فهرست مطالب mohammadhadi tavakoli

Ibn al-Kalbī in the Mathālib al-'Arab reports the emergence of Zindīq among Qurayshs while introducing the religions existing among Arab tribes and states that the Christians of al-Hirah taught the Zindīq to the Qurayshs’ merchants. He also mentioned the names of the Zindīqs of Quraysh. According to the historical evidence of using Zindīq in the meaning of Mazdakism, the question of this article is whether the Zindīq that Ibn al-Kalbī talked about its prevalence among Quraysh can mean Mazdakism or not? Therefore, with a historical approach and a library method has tried to discover the evidence of the presence of Mazdakism in Saudi Arabia. The accuracy of al-Kalbī's report and the analysis of the library evidence indicate that the mentioned Zindīq does not mean Mazdakism and to understand the meaning of the Zindīq reported by Ibn al-Kalbī other possibilities should be considered.

The review of the works of Mir Sayyid Sharif Jurjani (1816 AH) indicates that the theory of the unity of existence (waḥdat al-wujūd) was one of his main questions. Jurjani has tried to bring reasoning and intuition closer together in this matter as much as possible. According to his point of view, the correct understanding and recognition of the unity of the existence of mystics can only be achieved through the way beyond the way of reason, i.e. intuition. Reason can prove the "unity of existence", but not as the mystics believe, because the denial of plurality in "existence" is in conflict with the verdict of reason that the existence of multitudes is self-evident. Influenced by his predecessors, based on Ibn Sina's argument on divine monotheism, he has tried to argue on a kind of existential monotheism, which of course is accompanied by many fallacies that make it impossible to accept it. In this article, based on documentary method, Jurjani's statements about existential monotheism have been collected and then described and analyzed philosophically.

In the authentic sources of Imamiyya narration such as usul -al-kafi while discussing the visibility of God a narration has been narrated from Imam Reza (as) whose content is that seeing God with faith can not be combined with him neither in this world nor in the hereafter therefore it is not possible to see God. Shiite thinkers have considered this narration as a difficult and confusing narration and have proposed various solutions to explain its meaning. But none of the proposed solutions seems acceptable; Because some of the proposed meanings are either inconsistent with the appearance of the narration or some of them can not be in accordance with the narration in terms of meaning. For this reason one should either look for another solution in explaining the meaning of this narration, or because of the unknownness of Muhammad ibn Ubayd who is its narrator its issuance should be denied at least in the form mentioned in the narration sources.

According to Aristotle, there was a popular theory in ancient Greece according to which "unity" was considered an independent substance that has a causal role in relation to other substances. Aristotle tried to reject that theory by stating that “one” is a "predicate" and also referring to the corrupt result. This theory and Aristotle's critiques of it came to the attention of Ibn Sina, and he, unlike Aristotle, did not confine himself to simply considering the "one" as the “predicate”. In the Ketab al-Nijat, he tried, through three arguments, to prove the “one” is an indispensable accident and is the source of the derivation of "unity." Ibn Sina's arguments are distorted in many ways, but the most important drawback of his argument is the confusion of categorical and analytical propositions, and the acceptance of the predicate of the one and by accepting the predicate of the “one” and its non-separation from the subject, it is not possible to prove “unity” is an "accident", in contrast to the substance, and thus negate the causality of the one in relation to the substances.

In confirming the theory that the fanā or Waḥdat al-wujūd in Islamic mysticism is due to the entry of Vedanta's teachings into the Islamic world,Zaehner paid attention to some of Bayazid's statements and tried hard to reconcile some of his statements with the words of the Upanishads. In describing his ascension (miraj),Bayazid called what he saw in this journey a khudā (deception) and This prompted Zaehner to introduce "deception" as the equivalent of "Maya" in the Shvetashvatara Upanishad.In order to strengthen his theory, he also tried to find a suitable equivalent in the Upanishads and the Bhagavadgītā among some of the other titles that Bayazid mentioned in his Ascension.In this writing,by proving the Islamic origin of the interpretation of "deception" and also by arguing the semantic difference between "deception" and "Maya",the inaccuracy of Zaehner's claim is revealed and his theory about the influence of Vedanta on Islamic mysticism is challenged.

Sadr, who believed that while visioning, the human soul creates sensible forms, disagreed and criticized Suhrawardi's theory according to which, while visioning, the human soul gains illuminative knowledge in presence during the vision. Sabzawari defended Suhrawardi's theory and in addition to answering Sadr's criticism, tried to harmonize Suhrawardi's theory with the foundations of transcendent philosophy. The article is reporting, reviewing, and investigating to harmonize these two points of view as a new approach. The result is that two explanations can be understood from his words. These explanations suffer from some defects including incompatibility with illuminative philosophy, but the theory which is obtained from his second explanation is adjusted to the transcendent philosophy and can be regarded as a new theory in the history of development of theories on the quality of vision.

The problem of the unification of the intellect and intelligible can be found in the philosophies of Plato and Aristotle. Indeed, it has been explained more clearly in Plotinus’ philosophy and the Neo-Platonic School and its followers. This problem has also been tackled by the thinkers of the Islamic world however it reached its culmination in the Transcendent Philosophy. To prove the unification of the intellect and the intelligible, Mulla Sadra adduced two proofs, the ‘Argument of correlation’ and the ‘argument of light and obscurity’, which in the first one, he analyzes intellect existence and in the second analyzes intelligible existence. Misbah Yazdi in some of his philosophical books criticizes the mentioned proofs. In this article, after stating each of his refutals, I will evalute and cosequentley reject them.

The ‘argument of correlation’ is one of arguments by which Mulla-Sadra attempts to prove the unification of the intellect and the intelligible. Haeri Yazdi in some of his philosophical books has tried to explain the argument. His viewpoints in this regard has been criticized by other philosophers. In this paper on the base on last Haeri''s paper about the unification of the intellect and the intelligible، we will show that his viewpoints is uncceptable

The argument of correlation which Mulla Sadra present to prove the unification of the intellect and the intelligible، although accepted by some philosophers، but the other criticized it. Allameh Tabatabaii accepted the unification of the intellect and the intelligible but he refuted the argument of correlation by five reasons، and instead offered a new method to prove the theory. In this article، after stating all of his reasons، we have tried to reject them.

The theory of unification of the intellect and the intelligible is one of the most impotant issue in the transcendent philosophy. Allameh tabatabaii accepts this theory، but criticizes one of the proofs which Sadra had presented for it. Instead، he offers a new method to prove the theory. In this article we will analyze and criticize the allameh tabatabaii ''s mathod in proving the thory، then through a comparative approach، we will dicuss about differentiations of these two philosopher’s veiws about the problem.

There are different viewpoints about the question that “what is the creation and making of things?” Among various theories about this question, decedent Imam Khomeini (peace be upon him) has special viewpoint. Imam believes to the mystic’s monotheism, (i. e. oneness of being) and according to this view it cannot be said that existence is acreature, because the result of this position is real multiplicity in being. In ئcontrast, Imam says that the made thing is quiddity, but this made thing is not the primary creature but is a kind of appearance following the appearance of the existence. He thinks that by adopting this view, we able to reconcile the theory of priority of existence and the viewpoint that made thing is the quiddity and also reconcile the position that “made thing is the existence” and the viewpoint that made thing is the quiddity. This view has been criticized by some scholars. In this article we criticize and analyze Imam’s view and some of its criticisms and conclude that the mentioned criticisms are not valid.