جستجوی مقالات مرتبط با کلیدواژه « نهادگرایی تاریخی » در نشریات گروه « علوم انسانی »

Democratization stands as one of the most momentous occurrences of the 20th century, profoundly shaping the trajectory of social change in numerous societies. Throughout this era, waves of democratization swept across different nations and Iran was not exempt from this transformative tide. Considering a pivotal part of this democratization movement, the 1979 Revolution in Iran served as the focal point for this research. The objective was to delve into key concepts within the democratization literature, specifically examining the revolutionary period spanning from 1963 to 1979. To accomplish this, the research drew upon the conceptual models presented by Samuel Huntington, Gream Gill, and Charles Tilly, using their frameworks as a basis for analyzing the research data. Employing the historical institutionalism method, the primary and secondary historical references served as the primary sources of data. The findings of this study elucidated that the activities of the Rouhaniat institution and the emergence of underground Marxist parties in 1963 marked the inception of the Islamic revolution, ultimately leading to the events of 1978. Despite the state's efforts to regulate the democratization process by creating political space, historical incidents like the episode of  September 8 and the society's disillusionment with the state played pivotal roles in accelerating the democratization process.

Interpretation of the Islamic revolution in Iran is varied, encompassing Marxist, Islamic, and democratic perspectives. This research viewed the revolution of 1979 as a significant stride towards democratization in Iran. The historical institutionalism approach was employed to identify key historical factors and establish causal relationships between events. In this method, the researchers examined the chosen historical period to identify pivotal moments and trace the chain of events. Subsequently, the researchers elucidated the temporal and causal sequences that connected these events (Pierson, 2014: 227). To accomplish this, the research relied on a foundation of historical documents, including historical journals and books, as primary sources.

The research framework was rooted in concepts derived from theories on democratization processes. Charles Tilly's notion of mobilization of protesters finds support in the mosque networks and underground Marxist groups that facilitated a large-scale demonstration in 1979. Gream Geal's emphasis on civil society and the breakdown of elite unity was evident in historical actions, such as protest speeches and nationwide demonstrations in 1977. Indications of elite disunity included punishment of former political elites and the army's refusal to suppress the populace. Samuel Huntington's theory on the struggle to establish a new political order was reflected in the absence of nominations within the Rstakhis party and the demand for an Islamic republic.The process of democratization during this period originated from ideological disagreements between Islamic and underground Marxist groups and the state. In response, the state sought to suppress these dissenting actions by establishing its own party. Meanwhile, the society witnessed an increase in demonstrations and strengthening of civil society activities. However, the state also escalated violence against demonstrators, marking a pivotal historical moment known as the "Black Friday", which led to two subsequent significant events: widespread demonstrations and strikes. The persistence of street protests following these events ultimately culminated in the final stage of democratization characterized by the collapse of elite unity.Applying the historical institutionalism approach, the results demonstrated that after the incident of "Black Friday" in September 8th, 1978, the state responded with severe repression, using violence as a means to control the society. In turn, the society responded by intensifying its civil resistance, leading to a significant number of protests involving millions of participants and nationwide strikes. These events collectively formed a causal chain that played a central role in the process of the 1979 revolution.

