amirehsan karbasizadeh

One of the most important aspects of our mental life, in terms of the quality and meaning of our existence, is emotions; Because emotions can guide our perceptions, thoughts, and actions in a certain direction. To explain this category, the differentiation of passions, rational tendencies, instincts, and the role of each in human actions should be investigated. Leibniz in his philosophy of mind highlights these different inclinations of the mind well and by focusing on dynamic forces, transforms the understanding of the human mind specially. He tries to explain how these types of emotions affect the body and mind based on the approach of psychophysical parallelism and the experience of states such as pleasure and pain based on his metaphysical background. Although Leibniz never wrote a separate treatise on passions like Descartes, he deeply cared about the appetent dimension of the human mind, and his ideas in this regard can be found in the work new essays on human understanding. In this article, an attempt is made to explain his approach to emotions and, more specifically, human passions by focusing on new essays on human understanding.

Modern scientific research relies heavily on scientific experiments to produce valid results. Scientists often claim that their work is based on empirical evidence. A common assumption in the scientific community is that many discoveries in each field are the direct result of quantitative methods and the mathematical modeling of the data collected by scientists. This study will focus on the theoretical assumptions and their implications for the outcomes of cognitive science. The main question is how and to what extent fMRI pictures can help scientists to justify their claims. So, the epistemic status of the fMRI pictures and their role in affirming theories in cognitive science should be addressed.

Using conceptual analysis and philosophical reasoning to examine the Theory-ladenness of observation in neuroimaging.

In this paper, I have shown that interpretation of fMRI pictures from other points of view is still possible and cannot be dismissed by mere experiments. The conclusions do not entail from their conceptual theories, essentially.

The fMRI pictures and observations in cognitive science are theory-laden. It can support many perspectives for looking at the fMRI pictures. It can have many profound impacts on the evolution of this discipline and help to use in different domains of human life. Thinking about the concepts used in cognitive science may open new horizons to this immature discipline.

Cornell realism belongs to the new wave movements in ethical naturalism debates. What distinguishes Cornell realism from other ethical naturalism is that the thesis adopts an anti-reductionist approach towards ethical facts. Our aim in this paper is to consider the thesis based on Richard Boyd’s views who is the most well-known defender of the thesis. We try to show that Boyd’s proposal on the semantics of ethical terms can defuse both Moore’s open-question argument and constructivist relativism arguments. Along with considering Boyd’s thesis, we will consider the required premises of his argument like the idea of the natural kind, extensional identities, co-referentiality, and partial denotation.

Cornell realism has been widely discussed in contemporary literature of philosophy. Jackson and Pettit (1990) propose an influential defensive argument called “program explanation” pro-Cornell realism. This explanation bestows moral higher-order properties a place in the best explanation of the natural world. We begin by specification of the proposal and its explanatory role in moral endeavors. In part two, Leiter’s criticisms against program explanation will be assessed. In part three, we consider Miller’s criticisms against both Leiter’s argument as well as program explanation. We end by proposing a new defence of program explanation based on Nelson’s argument.