جستجوی مقالات مرتبط با کلیدواژه « georgia » در نشریات گروه « علوم انسانی »

The theory of the Hazara people being Mongolian after the ambiguities that arose regarding the race and origin of the Hazara people, led to the beginning of extensive research to clarify the racial origins of this people. Based on this, researchers have expressed different theories about Hazaras being Mongols. The main question of the upcoming research is to what extent the Mongols were involved in the formation of the origin and racial origin of the Hazara people? In the seventh century A.H. After the invasion of the Mongol armies to the Ghor or Hazara Jat areas, and then during the process of settlement and blood mixing with the native people of these areas, a new tribe called the Hazara emerged. This research is qualitative and with a descriptive-analytical method and using the collected library data aims to clarify the race of the Hazara people and the relationship between their racial origin and the Mongols. The findings of the research show that in the area of ​​race and rooting of the Hazara people, the mentioned people are of the yellow race with obvious physical and cultural similarities and have a long-standing racial relationship with the Mongols.

Discourse analysis is an interdisciplinary approach in the fields of linguistics, semantics, literature, cultural relations, and international fields which analyzes and evaluates how meaning and message are crystallized and formed in relation to intra-lingual and extra-lingual factors. Discourses are a kind of language of power relations due to the use of language and linguistic power. Since coherent and common meanings and themes (Semantics-based) that are crystallized in language are also prominent manifestations of cultural power; the authors of this article sought to explain it on the basis of semantics and discourse analysis in the development of cultural relations. The most important findings of this study indicate that in the approaches of semantic discourse analysis based on common celebrities in the field of common (non-linguistic) civilization, themes, mental and especially mystical schemes between common Iranian and Turkmen celebrities are evident. It also has mystical and moral schemas for Iran and Uzbekistan, which can be of interest for the public. The themes and mental schemas of the Shahnameh and the themes of some of the love poems or even the themes of Omar Khayyam's poems, which have been most welcomed by Georgian scholars, can be considered in writing Persian language textbooks in Georgia to provide deep cultural ties with friendly countries in the field of common civilization.

One of the important accomplishments of Shah Abbas I was transforming the structure of the army. Through fortifying the army, he consolidated the foundations of the Safavid government. In order to execute this policy, after the conquest of Georgia and becoming familiar with Georgians’ special features, he founded a new military structure by benefitting from the services of some powerful and worthy Georgian military men and called it Qullar or ghulams (slave soldiers). Following a descriptive-analytic method, the purpose of this study was to investigate the role of Georgian slaves in the Safavid army in Shah Abbas’ period. The findings of the study demonstrate that Georgian slaves held a high position in the military structure of the Safavid government.

Ottomans, each claiming leadership of a part of the Islamic world, over the Caucasus (mainly Georgia and Iran) lasted from the 16th to the 18th centuries. Finally, in the 19th century, another rival in the disputes over the region was added to the list of countries involved, namely Russia. The importance of the Caucasus was not only due to the fertility and prosperity of its rangelands in the foothills of the Caucasus Mountains but also due to its transit position on the eastern shores of the Black Sea. And they were trying to achieve their economic, social, political and cultural independence, and at the time we are discussing, they were again under the control of the Iranian government. In line with this fact, our research aims to show the incompetence of the Safavid court and the social, cultural and economic beliefs and political performance of the Safavid kings did not conform to the ideals and aspirations of Armenians and other Christians and greatly influenced their tendency towards the Ottomans. For many years, it was superior to the Safavids in terms of political power in the region and was a significant rival to European powers in world politics.