In explicating the essence of a modern state, one must navigate a theoretical landscape defined by a set of characteristics, criteria, and requisites that differentiate the theory of the modern state from alternative paradigms, notably the absolute state. This theoretical realm, characterized by a prescriptive understanding of modern governance, serves as a guiding force, prompting governments worldwide to emulate its structural blueprint. This form of governance, intricately woven into the fabric of contemporary political landscapes, commands loyalty from its constituents. It wields influence both directly and indirectly, orchestrating societal affairs through a bureaucratic apparatus that intricately affects diverse aspects of citizens' lives.In stark contrast to premodern governance reliant on tribute and force, the modern government garners economic sustenance directly from its citizenry, levying taxes to fulfill its distinct responsibilities. At the core of the modern state lies the imperative of nation-building, an endeavor necessitating the homogenization of social identity. However, the crux of our inquiry lies in the intricate relationship between us Iranians and the modern state. Delving into the historical narrative of the modern state as an experiential journey and scrutinizing it as a malleable theoretical model emerge as imperative undertakings.The overarching purpose of this research is to meticulously examine the historical trajectory underpinning the formation and stabilization of the modern state in Iran. Anchored in the intellectual currents of Western thought, this scholarly pursuit aspires to enhance our understanding of the state's essence and its nuanced position within the Iranian milieu. A discerning analysis of the country's policies and orientations naturally unfolds as a byproduct of this historical exploration.Guiding our intellectual journey is a theoretical framework rooted in historical institutionalism. This approach, a beacon in the study of state building in Iran, focuses on unraveling the intricate tapestry of social, political, and economic behaviors, tracing their evolution over time. Institutions, elevated to the status of independent variables, emerge as architects shaping individual and collective actions alongside the broader panorama of social and political phenomena. Recognizing that institutions not only mold actors' strategies but also sculpt their objectives, historical institutionalism, with its attention to structural variables such as class position and mediating entities like political parties and unions, provides a nuanced lens through which to study the formation and construction of the government in Iran.The research methodology, a dual-pronged approach, employs the content analysis method to scrutinize definitions of the modern state put forth by Western thinkers. This analytical approach, eschewing the exploration of attitudes and beliefs in favor of dissecting produced messages, is complemented by the historical research method. This method involves a meticulous examination of specific past events within a defined temporal scope, integrating historical facts through a rigorous regimen of data collection, evaluation, and verification.Tracing the historical trajectory of government formation in the West, political scientists posit that the foundations of the modern state or nation-state were laid in the late Middle Ages, influenced by the Catholic cultural context. The formation of modern national states was shaped by factors such as religious reform movements and conflicts among European countries. The Treaty of Westphalia in the 16th to 18th centuries is considered a pivotal event in the emergence of the modern state. From the 19th century onward, the modern government model gradually supplanted other political systems globally.The indicators and criteria of modern governments encompass a legitimate monopoly on controlling the means of violence, a specific territorial territory, sovereignty, centralized power, a codified constitution, the use of impersonal power, nationalism, a public bureaucracy, authority/legitimacy, citizenship, and provincial tax.The historical exploration of government formation in Iran reveals nuanced epochs, beginning with the Safavid era's establishment of a robust central government to counter threats from the Sunni Ottoman Empire. Shah Abbas I marked a zenith, unifying the country politically, relocating the capital to Isfahan, fostering a unified religious identity based on Shiite Islam, and expanding diplomatic relations. Subsequent governments, such as the Afshariya and Zand, did not significantly alter national and state organizations. The Qajar dynasty witnessed an expansion of central government power, albeit rooted in the Illyrian system. The constitutional revolution of 1285 emerged as a historical turning point, ushering in constitutionalism and paving the way for a more structured political system in Iran. The subsequent Pahlavi absolute government, while characterized by economic nationalism and centralization of power, laid the foundations for absolute rule.In conclusion, this historical exploration, spanning from the Safavid era to the Pahlavi period, unveils Iran's trajectory of independent political thought and the evolution of a nation transitioning to citizenship. Constitutionalism emerges as the cornerstone of modern governance, establishing a balanced relationship between the government and the nation. The era of Reza Shah, marked by economic nationalism and the consolidation of government power, signifies a fundamental shift, laying the groundwork for absolute rule. This scholarly endeavor sheds light on the nuanced tapestry of Iran's political evolution.

The period of Shah Abbas created new conditions in internal relations that led to the differentiation of this period from Safavid history. This period arose through the reconstruction and adherence to the institutions that formed and sustained the Safavid political system.Previously, the institutions of the Safavid political system, despite the various ups and downs that coordinated the structure and functioning of the government, became critical with the death of Shah Tahmasb and the failure to appoint a successor.This article tries to explain the mechanism of interactions of this period with the approach of historical institutionalism that the institutions and rules created by the Safavid system led to the employment of Shah Abbas and the consolidation of his period.In response to the reasons for the coherence of the Shah Abbas period, the article follows the assumption that adherence to the laws and institutions established in this period creates relationships that can create reconciliation and balance despite the conflict between groups, which instability Destroys. As a result of convergence, differentiation and coherence of this period was formed.

