جستجوی مقالات مرتبط با کلیدواژه « کم سرمایه گذاری » در نشریات گروه « علوم انسانی »

The present research is aimed at investigating the relationship among managerial overconfidence, internal information quality, and investment efficiency in companies listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange (TSE). To this end, the financial information of 84 companies listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange (TSE) during the years 2014-2021 was employed. The research results indicate a positive significant relationship among the internal information quality, investment efficiency, and overinvestment; however, the relationship between the quality of internal information and underinvestment is negative and significant. Further, the results revealed that managerial overconfidence improves the relationship between the internal information quality and investment efficiency, while it weakens the relationship among the earning announcement rate, the accuracy of profit forecast by management, and overinvestment. Nevertheless, the opposite applies concerning the absence of updated financial statements due to significant errors. Moreover, the relationship among the earning announcement rate, the accuracy of profit forecast by management, and underinvestment is not affected by managerial overconfidence; but managerial overconfidence strengthens the relationship between the absence of updated financial statements due to significant mistakes and underinvestment.

Overconfident managers overestimate the probability and impact of favorable events on the company's cash flows and evaluate it for negative events less than reality. The characteristic of overconfidence in managers affects the way profit and loss are and the book value of assets and liabilities recognized. Financing and investment strategies are the two basic strategies in the field of financial management of an enterprise that the manager must decide. Therefore, the purpose of this study is to investigate the relationship between managers' uncertainty, domestic financing and investment efficiency in companies listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange. To test the research hypotheses, multiple linear regression model based on panel data has been used. The results of the survey of 140 companies listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange during the period 2013 to 2019 indicate that there is a positive and significant relationship between managers' overconfidence and the efficiency of investment and domestic financing. In fact, when managers were overconfident, there was too little investment. In addition, the research findings show that there is no significant relationship between managers' overconfidence and low investment.

In this research, the effects of product market competition on labor investment efficiency with emphasis the role of financing constraints are examined. The methodology of this study is a quantitative and ex-post. The sample of this research is consist of 122 companies on Tehran Stock Exchange (TSE) from 2012 to 2020. The results of research regression analysis showed that there is a positive and significant relationship between product market competition and firms’ labor investment efficiency. The relationship between financial constraints and firms’ labor investment efficiency is also negative and significant. Also, the evidence showed that the relationship between product market competition and over- or under-investment in labor is negative and significant. In addition, the intensity of the positive (negative) relationship between product market competition and labor investment efficiency (over- or under-investment in labor) in companies with financial constraints is less. These findings have important political implications for businesses and employment policymakers.

Efficient investment in human resources and the factors affecting it are among the topics receiving less attention in the academic literature. This study seeks to investigate the impact of institutional investors and ownership concentration; as the two regulatory elements of corporate governance, on labor investment efficiency.

To test the research hypotheses, a panel data model was used, and to measure the labor investment inefficiency, Jung Lee and Weber (2014) model was applied. The research sample, after imposing the intended restrictions, included 179 companies enlisted on the Tehran Stock Exchange, in the period from 2010 to 2019.

The results indicated that institutional ownership has no impact on the labor investment efficiency, while ownership concentration reduces it. This effect existed in the case of overinvestment but it was not observed in the case of underinvestment.

Conflict of interest and information asymmetry between managers and owners increase the risk of inefficient decisions, especially in the context of investing in human resources and the risk is likely to be reduced by strengthening regulatory mechanisms. Corporate governance mechanisms, such as ownership concentration, lead to more careful observation on management and reduce inefficiency in the made decisions.

The power of profitability and increasing the wealth of shareholders in the enterprise requires the optimal use of resources and efficiency in performance. In this regard, information asymmetry and conflict of interest between managers and shareholders can be an important obstacle; therefore, in this study, we try to influence the quality of accounting information (profit forecasting) on investment performance (efficient investment and more or less investment). Also, in order to resolve the conflict of interest, the quality of the auditor (expertise, tenure and remuneration) who plays the role of moderator in this research is used. Therefore, 138 companies listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange in the period 2011 to 2018 were tested by data panel method. The results showed that the quality of accounting information improves efficiency and reduces investment more or less, and the auditor's expertise increases the impact of accounting information quality on investment efficiency and decrease more or less investment; as a result, optimal use of resources and increase efficiency In enterprises, more is achieved.

Investment efficiency is one important factor affecting a firm's performance. Also, financing decisions affect investment decisions, regarding the effects of the non-optimal capital structure on the rate of capital cost and cash flows of the firm. This study examines the relationship between deviation from optimal capital structure and inefficiency of investment.

