جستجوی مقالات مرتبط با کلیدواژه « برهان وجودی » در نشریات گروه « علوم انسانی »

This paper has two objectives first, to provide an explanation and analysis of Anselm and Plantinga's ontological argument based on the interpretation of William Rowe, a contemporary atheist, and second, to determine the place of the fallacy of " begging the question" in this argument. After presenting the criticisms of Anselm's interpretation of the argument, Rowe considers Plantinga's modal version to be the most convincing version of the argument and believes that previous interpretations, based on the principle that "existence in reality" is a superior property, are caught in a logical fallacy. Plantinga's interpretation is also based on the premise that God is "a possible being with maximum perfection," and this proposition is true only if God exists in the real world. In this research, using an analytical-critical method, I show that Anselm's interpretation and Plantinga's reconstruction of it are fallacious, and although Plantinga's modal interpretation has logical necessity, it does not prove the necessity of God's existence in the external world. This is because perfection in this argument is defined in a way that falls into the fallacy of "begging the question”.

The ontological proof of God's existence is a highly controversial argument sought after by Western philosophers and Islamic thinkers. To compare the discourse between the Western and Muslim perspectives, this research examines the initial coherent statements of Anselm and Naraghi, finding complete similarity in both propositions. The starting point of this argument is the concept of God as a being beyond which nothing greater or superior can be imagined, a premise accepted by Naraghi as well. The research seeks a common knowledge basis between these two thinkers, revealing similarities that demonstrate the existence of God as an inherent and unquestionable truth for both. Acknowledging this innate knowledge of God plays a crucial role in establishing the argument's premise. By neglecting the epistemological origin of this argument, certain challenges raised by individuals like Gunilo can be addressed and resolved.

This paper aims to explain an innovative formulation of the argument of the Righteous (burhān Ṣiddīqīn) from Imam Khomeini’s point of view and to compare it with the existential argument of Anselm and Descartes. This was done using a descriptive-analytical and a library research method. One of the basic shortcomings of the Anselm-Descartes existential argument is the confusion between the concept and the referent, or between primary essential predication and common technical predication, while burhān Ṣiddīqīn does not suffer from such a fault, in neither of its Avicennian or Sadrian formulations. However, the fundamental principle that enables Imam Khomeini to give a new spirit to the arguments for the proof of God is that he expresses his view and reading of burhān Ṣiddīqīn with solid foundations, and that is departure from the canonical meanings and theoretical words in proving the existence of God. He believes that the argument of the Righteous is basically grounded on intuition and does not require argumentative or philosophical preliminaries.

The natural atheism is based on two items: “the concept of God” and “the explanatory realm of science and religion”. The concept of God in new atheism is different from that in Abrahamic religions, especially Islam. Besides, the science and religion are two different spheres and are, as far as explanation is concerned, essentially different. Since past, various methods have been used to prove the existence of the Necessary Being, one of which is founded on the very “concept of existence” itself; that is, the philosophical explanation of God’s existence a priori. Richard Dawkins maintains that the “ontological argument” is nothing except a word game, and Kant has rejected that argument. Descartes, however, presented a new exposition which was totally ignored by Dawkins. This article seeks to explain and review Dawkins’ statement in The God Delusion to show that Dawkins’ critique of Anselm’s ontological argument is by no means right and is a cheap reading of that argument.

 The existential argument in contemporary Islamic philosophy has been criticized on the basis of one of the initiatives and innovations in this philosophy. This innovation is about discussing propositions and their division and the condition of contradiction. This critique is more concerned with Anselm's argument. But it also includes other narratives of the existential argument, especially Descartes. Javadi Amoli, one of the commentators and followers of Sadr al-Muta'allehin of Shiraz, made a relevant criticism. The main aim of the present study is to analyze Javadi Amoli's critique of the existential argument, in addition to the author's critique and evaluation. One of the authors' critiques and evaluations has also been proposed and criticized by the author of this study. Although the aim of this study apparently has two components: the author's evaluation from Javadi Amoli's point of view and the author's evaluation of one of the author's critique of Javadi Amoli, this duality is purely apparent and the research problem is the same. The study confirms Javadi Amoli's critique of the existential argument based on the difference between the two predictions. As a result of this evaluation, the extent to which this critique needs to be reviewed and, at the same time, its resilience to criticism is explained.

Anselm's argument is one of the most controversial ontological arguments. According to Oppy،, this argument,, can fall into the category of modal,,meinonigian, or conceptual arguments. He believes that one of the sources of Anselm's thought in presenting the ontological argument is the ontological argument of Ibn Sina. In this study, we seek to answer these questions:Can the argument of Sinian Srddighin proof be considered as a kind of ontological argument? And is Anselm's argument an argument with two different interpretations, or are we confronted with two arguments? The purpose of this study is to compare Anselm's argument with Sina's proof. The findings of the study show that, from Oppy's point of view, Anselm has based only one argument on the existence of God in Proslogion's treatise.Although this argument is similar to the Siddighin proof in its a priori, inspired by the holy book and come to God through God, the essential difference between the two arguments is so great that these similarities can be overlooked. The ontoligicall argument begins with the " the concept of existence," while Seddighin proof is based on the " the truth of existence."And this is the beginning of the important differences between the two arguments.