Examining the upstream documents of economic policy in Iran after the revolution, such as the general policies of development programs and the resistance economy document, shows that in order to achieve high and stable economic growth, the strategy of economic externalization in the framework of comprehensive support and Targeting the export of goods and services, investment development through the attraction of foreign resources and capital, and the expansion of commercial cooperation are among the key axes of macroeconomic policy. At the same time, examining the indicators of Iran's economy during the years 1358 to 1398 in this area and comparing it with the developments of the world economy shows that Iran's economy during this period is an introverted economy. The main question in this article is why Iran's economy after the revolution is an inward-looking economy, contrary to the upper documents of economic policy? The hypothesis of this paper based on the historical institutionalism approach is that the manticore (complex and conflicting) nature of the state in its constructive idea, its structure and functions is the factor in the formation of an introverted economy. On this basis, the government in Iran after the revolution has been responsible for two categories of development and extra-territorial functions, and as a result of the predominance of extra-territorial functions over the development functions of the government, a wide range of sanctions against Iran Formed, the consequence of which is economic introversion.

The traditional Iranian state experienced decline and decay during the late Qajar period, and its continuity was not possible. After that, the institution of state underwent transformations throughout various historical periods, and this process continued until the Islamic Republic era. The main question in this article is what are the institutional foundations of the state in the Islamic Republic of Iran? Our hypothesis, based on the historical institutionalism approach, is that the institutional foundations of the state in Iran today are influenced by the institutional heritage of the traditional state ment, the institutional transformation of the state in the critical juncture of the constitutional revolution, the dependence on the oil path in the Pahlavi period, and the institutional transformation of the state in the critical juncture of the 1979 revolution. As a result, the state in Iran after the revolution has combined various elements of the traditional state, the constitutional state, and the Islamic state. The elements that have been combined in an incompatible mixture have different epistemological foundations and historical roots, and therefore, have caused internal conflicts within the state structure. In the present study, a novel theoretical configuration called the “Monticore State” was introduced to explain the unique nature of the state in the Islamic Revolution. On this basis, understanding the internal logic of the state, the formation and perpetuation of macro-scale policies in various areas, and, consequently, the pathology of governance in the Islamic Republic requires understanding the Monticore nature of the state, its institutional legacy, and its historical roots.

The formation of the Safavid State in Iran led to a profound change in the foundations of political arrangement and the establishment of new institutions in the body of society. Contrary to the prevailing theoretical approach in explaining the relationship between State and society in Iran - which emphasizes the exclusive agency of the State and the absence of social forces in the evolution of society - this article seeks to be inspired by the historical institutionalist approach and chain explanations (historical causal narrative). To provide an alternative narrative of the relations between society and State in Safavid Iran and the continuation of the lasting institutional heritage resulting from institutional change in this historical period. The research findings show that in the institutional configuration of the Safavid period, society is not a static concept and political arrangement is deeply influenced by social components. Another is that the formation of the Safavid State on the basis of multiple powers reproduced a new institutional configuration based on the relatively complex network of interrelationships between the key institutions of power in this period, namely the State, tribes, clergy and the market, which led to The formation of a special institutional heritage that lasted for centuries after the fall of the Safavids. The method of the present research is historical sociology and according to its problem, purpose and theoretical framework, it is placed in the framework of historical-analytical strategy.

