فصلنامه حکمت اسلامی
پیاپی 39 (زمستان 1402)

‘Allāmah Ṭabāṭabā’ī is a thinker who has shown great interest in comparative studies of mysticism. The foundation of ‘Allāmah's studies in this field is the existence of the innate monotheistic religion as the root of all religions, and the existence of an innate inclination and insight as the principle of all mysticisms. He considers self-knowledge (ma'rifat al-nafs) in the realm of spiritual journey (sulūk) as a common spiritual method among all Muslim and non-Muslim mystics, tracing its roots in human nature (fiṭrah). ‘Allāmah believes that due to the egoistic desires or the neglect of the seeker from some monotheistic foundations, the method of self-knowledge has deviated from its main path in some mystical schools. Instead of being a path for the seeker (sālik) to attain knowledge (ma’rifah) of God, it has been perceived independently, causing the seeker to deviate from reaching the goal of knowing the Lord. In the realm of knowledge (ma’rifah), ‘Allāmah sees the ultimate goal of mysticism as proximity of the ultimate truth and attainment of existential self-subsisting monotheism. He argues that manifestations of this monotheism can be observed in the sacred texts of other religions as well, although here too in some schools, deviations have occurred in this monotheistic perception due to the general incomprehensibility of some teachings, neglecting reason, and substitution of the tradition of servitude. The result of which is that throughout history, polytheistic understandings of these sacred texts are presented. ‘Allāmah Ṭabāṭabā’ī, in his comparative studies in the field of mysticism strives to transcend the superficial and secondary cultural and social levels, and attempts to reach the depth of the mystical truth arising from the innate inclination and insight, which is consistent with the innate monotheistic religion. Alongside, he also pays attention to deviations and damages of mysticism in the realm of knowledge and practice.

The issues in first philosophy are established by proof (burhān), which is either a priori or a posteriori. Each of these two is further divided into categories. According to ‘Allāmah Ṭabāṭabā’ī, reasoning or dalīl (i.e. proceeding from effect to cause) or any argument that requires proceeding from effect to cause, inherently lack certainty. Therefore, the philosophical problems cannot be established through them, and essentially these arguments have no place in philosophy. According to him, although a priori proof brings about certainty, it has no place in philosophy; since introducing it in philosophy is tantamount to the contingency of the existent from the perspective of existence. ‘Allāmah’s claim has been critiqued by scholars such as ‘Allāmah Miṣbāḥ, ‘Allāmah Jawādī Āmulī and Āyatullāh Fayyāḍī. This discourse, by using proof as a methodology, shows that none of the raised criticisms dismiss ‘Allāmah Ṭabāṭabā’ī’s claim because we will show by proof that:-The proof is either “a priori”, but establishing the judgment is not among the essential accidents of existent from the perspective of existence. Hence, it is not a philosophical issue. - Or it is not “a priori”, and the judgment of essential accidents of existent is from the perspective of existence. The middle and the major terms are from the general concomitants, and the issue belongs to first philosophy.

The existence of nature and the occurrence of causality in its elements are accepted facts in various branches of knowledge. Except for a few skeptics or idealists, no one denies it, but the independence of nature from the non-physical elements and the exclusivity of causality within its constituents have their proponents. One corresponding claim is the physical causal closure. This principle asserts that physical phenomena arise from physical causes and the non-physical element either does not exist, or if it does, it does not intervene or have an explanatory role. Therefore, there is no need to consider the role of non-physical factors in explaining physical events. Muslim philosophers also believe that physical events are caused by the specific nature of objects, and nature itself is the "direct agent." Such a view is susceptible to being assumed same as the principle of physical causal closure. Philosophical investigations show that this perspective is not the same as the principle of causal closure because philosophers reject the exclusivity of causality in physical causes by accepting non-physical causes, soul and their involvement in physical events. Therefore, the confinement of the investigation methodology of nature to sense and experience is denied. ‘Allāmah Ṭabāṭabā’ī also holds this view. Therefore, he cannot be considered in agreement with proponents of the causal closure. This matter is examined through analytical and rational methods by referring to existing texts on these perspectives.