This is a descriptive, correlation, and post-event study. The statistical population consists of the companies listed in the Tehran Stock Exchange, and the sample comprises 142 companies during 2007-2017, accounting for 1562 company-years.

The findings showed that an increase in the deviation from optimal capital structure increases investment inefficiency.  Also, an increase in the positive deviation from optimal capital structure (over-leveraged) has a significant and negative effect on over-investment and a positive effect on under-investment. Besides, an increase in the negative deviation from optimal capital structure (under-leveraged) has a significant and positive effect on over-investment and negative effect on under-investment.

The results imply that the optimal capital structure can affect investment efficiency by moderating the cash flow availability and the expected interest rate.

The purpose of this study is to examine the effect of Managerial overconfidence the Relationship between internal financing and investment efficiency.The statistical population of the study is Tehran Stock Exchange companies. Sampling method was used for systematic sampling (screening), according to which 87 companies were selected as sample. The present research is an applied and post-event method. The realm of research has been from 2012 to 2017. To investigate the hypotheses of the research, ordinary least squares method has been used in the form of Eviews software. Research findings show that internal financing has a positive and fair effect on investment efficiency. And internal financing does not have a positive relationship with investment. Also, internal financing has a negative and equitable relationship with low investment. The Managerial overconfidence on the relationship between internal financing and investment efficiency is not the same.

The purpose of this study is to test the effectiveness of VAT on the investment efficiency in listed companies in Tehran Stock Exchange. In this regard, 140 companies (980 observation year-companies) accepted in the Tehran Stock Exchange during the period from 2011 to 2017 have been investigated. In order to test the hypotheses of the research, a multiple linear regression model was used using combined data (integrated method). The results of this research indicate a negative and significant effect of the value added tax on the investment level of the company. Also, the research results showed that value added tax has a positive and significant effect on investment efficiency. In addition, the results of the research showed that the value added tax has a negative and significant effect on overinvestment and underinvestment and increases the investment efficiency. These results point to the importance and effectiveness of value added tax in acquiring an unconnected and efficient investment for the company.

This research analyzed the impact of debt maturity and financial reporting quality on under-over investment. Investment inefficiency (under-over) is measured based on the model presented by Biddle et al (2009) and financial reporting quality is measured based on the model presented by Dechow & Dichev (2002). The research sample includes 219 companies listed in Tehran Securities and Exchange over the period 2010 - 2014. Results showed that financial reporting quality and short debt maturity have significant and negative impact on Investment inefficiency. These analyzing also have done in two categories such as over investment observations and under investment observations. Results suggested that financial reporting quality has significantly negative impact on over investment, but no impact on under investment. Short term debt maturity has no significant impact on over investment and under investment. Other results showed operational cash flow, tangibility and volatility in operational cash flow have significant and positive impact on over investment; sales volatility has significant and negative impact on over investment. But age, growth opportunity, loss and size have no significant impact on over investment. Also, size has significant and positive impact on under investment; growth opportunity and tangibility have significant and negative impact on under investment. But age, operational cash flow, loss, sales volatility and volatility in operational cash flow have no significant impact on under investment

In this research, the effect of financial reporting quality model and timing of liabilities on investment efficiency as well as the effect of timing of obligations on the relationship between financial reporting quality and investment efficiency and inefficiency in listed companies in Tehran Stock Exchange is investigated. To testthe impact of 80 companies in the years 2007 to 2017, data was analyzed using Eviews software. In this research, three distinct methods (accruals, accruals, accruals, accruals, and accruals) were used to calculate financial reporting quality and their combined method. The results indicate that financial reporting quality has a positive and significant effect on investment efficiency. The quality of financial reporting does not affect investment and investment. Increasing the ratio of short-term debt to total debt will increase investment efficiency. Increasing the maturity of debt has no effect on investment and more. Other research findings indicate that the maturity of a debt, whether short-term or long-term, does not affect the relationship betweenfinancial reporting quality and investment efficient

Financial research widely, has studied the company's investment decisions. According to the literature, the relationship between cash flow and investment levels is a common technique for analyzing issues over or under investment. This research investigated the investment decisions of firms under financial distress in Tehran Stock Exchange for 280 observations (firm- year). In order to examine the hypothesis, we used panel data in way of dynamic Generalized Moment Model. Moreover, to robustness of results the data classified into two sections based on firms with high and low investment opportunity and least square estimator has been used. The findings by GMM-System estimator indicate that firms in financial distress that have high investment opportunity present greater propensity to over-invest. But when firms divided into two parts as mentioned above, the results show that generally in sample of Iranian firms listed during 2012 to 2015, failed firms without regard to investment opportunities have to raise the level of investment.