One of the essential problems in institutional policies in developing countries is the existence of abstractive institutions such as incompetent rents, the culture of kinship and the lack of transparency of administrative processes. This article focuses on the concept of clientelism as institution within the framework of the new institutionalism theory, seeking to disclose the indicators and significance of this institution in the Pahlavi II government. Clientelism assumed as an abstractive institution which leads to the development of the cycle of vicious. The main hypothesis (idea) of this article is that the clientelism is the main reason for losing social trust of sovereignty and the reduction of social capital in the second Pahlavi state, finally, the main reason of its collapse. In the other words, social distrust as a result of the institution of Clientelism bring the second Pahlavi into a social catastrophe, its outcome was the collapse of the political system. Social trap means choice of advantageous policies by social networks and political system, which evidently to be profitable initially, but ultimately leads to social harm and harm. But ultimately it leads to social collapse and political fall down; the Islamic Revolution (1979) was the result of these extensions.

Kuwait is a rentier state which obtains most of its income from oil revenues. However, and despite the arguments that suggest rentier states hinder democracy, the Kuwaiti system almost exclusively among the GCC states, could maintain a relatively good reputation concerning the development of its democracy. What helped Kuwait overcome its rentier state tendency for authoritarian rule, is the focus of this paper. While many scholars have emphasized the role of citizens' taxation as the most important driver of political participation and, at the same time, promoter the legitimacy of government, my paper focuses on the historical process from the perspective of historical institutionalism and emphasizes that the legitimacy of the state in the eyes of the Kuwaiti public, based on a parliamentary model, and the organization of the Kuwaiti parliament itself, have been institutionalized in a historical process, and what we see from the progress of democracy and the outcomes of these two institutions in the political sphere of Kuwait today, is the result of this historical institutionalization. Now the fundamental question is how to evaluate the rentier state dynamics in relation to the historical institutionalization of parliament in Kuwait, and what is the role of a variable called a consolidated institution in this regard?

Understanding and analyzing the relationship between government and parliament in the Islamic Republic of Iran has been the focus of politicians, journalists, and researchers in recent years. Since facts do not speak for themselves and need to be interpreted and organized, the article seeks to provide a theoretical basis for this purpose. The starting point of the discussion is the theory of historical institutionalism and the refinement of its position among various theories in the field of political science. The question, then, is what opportunities or insights does historical institutionalism provide for researchers in this field, and what tools for analyzing them? After extracting the methodic possibilities in the theory of historical institutionalism for analyzing the relationship between government and parliament, in the second part, the article tries to provide a guide map for collecting and analyzing data on the relationship between government and parliament in the years after reviewing the constitution.

In sociology, civic institutions are one of the most important sets of organizations and communities in society, which is located between the masses of citizens and the government, and as a result of the process of interaction between the government and independent social institutions are formed. . The Safavid government, based on the logic of the "Reactive sequences" model, by moving a chain of reactionary events, led to the formation of a special institutional heritage in Tabriz, the first Safavid capital, which finally came to fruition in Qazvin and Isfahan with political concentration. However, this centralism placed many ups and downs on the institutions, the study of which can help to better understand the traditional institutions in the Safavid era. Inspired by the theoretical model of historical institutionalism and historical research method and descriptive-analytical method based on first-hand sources and reliable sources, while considering the need to use sociological approaches in the analysis of historical phenomena is looking for a suitable answer to this question "According to the approach of historical institutionalism, to what extent has the Safavid government been able to achieve the formation of a relatively stable institutional balance between the clergy and the central government?" The results show that the formation of the traditional institutional balance of the Safavid period was based on a complex network of interrelationships between the two main institutions, namely the central government and the clergy, which resulted in a relatively stable institutional balance between these institutions. This institutional balance was not due to the domination of one institution over other institutions, but was the product of a balance of power based on the mutual needs of these institutions, which was rooted in the conditions and formation of the Safavid government based on a combination of socio-political forces and ideological power.