The process of neighborliness between Iran and Russia began in the middle of the sixteenth century and was implemented until the end of the same century. In the meantime, the two sides pursued diplomacy backed by common enemies and business incentives. Potentials for tensions emerged during the first half of the seventeenth century with the restoration of Iranian sovereignty over its Caucasian territory from Ottomans and the Russian efforts to break into Georgia and Dagestan. However, the balance of forces prevented the situation from becoming worse. This situation continued until Peter’s reign in the late seventeenth century. This article attempts to examine the evolution of Iranian-Russian relations from the attempt to military cooperation to the direct and indirect conflicts in the 17th century. The method of writing is descriptive-analytical based on the analysis of data extracted from primitive sources and authentic research. This study seeks to answer the question of why in the process of developing bilateral relations, despite potentials for cooperation, potentials for tension led to conflicts between the two sides. The result of this study shows that Russia was not able to face Iran directly in the 17th century, so it benefited from the nurturing activities of its citizens, especially Don Cossacks, along the Iranian Caspian coast, and on Caucasian issues, it was also advancing with the recruitment of local rulers and fortifications in the buffer zones between its territory and Iran. Russia’s key goal was to dominate the strategic segments of the North-South Corridor both at sea and on land. Iran’s historical relation with Russia dates back to about a thousand years, and in addition to trade, it includes the Varangians’ invasion to Iran via both land and the Caspian Sea during the 9th to 11th centuries. The history of official relations between Iran and Russia goes back to the reign of Ivan III of Russia. Realizing the importance of the Aq Qoyunlu, he sought to establish relations with them. Although Uzun Hasan responded to the embassy initiatives, he did not prioritize relations with distant neighbors. The turning point in Iran-Russia relations was the fall of Kazan in 1552 AD and Astrakhan in 1556 at the hands of Ivan “the fourth” and beginning of neighborliness between Iran and Russia through the Caspian Sea. The official relations between Iran and Russia were formed in the second half of the sixteenth century on three axes: trade, political-military cooperation, and geographical conflict, consequently, tensions between the two countries were not unexpected in such a situation. During the period between the two countries’ maritime neighborliness in 1556 and their land contacts in 1591 and 1604, the first capacities of tensions arose in relations between the two countries, indicating further complications. The desire of Tsarist Russia to receive the ownership of west coast of the Caspian Sea from Iran was revealed in the case of the Vasilchikov embassy in 1587. Of course, Iran's firm stance against Russian movements on its borders became apparent in the late 16th and early 17th centuries. In the meantime, the internal engagements of the two sides and their priorities in the face of their enemies led both sides to try to rely on the positive and constructive aspects of relations and contain the capacities of tension. As during the First Russo-Persian War (1651-1653), Tsar Alexei, the father of Peter, and the architect of many of Russia’s foundations of power, quickly sent an ambassador to make peace, or even during Razin’s invasion to Iranian ports of the Caspian Sea from Darband (Derbent) to Astarabad, Russia kept its diplomatic wing very active in its relations with Iran. If in the late sixteenth century the confrontation with the Ottomans and the Shaybanids was a serious incentive for the parties to cooperate, but with the fall of the Shaybanids at the end of the sixteenth century and the end of the Iran-Ottoman conflict, especially with the Treaty of Zuhab in 1639, Trade and neighborhood requirements became the main drawbacks of relations; while the Russian side pursued a dual game in its relations with Iran based on its activities on the coasts of the Caspian Sea and established Caucasian communications. Iran’s action to destroy Russian castles on the banks of the Sunzha River and expelling the Russian trade delegation with diplomatic cover, followed by the plundering of Iranian shores by Russian Cossacks, were three Pieces of evidences of the severity of relations that did not tend to be obvious. In 1653, following the success of the Sunzha River operation, Khosrow Khan Shervani was ready to march to Tersky, but Shah Abbas II preferred the path of diplomacy. On the issue of the Cossack’s attack, Iran also preferred to respond to Russian diplomacy. Russia’s proliferation on the Caspian Sea coasts and its infiltration into Dagestan and Georgia were the main roots of tensions in relations between the two sides, which were managed due to Iran’s balance of power and relative superiority. Although the benefits of trade with Iran for Russia and the interests of Russia from being the route for Iran’s trade with Europe was very important to Moscow, but in a model reminiscent of the conflict between the Golden Horde and the Ilkhans in the Caucasus, the Kremlin sought to dominate both the sea and the land route, pursuing indirect destructive actions in its relations with Iran in the cases of Caspian sea shores and the Caucasus that overshadowed at least its own short-term interests. The Russian governors of Astrakhan and Tersky had been cooperating with the Cossack bandits at many times, similar to the Khazar Khaganate’s action in 913 AD, which allowed the Varangians to cross their territory and move from Don River to Volga river and to the Caspian Sea to access Iranian shores for plundering the civilians. With so much evidence, these governors' coordination with Moscow cannot be questioned. Therefore, duplicitous behavior and indirect persecution should be considered part of Moscow's policy towards Isfahan. In the seventeenth century, Russia, in the balance of power with Iran, was gradually trying to change the balance in its favor. The Tsars’ continued efforts to establish relations with the Dagestani and Georgian elites, especially with those who were dissatisfied with Iran. Russia’s failed attempts to make its relations with several Georgian elites to a bargaining tool with Iran and interference in Georgia’s affairs, were examples of Moscow’s soft political approach in its rivalry with Iran during seventeenth century. However, the invasion of Iran by Peter the Great in 1723 marked another aspect of a macro-politics, a policy that continued from the Ivan the “fourth”, Boris Godunov, and the Romanovs in three dynasties. It can be said that the developments of Iran-Russia Relations during seventeenth century showed that the relations between the two sides should have been considered as an equation in which the key effective factors were geopolitical conflict, commercial and political interests , rivalries , cooperation and competition in foreign policy, which over time, the results were different.