Information asymmetry and conflicts of interest between management and shareholders lead to the phenomenon of moral hazard. Moral hazard means that the managers may make some decisions (e.g. investment decisions) that do not meet the interests of shareholders. Inefficient investment decisions include over or under-investment in firms’ labor and utilize the non-optimal number of human resources in business entity. One way to avoid inefficient investment decisions is providing the financial reporting quality; because the higher reporting quality increases the stakeholders’ ability to monitor the managers’ behaviors and decisions such as decisions on determine the number of labor in firms. This study investigates the impact of two measures of financial reporting quality (accruals and disclosure quality) on labor investment inefficiencies (include over and under-investment) in a sample of 107 firms listed in the Tehran Stock Exchange during 2003 - 2014. The research results show that the increase in accruals quality and disclosure quality decreases the labor over and under-investments inefficiencies and eventually, companies employ more optimal levels of human resource.

The goal of this paper is to examine the association between product market competition and corporate investment decisions on particularly, over investment and low investment. The managers have different incentives to keep cash in firms. Product market competition is another powerful mechanism ensuring that management does not waste resources. When competition exists, shareholders can observe performance in other firms and use this information as a benchmark to evaluate managers. The aim of this research is to investigate impact of product market competition and Interactive relationship between product market competition and free cash flow on over- investment and low- investment in free cash flow. The Herfindahl-Hirschman index was used as measures of competitiveness. The sample consisted of 110 companies listed in Tehran Stock Exchange from 10 different industries over the period 2010 to 2015. Research findings indicate that there is no significant positive relationship between Herfindahl- Hirschman with the low_ investment and over_ investment. The interactive effect of product market competition on a negative free cash flow has significant relationship with low investment.

Over and underinvestment has led to low investment efficiency and increased economic overheating and inflation severely damaging the interests of the shareholders and the sound development of macro economy, and has been a mainstream topic in the field of modern corporate finance research. This paper aims to investigate the interactive effect of accounting information quality and information asymmetry on inefficient investment. The main purpose of this study is to inform managers, investors, professional accounting bodies, standard-settings and stock exchange about the accounting information quality as a key factor to reduce information asymmetries and enhancing the efficiency of investment. Research Hypotheses To achieve the purpose of this study, six research hypotheses are chosen. These hypotheses are as follows: There is a significant and positive relationship between information asymmetry and overinvestment at corporate level. There is a significant and positive relationship between information asymmetry and underinvestment at corporate level. There is a significant and negative relationship between accounting information quality and overinvestment at corporate level. There is a significant and positive relationship between accounting information quality and underinvestment at corporate level. There is a significant and negative relationship between accounting information quality and information asymmetry with overinvestment. There is a significant and positive relationship between accounting information quality and information asymmetry with underinvestment.Research Statistical population of this study consists of the companies accepted in Tehran Stock Exchange. The study period is between the years 2001 to 2012. Research method is exploring and determining the relationship between dependent and independent variables. Post event inquiry researches have been used (using historical information). For statistical analysis and to test hypotheses, descriptive statistics (mean and standard deviation) and inferential statistics (correlation-test, single and multiple linear regression and analysis of variance) are used. The results reveal that there has been a significant and positive correlation between information asymmetry and underinvestment. There has also been a significant and negative (positive) correlation between accounting information quality and over (under) investment. Another result reveals that there has been a significant and positive correlation between accounting information quality and information asymmetry with underinvestment; but there has not been a significant and negative correlation between accounting information quality and information asymmetry with overinvestment. Discussion and According to the results, we find that the accounting information quality reduces overinvestment and underinvestment in corporate level and information asymmetry is the key factor for underinvestment. Therefore, increasing accounting information quality will result in investment efficiency.

This study investigates whether and how firm investment efficiency is influenced by the accrual-based earnings management. The major purpose of this paper is investigating and analyzing the relationship between proxy of accrual-based earnings management and firm’s excess investments. Prior researches suggest that earnings management leads to increase in excess investments of firms (over-investments or under-investments). In this study, the data from 63 listed companies in the Tehran Stock Exchange in the period of 1378-1388 (1999-2009) was collected. The results indicated that there is a significant relationship between discretionary accruals (as proxy of accrual-based earnings management) and excess investment. This suggests that firm’s investment behavior is influenced by accrual-based earnings management. The results also indicate that there is a significant relationship between discretionary accruals (as independent variable) and firm’s excess investment in the period afterwards

One of the most important principles of corporate governance، the CEO of the Company on the Company''s operations and results could be the different ways it affects. One of the current discussions on the theme of the CEO، focused on the issue of the CEO reputation. The goal of this research is evaluating the effect of CEO reputation on relationship between agency costs and cumulative abnormal returns in firms over (under) investment. In this research، information was collected from company listed in TSE during 1383 -1391. capital investment ratio as the indicator of measuring over (under) investment، free cash flow and interaction between growth opportunities and free cash flow as the indicators of agency costs. research method was descriptive correlation and for hypothesis test of method pooled Least Squares. the research finding show the negative and significant relationship between agency costs and cumulative abnormal returns and effect CEO reputation and factors (CEO Tenure، CEO outsider،CEO perform) on the relationship are positive and significant.

