مقالات رزومه سید احمد حسینی سنگ چال

"Language-based argument" is an argument from the structure of language to understand the structure of the world. Although this mode of argumentation has been represented in the context of analytical philosophy, examples of such arguments can be found in the tradition of Islamic philosophy. The influence of the issue of simplicity or complexity of the derivative (mushtaq) on the primacy of existence (aṣālat al-wujūd) is one example of these arguments. In this article, a general account of this influence is provided and examine ‘Allāmah's approach towards this argument. It will become clear that ‘Allāmah does not agree with such arguments in the philosophical tradition. ‘Allāmah's argument for the copulative existence apparently falls within the category of language-based arguments, and if so, a kind of inconsistency can be seen in ‘Allāmah's encounter with this model of argumentation. By presenting two alternative arguments for the externality of the copulative existence and critiquing the interpretation of the commentators of ‘Allāmah's argument, we will exclude this argument from the language-based arguments.

Solving the problem of attributing quiddity to existence in Dashtakī’s view is intertwined with the theory of predication, derivative, and the principle of subordination. Through separating existence in the sense of being in existence and existence in the sense of existent and distinguishing accidents by-themselves from mentally-posited accidents, Dashtakī has analyzed the problem of attribution in line with the pre-supposed elements. He agrees with the occurrence of existence to quiddity only in existence in the sense of existent in the mind. Mullā Ṣadrā has usually provided an incomplete narration of Dashtakī’s view of attribution, theory of predication, derivative, and the necessity of demonstrating the source of the predicate for the subject. In fact, he has explained all the related elements in one place. In his analysis of the subordination principle, he is completely influenced by Dashtakī. It seems that, in spite of his great efforts at providing a consistent narration of Dashtakī’s view, Mullā Ṣadrā has failed to present some elements consistently in his own theory.

In the Mulla Sadra’s expressions, we are faced with inconsistencies in the interpretation of the principle of presuppsition and its application. This article tries to find the root of these inconsistencies based on the arguments of Dashtakī and Dawānī in these two issues. In the following, we show what is the final basis of Mulla Sadra in the analysis of the principle of presuppsition, and of course it becomes clear how the Mulla Sadra’s inconsistencies in the cases of application of this principle can be analyzed. The existential propositions are one of the application cases of this Principle, and the difference in the interpretations of Mulla Sadra in the analysis of the existential propositions is due to the difference in his foundations in the analysis of the principle of presuppsition, and with the clarification of his final foundation in the principle of presuppsition, his final theory in the analysis of the existential propositions will also be clarified, and the it’s conflicting texts needs renovation.

In the Mulla Ṣadra’s works, there are two different accounts of the “principle of presupposition”. It seems that this two different accounts are inconsistent. There are strong intertextual relationships between Mulla Ṣadra  and Jalal al-Din Davani and  Sadr al-Din Dashtaki’s works. The two different accounts of Mulla Ṣadra can be traced back to a dispute between Davani and Dashtaki about this principle. Considering intertextual relationships in Mulla Sadra's works, I will present a new reading of Mull Ṣadra's real position on the meaning of the principle.

The rule of subordination is one of the most important philosophical rules. Davani presents his special analysis about this rule. We should present his analysis in all his texts. Davani s theory of predication is conceptual difference and existential identity. He develops the identity. With this development Davani presents a new attribution theory. The rule of subordination consists of three parts: the existence of subject, the existence of predicate and the existence of subject before the existence of predicate. In Davani s opinion the existence of subject is essential but the existence of predicate is not essential and the existence of subject before the existence of predicate is not essential too.

Before offering his own theory of the logical predication, Sadr al-Din Dashtaki first criticizes two alternative theories; the first interprets logical predication as the attribution of something (predicate) to something (subject), and the second takes it as expressing the conceptual difference between the subject and the predicate and their essential identity. He then proposes the “conventional difference and existential identity” as the criterion of the logical predication. This theory is constituted of several elements including his peculiar analysis of the derivative words. Dashtaki discovers that both theories of simplicity and complexity of the derivative words are inconsistent with his theory of predication and thus, introduces a new analysis of the derivative words. This analysis pays way to differentiating between attribution of the root to the subject and the identity of subject and predicate. This complex net of principles helps Dashtaki to provide a plausible analysis of special sorts of propositions like existential propositions and hypothetical propositions (la Batti).