The present paper seeks to measure the contribution and influence of Rentier state elite as the forces of historical institution in determining the current political and economic structures of Iran. Why the Islamic Revolution of Iran, which claimed a new political and economic system and made changes in all fields; couldn't change the political economy of the country and the structure of the political economy continued to move forward? in other words, what forces or phenomena continued to move the post-revolutionary states, especially the constructive and reformist governments (1368-1384), on the path of the rentier and educated state? research findings obtained using the combined framework of historical institutionalism and historical sociology and the Rantierian government, shows that the process of formation of Pahlavi state institutions was influenced by the influx of oil dollars This has led to the emergence of specific institutional oil practices in this government and after the victory of the Islamic Revolution, the presence of forces dependent on the previous order in the new order and the emergence of crises, as well as the pressure exerted by social and political forces on the elite choices of decision-makers in the constructive moments cause choice the pattern "Wa Depending on the course of the journey " by these forces as a result, the institutional framework of the oil state, including budget, exchange, private sector, community, and oil production, developed during the Pahlavi era; It was transferred to the constructive and reformist governments, which made the rentier state survive.

Improving governance and its quality is main concern of reforms for achieve development in today's world. In the meantime decentralization is one of the main ways to improve the quality of governance. In the islamic republic of Iran, and in accordance with the articles of the Constitution, the Islamic city and village councils are the main trustees of decentralization. But investigating the genesis and transformation process of the councils and ultimately legacy left by these councils anticipats its defective institutional cycle towards more centralization, confiscation of powers and transformation of the character of local government, So with any reforms decreased part of the aura of authority that was given to this local governance until finally transform the council into a digestible and inefficient institution in the body of the existing administrative system. This inefficient institutional legacy has led to efforts for the next reforms were just reproduce and reconfigure the same path that the previous rules were determined. As a result, the inefficiency of the councils in decentralization becomes a chronic phenomenon and depending on the predetermined path . This paper with utilizing qualitative method and within the framework of historical institutionalism addresses this main question that why and how did the city and village Islamic councils fail to decentralization ?

State building is a long, complicated and challenging trend everywhere. Iran’s revolution as a most populist revolution in 20thcentury, heavily changed the fundamental aspects of political order in the country and helped to set new institutions in power and state structures after revolution. These institutions were helpful in harnessing extreme domestic and foreign crisis that were emerged soon after the revolution. The article tests this claim as a hypothesis that Iranian revolutionary movement showed its high capabilities in institution building from down and that helpedemerged power vacuum, as a result of collapsed former state and absence of a revolutionary party, was filled easily. Building new state and managing crisis affected heavily from this kind of state building. The article studies making some new governmental institutions and revolutionary organs and emerging new political behavior in first years after revolution and searches the causes of their successful functions in managing crisis and sustaining new emerged political order.

In most socio-historical studies, the gap between the state and the nation has been introduced as a historical and inherent feature of the traditional Iranian society. This means that the state's lack of external legitimacy, as well as the lack of procedures that determine the rights and duties of the state and society, have led to the alienation of social forces and the state of each other, and the historical gap between state and society. Hence the only relationship between these two was the exercise of unilateral domination by the state over society and obedience and subordination of society to the state. Referring to the historical institutionalism approach and using Reactive sequences analysis, this article provides an alternative narrative of the relation between state and nation. In this narrative, on the contrary, to the theory of the historical gap between the state and the nation, the mutual needs of the state and social forces led to a specific institutional configuration in the Iranian society, that was based on a complex network of interactions between the four main institutions of central government, the clergy, tribes and the market, resulting in relatively stable institutional balance between these institutions. This institutional configuration was rooted in a series of Reactive sequences, which brought about the formation of the Safavid government based on numerous tribal and ideological foundations.

Iran’s revolution as a profound social change in which most part of population took part heavily changed the fundamental aspects of political order in the country and helped to set new institutions in power and state structures after revolution. These institutions were helpful in harnessing extreme domestic and foreign crisis that emerged soon after the revolution. Revolutionary elite in Iran in a rather short term between January 1979 and May 1981, succeeded in establishing new political order after revolution. The main claim of the article as its hypothesis is that “Iran revolutionary elite in three years after revolution (as critical juncture) in response to huge crises and necessities of building new order inclined to institution building from the bottom and as a result effective institutions for supporting new political regime and new political order were formed.The article studies making of some new governmental institutions and revolutionary organs and emergence of new political behavior in the first years after revolution and searches the causes of their successful functions in managing crisis and sustaining new emerged political order. The article uses historical institutionalism as its approach and historical-causal analysis as its methodology. The article shows that high capabilities of revolutionary system in managing crises originated from this mode of institution building.