"Language-based argument" is an argument from the structure of language to understand the structure of the world. Although this mode of argumentation has been represented in the context of analytical philosophy, examples of such arguments can be found in the tradition of Islamic philosophy. The influence of the issue of simplicity or complexity of the derivative (mushtaq) on the primacy of existence (aṣālat al-wujūd) is one example of these arguments. In this article, a general account of this influence is provided and examine ‘Allāmah's approach towards this argument. It will become clear that ‘Allāmah does not agree with such arguments in the philosophical tradition. ‘Allāmah's argument for the copulative existence apparently falls within the category of language-based arguments, and if so, a kind of inconsistency can be seen in ‘Allāmah's encounter with this model of argumentation. By presenting two alternative arguments for the externality of the copulative existence and critiquing the interpretation of the commentators of ‘Allāmah's argument, we will exclude this argument from the language-based arguments.

One of the significant issues in the field of religious studies is the question of the origin of religion. Some consider the origin of religion to be the legislative will of God, while others regard it to be human involvements (such as ignorance). ‘Allāmah Ṭabāṭabā’ī is one of the prominent religious scholars who extensively addressed the issue of the origin of religion in his works. He argues that religion has a divinely revealed and innate origin, and each of these two origins has mutual functions that collectively lead to humanity's perpetual need for religion to attain felicity. The main issue of this research is to examine the aforementioned functions from the perspective of ‘Allāmah Ṭabāṭabā’ī, for which it focuses on his works through a descriptive - analytical method. From his viewpoint, religion is divided into natural (fiṭrī) religion and revealed religion. Natural religion consists of beliefs and laws guided by the natural disposition (fiṭrah). Natural religion and revealed religion have mutual functions, whereby natural religion serves as the basis for the teachings of revealed religion, guiding man towards the revealed religion and ensuring the perpetuity and universality of its teachings. Revealed religion, in turn, plays a significant role in identifying, elaborating, moderating, affirming, and reviving the teachings of natural religion.

The primacy of existence (aṣālat al-wujūd) serves as the basic and fundamental pillar of transcendent philosophy, and all the ingenuity of Mullā Ṣadrā is a direct result of it. Various interpretations of Mullā Ṣadrā about the posteriority and unreality of quiddity (māhiyyah) have led to the formation of a range of interpretations by the proponents of transcendent philosophy. This article examines the correct interpretation of the role and position of quiddity in four stages. At the first stage, the locus of conflict between the primacy of existence and the primacy of quiddity is elucidated. At the second stage, by accepting the primacy of existence, various interpretations of the position of quiddity are examined. The third stage addresses the impact of different interpretations of the primacy of existence on the theory of substantial motion. The fourth stage demonstrates which interpretation the theory of substantial motion fundamentally supports and endorses. The findings of the article, based on a descriptive-analytical approach, indicate that in the issue of the primacy of existence, considering quiddity as a mental concept (i'tibārī) is akin to a mirage, as interpreted by ‘Allāmah Ṭabāṭabā’ī. It appears that the theory of substantial motion, while confirming this interpretation, has a greater compatibility with it. Some researchers have suggested that accepting ‘Allāmah Ṭabāṭabā’ī's interpretation somehow negates nativism and leads to falling into idealism or perhaps nominalism. However, it must be noted that: Firstly, in this interpretation, the external existence of physical universal is not only not negated, but it also has a greater compatibility with the foundations of the primacy of existence. Secondly, the interaction of the mind with objective reality demonstrates that quiddity is not solely a construct of the mind, but due to existence of a real source of abstraction, it signifies the external reality.

One of the issues surrounding subjective considerations (i’tibāriyyāt) is its background among the philosophers. In order to closely examine this issue, firstly, the characteristics of subjective perceptions according to ‘Allāmah Ṭabāṭabā’ī are extracted in this paper and in the next step, they are searched for in the works of Fārābī. According to ‘Allāmah, these characteristics are as follows:- They are constructed based on human social needs. - They do not aim to discover or correspond to an objective reality. - They are formed from common beliefs (mashhūrāt) and imaginations. - They do not lead to human perfection. - Their benefit lies solely in motivating humans to perform actions. - These concepts have a real origin and take shape by making a real concept to represent another thing. - The faculty that forms these concepts and their related propositions is practical reason and the perceptual faculties that are under its command, namely estimation and imagination, etc. By searching through Fārābī's works, these characteristics can be found in non-certain propositions including "dialectical (that employs common beliefs), rhetorical (that employs accepted propositions), and poetic (that employs imaginations)". ‘Allāmah Ṭabāṭabā’ī examines all these propositions under one single topic of subjective considerations (i’tibāriyyāt) and explains their formation, epistemic value, and functions in detail and with greater precision. The discussion of subjective considerations can draw the attention of scholars to the role of these perceptions in contemporary humanities and their distinction from real practical sciences.