The Caucasus has long been inextricably linked to the Iranian land. The two regions of Aran and Shervan were an inseparable part of Iran from the beginning, and the kings of this region who were lovers of literature played an important role in enhancing Persian poetry and literature in the region. In other words, Persian was the cultural language of the region. Persian language also gradually flourished in other Caucasus regions such as Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia and Dagestan. Nowadays with the growth and development of scientific centers, paying attention to Persian language and Iranology studies is of great importance in each of these areas. In addition to historical links, cultural and economic exchanges between the north and northwest of Iran were increased in the last years of the 19th century, as a result a great number of written sources and manuscripts were added to the libraries and archives of the Caucasus in the late nineteenth century; this was one of the reasons for the creation of the Iranology Studies Departments in this area during the Soviet era. Since the fall of communism, based on Soviet research on Iranology studies in its republics, numerous departments of Iranology Studies have focused on Persian language and literature, linguistics, history and anthropology of Iran in these centers. Given this issue and the importance of Iranology studies in the Caucasus, the present study is expected to examine the status of Iranology Studies in the Caucasus and developments in this field. Given the Caucasian historical and cultural background in Iran, Persian language and Iranology studies seem to be of major importance in Caucasian scientific research.

South Caucasus considered as the place for the unity of east and the west civilizations as well as the variety of races, religions and schools has been part of Islamic civilization domain. This research is to answer this question related to the time of entrance of Islam in this area and the elements of its propagation. Relying on the historical analysis, the article illuminates that the Muslims propagated the Islamic symbols in this region depending on the victories, armistice, propagators, commercial groups, cultural and intrinsic capacity of Islam religion and accordingly, they could be the reason of eternity of Islam in this area

Crimea's separation from Ukraine and its annexation to Russian territory, Russian war with Georgia, and recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as linguistic syndromes suggest that Russia seeks to expand its sphere of influence close to near abroad. On the other hand, the purpose of the article is to induce that, given that the will of Russian policymakers in the post-historical world is still drawn on two elements of historical and ideological subjectivity, implementing a regional solution contrary to Russian interests is not possible. The question here is what are the consequences of the deconstructive policies and contrary to Russia's foreign interests, for Ukraine and Georgia? With the help of linguistic propositions, the efforts of these countries to separate from the Russian-led centralist security complex have had no effect other than the separation of Crimea from Ukraine and the Kremlin's support of Georgia's autonomous regions such as Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