Post -revolutionary states in Iran have not achieved any success in escaping from an oil-dependent economy despite many slogans and programs. This article benefiting from historical institutionalism and revisionist versions of rentier state theory tries to show that state dependence to oil revenues in Iran in the first years after revolution stems from decisions of revolutionary elites to resolve peculiar challenges (of course elites had the opportunity to follow other models for the mobilization of the revenues in those years). Therefore, oil-dependence shaped an institutional feature of the post-revolutionary state. As a result, in every attempt to decrease the state dependence to oil revenues, we must pay attention to these institutional forces and their resistance against different economic and political conditions. Methodology of this article is based on descriptive –analytical method.

This paper focuses on developments in welfare policy and the main factors of these developments in the Pahlavi era. For this purpose, the development process has been studied in three historical periods: the period of Reza Shah, the period from the fall of Reza Shah to the coup of August 28, and the period from the coup to the Revolution. Organizational and institutional development shows that different factors were involved in the formation and development of welfare policies. The Pahlavi era is known as the beginning of the formation of the modern state in Iran. Nation-building and state-building occurred in this period in order to perform a variety of institutionalization; and welfare policies are also analyzed in this framework. But since September 1941 leftist movements were active in Iran and there were more demands for a greater role in shaping social welfare policies. But this factor reduced in effectiveness since the mid-1950s after the coup, and the government tried to increase his role by relying on the increase in oil revenues.

The gravity point of Institutional analysis is emphasizing on the role of institutions as an independent variable in forming procedures and outcomes of individual and collective actions and social and political phenomena. Contemporary social sciences, due to the dominance of background-based approaches (in Sociology and Political Sciences) and quantity-based approaches (in Economics), didn’t give due attention to the analysis of institution variable status in forming social, economic and political phenomena. This article, first, attempts to introduce the institutional perspective in social and political analysis, and then introduces the internal reformations and varieties of this approach. The second purpose of this article is to show that historical institutionalism as a kind of neo- Institutionalism can develop an appropriate framework in integrating the Institutionalism and background-based approaches in political analysis, due to its dynamic viewpoint on the category of institutional change. According to this view, although different forms of institutions should be seen as independent variables in forming the social and political actors’ behaviors, these institutions are developed phenomena in the context of social and political historical disputes.

The Constitutional revolution in Iran at the late Qajarid dynasty resulted from a coalition of middle classes; however, it failed to be consolidated. This paper applies the structural-institutional approach to explain the instability of constitutional achievements and fragile coalitions between the revolutionaries. Five structural-institutional factors will be discussed as the causes of fragile coalitions. Analytical narrative is the method for explaining events. A matrix of institutional arrangements including imbalanced class structure, economic deficiencies, world-system situation, and incapacitated state were identified as the main factors that created instability. But the effect of weakly founded political institutions of constitutional period was the most important factor of the fragile coalitions, which resulted in conflicts between the political actors, loose agreements, and lack of structured system of decision making and achieving common aims.

This article deals with conditions of structural- institutional conditions of constitutional parliaments in Iran. The institutional evolution of constitutional parliaments and the interaction of structure of Iranian society and parliament have been investigated in this article. The main hypothesis is the situation of institutions in the time of Qajars made the parliament ineffective. The historical – causal method based on causal narrative has been applied to review Qajar history. The outcome of influencing world-system، capitalist economy، despotic state، and the weakness of Qajar dynasty resulted in unbalanced class structure. This factor، added to asymmetric power relations، and the positive feedback of these processes created ineffective parliaments that could not realize the goals of constitutional.