Like most Muslim philosophers, ‘Allāmah Ṭabāṭabā’ī considers the principle of causality as a necessary proposition and counts it among the primary self-evident propositions, deeming its denial as departing from human nature. He views the principle of causality as irrefutable and distinct from the issue of basis of need. In line with this perspective, the main focus of the current research is to present and examine the most significant epistemological discussions around the principle of causality, with an emphasis on ‘Allāmah Ṭabāṭabā’ī's viewpoint. The key epistemological issues related to this principle are crystallized in its epistemological characteristics. Therefore, after reviewing various interpretations of the principle of causality in the introduction, we examine its epistemological characteristics (such as necessity, primary self-evidence, irrefutability, and analytical or compound nature) and elucidate its reasoning.The accomplishment of this study lies in the impossibility of establishing a real proof to demonstrate the principle of causality. Any argument put forth for its establishment, even if based on probabilities, is just to bring it to awareness or dialectical. This is because the validity of any argument, whether for or against, is based on accepting this principle, and without it, no argument can be established.

Preserving the stability of the grand plan and laws governing human life, while meeting their variable needs, has always been a matter of interest to intellectuals. The complexities of elucidating these two aspects, especially in divine religions, have provided the groundwork for presenting various theories on this matter. One can explore such efforts made to present a comprehensive religious theory in the works and thoughts of ‘Allāmah Ṭabāṭabā’ī. He believes that divine laws have been formed based on human innate needs and therefore have fixed aspects. On the other hand, they also adapt to the daily needs of man, and in this respect, they consider the transformative aspect of material life. In this paper, through a descriptive-analytical method, while examining ‘Allāmah Ṭabāṭabā’ī's perspective on this issue, the foundations and consequences of his thought are reviewed. By inquiring briefly into the rival theories, the similarities and differences between them and ‘Allāmah’s views are highlighted.

The issue of hearing of the dead is one of the important topics that has received considerable attention from both Shiite and Sunni theologians, with various interpretations being presented in support or opposition to it. One of the arguments used by opponents is the adherence to verses 80 and 81 of Surah An-Naml, which apparently indicate the impossibility of hearing of the dead. According to the exegetes, the dead referred to in these verses are metaphor for disbelievers. Considering the truth reflecting nature of the Quranic verses, there is a real and true relationship between the metaphors used in the verses and their true meanings. Therefore, applying the term "dead" to disbelievers signifies a shared reality between the two, leading to the validity of using the term "dead" in a different meaning (i.e., disbeliever). This paper aims to provide a new interpretation of the non-hearing mentioned in the verses by analyzing the relationship between the real and figurative meanings of death and utilizing ‘Allāmah Ṭabāṭabā’ī's theory of ‘coining words for the spirit of meanings’. Through the analysis of this relationship, it becomes clear that death means the absence of effects and qualities in a thing, which is evaluated in relation to any given subject. In the case of the discussed verses, a human being who is not responsive to truth and guidance (i.e., a disbeliever), is dead in reality.

Knowledge by acquisition is a perceptual process in which three components provide the ground for the realization of knowledge; the first component is the perceiver or the person who understands, the second component is the outer object or the accidental known, and the third component is the subject or the essential known. To Allameh Tabatabai, the relation between the essential known and the accidental known is not explained by the Presence of material object in mind, but rather, it is the presence of an imaginational incorporeal form to the imaginational existence of the perceiver. Thus, the knowledge of the essential known is immediate and knowledge by presence. On this basis, the knowledge by acquisition also goes back to the knowledge by presence. The particular notion that Allameh Tabatabai has in quiddity has an impact on explaining the relationship between essential known and the accidental known in the knowledge acquisition process. Allameh believes that there is a intellectual inherence between objective existence and subjective essence. The question of the relation between objective existence and the essence that emerges from the objective existence in the mind is the problem of the present study.