This paper examines how real earnings management activities affect firms’ investment activities. Although there is a large literature on earnings management, there is a dearth of evidence on how it affects firms’ real activities. Healy and Wahlen (1999) point out that earnings management studies have paid only minimal attention to its real economic consequences. Research on the consequences of earnings management has concentrated largely on the external, financial impacts. In contrast, the present study investigates the impact of real earnings management on internal, real decisions firms undertake. One might suppose that if management chooses to paint a rosier view for investors in the numbers they report externally, then they would not allow this to influence internal investment decisions. However, it is possible that investment decision makers within the firm believe the misreported growth trend—because they are either over-optimistic or unaware of the misstatement—and invest accordingly. Alternatively, investment decision makers might understand the true state of the firm but choose to overinvest in a high-risk approach to turn around firm’s performance (McNichols and Stubben, 2008). Kedia and Philippon (2006) suggest that firms engaged with earnings management, manipulate the investment decisions to pool with better performing firms, in order to avoid detection. Regardless of the reason for the overinvestment, truthful reporting might have prevented it. Several parties are typically involved in investment decisions. If financial results are reported truthfully, then other parties could enter in order to control the investment. As a result, firms invest more than they otherwise would have; thus attempts to meet capital market expectations or meet bonus targets, for example, could affect investors, employees, customers, and a broad set of related parties. Research Questions or Hypotheses: This study investigates whether and how a firm’s investment behavior is influenced by real earnings management activities. On the other hand, we try to find out how managers’ reaction to real earnings management activities in the context of their investment decisions. Simply, we attempt to answer the following question: Is there any significant relationship between real earnings management proxies (abnormal operating cash flows, abnormal production costs and abnormal discretionary expenses) and firms’ excess investment? Given sales levels, firms that manage earnings upwards are likely to have one or all of these: unusually low cash flow from operations, and/or unusually low discretionary expenses, and/or unusually high production costs (Cohen and Zarowin, 2008). So, we can develop our research hypotheses as follows: H1: There is a significant negative relationship between abnormal operating cash flows and excess investment. H2: There is a significant positive relationship between abnormal production costs and excess investment. H3: There is a significant negative relationship between abnormal discretionary expenses and excess investment. We have used data for 63 listed companies on Tehran Stock Exchange for the period of 1378-1388 (1999-2009) to test the above hypotheses. We first generated the normal levels of CFO, discretionary expenses and production costs using the model developed by Dechow, Kothari and Watts (1998) as implemented in Roychowdhury (2006). To answer the research questions, this paper analyzes the relationship between proxies of real earnings management and firm’s excess investment by multiple linear regressions. The results indicate significant relationships between abnormal operating cash flows, abnormal discretionary expenses (as independent variables) and excess investment, suggesting that firm’s investment behavior is influenced by real earnings management. Our results also indicate a significant relationship between abnormal discretionary expenses and firm’s excess investment in the period afterwards. Discussion and Managers do not have a direct preference for investing, but the requirements of signaling compel them to act in a consistent manner. The essential point that emerges is a general one: in any signaling equilibrium investment must be consistent with reported profits. In alternative interpretations, such as managerial optimism or empire building, managers might have a primary desire for investment, but it is the same requirement of consistency that lead them to manipulate earnings. In both cases, earnings manipulation is a necessary condition for overinvestment.

This paper by using adjusted model of biddle et al (2009), conditional relationship between conservatism and accrual quality on investment efficiency has been tested in Tehran stock exchange (TSE) during 2006-2009. Investment efficiency can be defined as identifying, funding and implementing all positive NPV investment projects. Underinvestment is defined as rejecting positive NPV investment projects and undertaking negative NPV investment projects is defined as overinvestment. In this paper we use khan and watts (2009) model of conservatism. AQ is the deferential amount of cash income and accounting income. The research hypothesis’s is tested by multivariable simple regression using OLS estimator on panel data base. The result shows that firms report more conservative, make more efficient investment decisions. But there is no evidence that AQ significantly reduces either under or overinvestment. Our results add to a growing stream of literature suggesting that eliminating conservatism from accounting regulatory frameworks may lead to undesirable economic consequences. And can be benefited to accounting standard sitter and stock exchange market.