Georgia is the connecting point of the South Caucasus region to the North on the one hand and Russia and the Caucasus to Eastern and Central Europe, on the other. The Black Sea is located in western Georgia, which plays an important role in geopolitical matters in the region. Georgia has three important ports in this sea; the most important one is the port of Poti. In terms of geo-space, Georgia is the main source of access to the Black Sea, being in equations of the east corridor to the west and from the south to the north, also acting as a balance of power between  Armenia, Azerbaijan, Russia, Turkey and Iran and the strategic stratagem of Russia, Europe and the United States. Contrary to what is shown in the media, Iran hasn’t had significant economic achievements in Georgia.
After the signing of JCPOA (joint comprehensive plan of action) or Iran nuclear deal, a new era of economic relations between Iran and Georgia began. One of the motivating factors for investing in Georgia was the close relationship between Georgia and the European Union. In 2014, “Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement” was signed between the European Union and Georgia and since then, Georgia has benefited from concessions in economic relations with the European Union. According to some of the provisions of this agreement, Europeans considered concessions for another government in Georgia.
The question is how conclusion of this agreement will provide opportunities for the Islamic Republic of Iran to advance its economic policies in Georgia and whether it could lead to a greater proximity to Iran and Europe. There are many capacities to expand Iran-Georgia ties in economic spheres. In the meantime the European Union seems to be able to bring about closer regional cooperation.
In response to the above-mentioned question, it can be said that the clauses on free tariffs export, the rules of origin and the visa liberalization with Europe included in this agreement provide great opportunities for Iran and could increase the level of relations between Iran and Georgia on the one hand and improve relations between Iran and the European Union on the other. This cooperation has occurred in energy and transportation sectors.
In the first case, it can be said that Iran and Georgia have a special geopolitical position. The geographical location of Iran between the Caspian Sea and Oman Sea, the location of Georgia along the Black Sea and the fact that both of these states are transit routes for Europe and have great potential to develop three-way partnerships, are of paramount importance. Iran is one of the richest countries in the world in terms of oil and gas reserves, and the EU as one of the largest industrial poles in the world is strongly dependent on imports of energy resources. Georgia also is in need of new energy resources to complete its independency from Russia. On the other hand, oil, gas and other derivatives account for the bulk of the Iranian export market which has led the country to depend heavily on foreign exchange earnings from the sale of these products. Despite the huge reserves of Iran and its geographical proximity to the European Union, energy exchanges are not at the right level. Therefore, there is three-way sensitivity in the field of energy and transit between Iran, Georgia and the European Union.
According to liberal-political theories, regional agreements can open the way for the further expansion of economic cooperation. This is the policy pursued by the EU in its economic diplomacy. European Neighborhood Policy and the Eastern Partnership Program were important steps in active participation of Europe in the South Caucasus region and particularly in Georgia, which led to the conclusion of a cooperation agreement with the country. This paper has used interdependency theory for the hypothesis examination.
Currently good relations between Iran and Europe has provided the ground for effective Iranian presence in Georgia and can act as a major barrier (contributor) to the pressures of the United States and Russia and give Georgia a backing for deepening its ties with Iran. The concept of sensitivity in three-way relationship between Iran, Georgia and the European Union can be useful for all three sides. The concept of susceptibility is a healthy relationship in Georgia and the capacity for this three-sided sensitivity is fortunate. The reading of theory of interdependence means that among the countries with a high degree of bilateral trades, if trade value is not sensitive to price and income developments in the two countries, they will have limited economic dependence.
After the signing of JCPOA, EU confirmed Iran’s key role in the Caucasus. There is no doubt that cultural ties between Iran and Georgia can contribute to further development of relations but this will not be achieved without more dynamic economic relations between the two countries. Europe is the catalyst that provides more dynamism. Friendship with the EU is a key factor in increasing Iran’s presence in Georgia. Iran has the capacity to play a key role in geopolitics of the Caucasus including Georgia. With Europe’s support, Iran will look more as a reliable player. The historical and cultural commonalities between Iran and Georgia, the decline of Russia’s influence in Georgia, the involvement of Europeans in issues related to Georgia and Iran as a dynamic actor are the most important means for promoting bilateral and trilateral relations. In addition, Iran could benefit from the dynamics of the deep-rooted bilateral engagement with Georgia and EU.