In the history of philosophy, very few arguments have grabbed the attention of intellectuals as strongly as ontological arguments have. Graham Oppy, the contemporary Australian philosopher of religion, is an atheist who has considered different versions of ontological arguments in order to uncover their weakness. In this paper, we deal with how Oppy has formulated ontological arguments and what his objections to them are. The paper deploys an analytic method in order to elaborate Oppy’s classification and objections. It turns out that there are several versions of what might be called the “ontological” argument. For Oppy, these arguments are characterized by a priority. The most general objections leveled by Oppy at his 8 versions of the argument consist in: question begging, lack of epistemic value, denial of possible contradictions in case God does not externally exist, and inconceivability of an entity with infinite attributes. We conclude that given challenges of ontological arguments for the existence of God, they fail to serve as arguments for God, although Oppy’s atheism and his conception of God and His attributes are not acceptable.

As a contemporary neo-Sadraian philosopher, Muhaqeq Isfahani has proposed his own account of the ontological argument for the existence of Allah. This account of the argument is unprecedented and has caught the attention of many contemporary thinkers. There have been proposed five accounts of this argument upon three pivots. First is the concept of necessary being as a mental concept. Second is the concept of necessary being so far as it denotes something beyond the concept. And third is the very reality of necessary being existing by itself in the outside world. Each of the above accounts is open to some criticisms. Prof. Mahdi Ha’iri Yazdi has leveled four criticisms at that account of the argument such as counter-argument, begging the question, the confusion of categorical proposition with non-categorical one. The proponents of ontological argument have raised objections to Ha’iri’s criticisms. Most of those objections are not valid for they stem from the insufficient consideration of the fact that concepts such as “necessary being”, “God”, “partner of Creator” and the like are philosophical secondary intelligible. Accordingly, most of Prof. Ha’iri’s criticisms against Muhaqeq Ishafani are valid and thus the ontological argument fails to prove the existence of Allah.

Several arguments have been adduced on demonstrating the individual unity of being. Most of these arguments, which have been presented by such gnostics as Dāvood Qayṣarī, Ḥamzah Fanārī, and Ibn Turkah, suffer from some defects in terms of a confusion of concept and referent. In his glosses on Tamhīd al-qawā’id (the section on the arguments on the demonstration of the individual unity of existence), Ḥakīm Moḥammad Rezā Ghomsheī has presented an argument which demonstrates the pre-eternal necessity of God. However, three criticisms have been advanced against it. The first concerns the meaning of the absolute nature of being, which has been stated ambiguously. The second criticism questions the confusion of concept and referent. The first part of the third criticism targets the whole argument, based on the presupposition of the realization of the essence of nature, and its second part objects to the consistency of the realization of the essence of the nature of existence with limited existences, as acknowledged in Ghomsheī’s argument. Finally, the fourth focuses on the absence of any kind of innovation in this argument. Following an analytic-comparative method, this paper examines all these criticisms and responds to the first three of them. Accordingly, the authors acknowledge the truth of Ḥakīm Ghomsheī’s argument by presenting a detailed discussion in this paper.

In this paper, we compare between Ontological Argument and Seddiqin Argument and we assume that these Arguments represent two metaphysical point of view (Idealism and Originality of Being) and we assume that with regarding this representation, we can thought on these argument in more correct way. In our view, Ontological Argument  is based on Idealism, and Idealism gone a fundamental change from premodern to modern period, for this reason, Ontological argument gone a fundamental change  and this change entails to fundamental different  in  the  sense of final consequence of this argument and by this reason, it is necessary  that we regard this difference. Given that Presentation of two readings of ontological argument, we can find which reading of ontological argument Correspondence with seddiqin argument and which one diverge from it. Meanwhile, Given that different bases in Ontological Argument and Seddiqin Argument, we can obtain a more correct understand of  metaphysical background of Ontological argument.

As one of the most famous argument for the existence of God, late Sheikh Muhammad Husain's argument has been focused on by the scholars who emerged after him. Some have dealt with it as a perfect argument for the existence of God whereas others have considered it as an imperfect one insufficient to prove the existence of God. This argument proves the existence of God through invoking the nature of the necessary being – a thing that has raised controversy about it as to whether or not it is concept-centered. Terming it as concept-centered, some scholars have pointed out that this argument aims to prove the existence of God by relying on the concept of necessary being. Others have regarded it as non-ontological denying the centrality of the role of the necessary being in this argument. Each group presents its own arguments for the choice it makes. This article aims to relate and evaluate the reasons whether or not this argument is ontological. The evaluation shows that the reasons presented are not sufficient to show it is ontological. Answering the objections against non-ontological formulation, it indicates that the argument is among the most successful ones.

