in the media environment, as well as in reality. So some of their different methods, make their media strategies different.

The purpose of this article is to examine the characteristics of the Islamic Republic of Iran's strategic culture. Several factors contribute to the shaping of culture A strategy countries. From the perspective of a number of scholars of international relations culture has a huge influence on strategic decisions. In recent years, research on the role of national and international security is again considered. The main question of this study is that the characteristics of the Islamic Republic of Iran is the strategic culture and the characteristics of what factors and variables are derived.This research is descriptive and analytical approach to hypothesize that the historical experience, the teachings of Islam and geography than any other component involved in shaping strategic culture.

This article aims to identify the effective factors in the process of militarization of Caspian Sea. By militarization, Caspian policy entered a new round, a process which started from 2002. Until this year, the military power of the countries in the region was limited to a coast guard, but in 2002, because of the tensions over the legal regime of the Caspian Sea, especially after Russia’s naval maneuver, trends among the neighbors for establishing naval forces came to the life. Since that time, the amount of investments and initiatives for developing military power at Sea has been increased in these countries. In addition, western countries, especially America, has been influential in this process. Given the tendency of these countries to weaken the position of Russia and Iran in the region, through strengthening countries like Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, Washington tried to give the necessary capital and equipment to these countries.Generally, the dispute over the legal status of Caspian Sea, regional competitions and ultimately, the competition between Russia and America are the most important effective variables to the militarization of Caspian Sea.

The presence of extra-regional powers in the Middle East and their impact on the quality of security order of the region is one of the important issues which have attracted the attention of the observers. Since World War II till date the United States has been an important player which has actively intervened in the region and has had a determining role in its security structure. In this direction the United States has recently tried to expand NATO's sphere of operation toward the Middle East region by admitting new partners and collaborators. The present article is of the view that this strategic behaviour of the Untied States is within the objectives of security framework of that country. These objectives can be enumerated as follow: expansion of its sphere of influence and hegemony in the region, confrontation and containment of the growing power of the Islamic Republic of Iran, helping normalization of relations between Israel and Arab countries by participating them in NATO's programme and organs, accelerating process of reforms in the Middle East, fighting against Islamic fundamentalism and radicalism and terrorist activities emanating from it, ensuring the security of energy resources and their safe transfer to the United States and its allies and providing support for pro-West Arab governments. These measures have been welcomed by Israel and pro-Western Arabs and will have important effects on the security of the Middle East and will make NATO a significant Middle East player. It is true that NATO's main objective is facing international threats to peace and security and in this way it can ensure the Middle East's stability but NATO being a Western security organization will facilitate the objectives of the United States and its allies and therefore, it can be said that the presence of NATO in the Middle East will have adverse effect on security interests of Iran.