Shaykh Ishraq is the upholder of the mentally Posited (i'tibàri) of existence (wujud). He represents three arguments to prove this issue according to the binary of simplicity (bisatat) or the combination of derivation. Sadr al-Muta'allihin with presenting a new analysis of the combination (tarakob) of derivation (moshtaq) and separating the boundary of the conceptual specifications from existential characteristics freed himself from all Suhrawardi's difficulties. Muzaffar tries to base the simplicity (bisatat) of derivation to answer Suhrawardi's proof but far from many problems which deal with the theory of simplicity (bisatat) of derivation, on the supposition of simplicity (bisatat) of derivation, Suhrawardi has found out problems for the external realization of Being (Wujud) which should be answered. Allameh Tabataba'i believes that the origin of Suhrawardi's evidence is wrong and therefore, any attempt to answer it is approving a kind of wrong proof in philosophical tradition. The mentioned argument and every argument of language foundation makes us involve in intermingling reality with mental consideration and in general it is not expected metaphysic matter of the mentally posited issues.

The simplicity of derivatives that began as a controversy between Razi and Jurjani served Mulla Sadra somehow as one principle to understand his groundwork of the real primacy of existence and the relation between existence and what exists. Jurjani’s argument for the simplicity of derivatives has met many objections, but later scholars came to reconstruct the argument in order to get rid of those objections. This paper goes to examine those reconstructions.  To demonstration that a derivative is simple and has only one single part of meaning owes to the proving of two claims negative (that the subject -or agent- and relation to the subject are external to the concept of a derivative) and positive (the explanation that derivatives are different from their roots). The examination of those reconstructions is, indeed, the study whether those arguments succeed or fail in their attempts to prove the two above claims. In his attempt to defend Jurjani’s position, Sabziwari has embarked upon the reconstruction seemingly successful in proving that “the subject is external to the concept of the derivative”, like Jurjani’s argument does. Nonetheless, the reconstructions made by Ha’iri  Yazdi, and Gharawi  Isfahani are open to criticism due to their neglect of some aspects.      The negative claim comprises two parts, that the subject and relation to the subject are external to the concept of the derivatives. However, Jurjani’s argument and Sabziwari’s reconstruction can only work in proving that the subject is external to the concept of the derivatives, but the relation to the subject is not. Moreover, the two accounts fail to prove the positive claim, i.e. the relation of “negatively conditioned and none-conditioned” between the root and the subject. Other reconstructions even fail to prove that the subject is external as one of the two parts of the negative claim. Evidently they have failed to prove the other part of the negative claim (that the relation to subject is external) and the positive claim, either

After proving the originality of existence, investigating the role of existence in essential predications is of the same importance as originality of existence, and is somehow a completion to it. In his works, Allama Tabatabaie has dealt with resolving that puzzle, but it seems that the expositors have depleted those statements of innovation. In the present article, we criticize a view according to which existence plays role in the form of a part of substratum, in a way that the formation of essential attribution is realized through the essence becoming the substratum to the restriction of existence. Then, we defend a view that considers existence the whole substratum. According to that view, if the essential products are properly constructed in the form of a sentence, they would be, in effect, the attributes of existence. Besides, one cannot absolutely defend the role of existence being the whole substratum; rather, this precept is specified to the external effects of the essence, and the existence is not described by the mental effects of essence.

The problem of the simplicity or combination of the derivative is one of the controversial issues which, in spite of its similarity to mentally-posited discussions, has sometimes affected philosophical debates. The present paper reports on the results of a critical study of Jurjani’s reasoning regarding the simplicity of the derivative. In his view, whenever the derivative is assumed to consist of “shayin lahu …”, in case of attaining the concept of “shay”, interference of general accident in differentia occurs. However, in case of attaining the extension of “shay”, the transformation of the possible proposition through the necessary happens. In the first case, the differentia fails to be a differentia, and in the second case the direction of possibility is removed from the world of reality. In order to explain the quality of the transformation, a solution has been presented which analyzes the concept of portion and the role of limitation and determination in the predicate. Here, the writers, in spite of considering this argument to be perfect, clarify that the given reason for demonstrating the simplicity of the derivative is inefficient and is only capable of deriving the concept or referent of “shay” from the truth of the derivative.