Ayatollah Muhammad Hussein Gharawi Isfahani (Muhaqqiq Isfahani) presented an argument for the existence of God which is classified among ontological arguments. Among contemporary thinkers in Iran, this argument has attracted serious supporters and critics alike. Overall, five readings have been put forth for this argument. In the present study, these five readings have been analyzed in three main frameworks including (1) the concept of the Necessary Being as a mental concept, (2) the concept of Necessary Being as representing something out of itself and finally, (3) the reality of the Necessary Being or the objectivity of the Being by Itself. After presenting each reading, its compatibility with Isfahani’s argument will be analyzed. It will be shown that Isfahani's argument should be regarded as an argument in the second framework.

Kant categorizes the arguments for the existence of God into ontological, cosmological, and design arguments. He holds that whereas existence is not a real and determining predicate, it is not allowed to be a part of object’s definition and so the ontological argument is fruitless. Along with Kant and Bennett, I shall try to show that existence is not a perfection nor a determining predicate. Besides, contrary to Bennett, who assesses Kant's reasoning insufficient, I argue that Kant finds the fallacy hidden in the argument and argues that the flaw of cosmological argument is its dependence on the insecure ontological argument. While Bennett truly notices the ambiguity and weakness of this relation, Kant, by appealing to a strong criticism, destructs the cosmological argument later. Finally, despite his interest in the argument from design, Kant asserts that it is based on the invalid cosmological argument. In this stage, Bennett criticism neglects the inherent connection between design and cosmological argument.

Since 1970, when Gödel tried to provide a new articulation of the so called ontological argument, many considerable discussions has been emerged due to assessment of his argument's validity and soundness. For example, Sobel tries to show some defects of Gödel's argument. Petr Hájek, the eminent logician and mathematician, tries to save this argument from Sobel's critiques by some small amendments. According to him, if we articulate this argument in S5 system of modal logic with a few changes, we can have a safe argument. Besides, Hájek believes that this argument is of little interest from theological perspective. In this article, after a survey of Hájek’s work, we shall try to put this later claim under scrutiny and show the theological relevance of the argument. Finally, we show that despite the fact that Hájek and many other logicians consider Gödel's argument just as a "formal model" of an ancient argument, this argument seems a bona fide and justified argument for God’s existence.

The first part of the first sermon of Nahjul Balagha is a discursive proposition of description and explanation of different levels of faith, knowledge, purity and unity of the Almighty God. In the statement "Kamalo Marefatehi Al-Tasdiqo bih" (Knowing Him perfectly means confirming Him) in this sermon, Imam Ali (PBUH) talks about the relationship between knowing the Almighty and confirming him.
Adopting a logico-analytical approach and its various tools, this study aims to describe and explain how "Knowledge of the Almighty God" and "His confirmation" in the above mentioned statement are related and integrated. The result of the analysis of this proposition suggests the disputability of knowledge, and identification – not just entailment – of "conceptual knowledge" with” assertive knowledge" of the Almighty God. The possibility of the identicality the two types of knowledge – conceptual and assertive – could only be presented in the context of epistemological principles of transcendental philosophy, which is a true account. The above-mentioned statement in Nahjul Balagha could also be turned into a kind of existential proof for proving the Almighty God. The criticisms of "the confusion of concept and instance" and "the impossibility of obtaining assertive knowledge through conceptual knowledge" leveled against this proposition and other existential proofs are refuted and appropriates explanations are provided in this regard.

Seddiqin reasoning is among the philosophical proofs to prove the Godexistence having been narrated and asserted variously since its emergence within the fieldof Islamic philosophy. The great contemporary philosopher, Allameh Tabatabaie, hasproposed two types of assertions from this reasoning in his works. He has proposed anarration of this reasoning in two of his books Bedayat Al-Hikmah and Nahayat Al-Hikmah being similar to the proofs of the predecessors while in the commentary on Asfarand Philosophy Principles and Realism Method he has proposed a particular narrationbeing considered to be his innovative reasoning and it is not based on any theoreticalbackground and authenticated origin from philosophical principles.

Ontological arguments are arguments to prove the existence of Allah, in which His existence is proved, a priori, through a mere concept and without adherence to any objective entity. In the west, St. Anselm (1109-1033 or 1034) proposed this kind of argument in the Christian theology, and ever since it has had leading opponents and proponents. In the Islamic philosophy and theology, the argument has not had an outstanding place; however, in the words of the predecessors, and of Farabi as a frontrunner, traces of attention to this argument can be noticed. But, during the last half century, the attention to it is increasing. Some have accepted it, and some have negated it. In this article, after a brief review of the development of the ontological argument in the west, we have posed some Muslim philosopher’s views on the argument. Then, reconstructing Allameh Tabataba’i’s “argument of the truthful ones”, we suggest a new exposition of the ontological argument, which is immune from the critiques presented to Anselm’s ontological argument and its different narrations.