جستجوی مقالات مرتبط با کلیدواژه « Near Abroad » در نشریات گروه « علوم سیاسی »

The separation of Crimea from Ukraine and its annexation to the territory of the Russian Federation in 2014 and the special military operations of the Russians against this country since February 2022 as linguistic symptoms suggest that Russia is seeking to expand its sphere of influence in the foreign region as much as possible؛ It is close and at the same time preventing the presence of the West in NATO in order to increase its security factor in it. Therefore, due to the fundamental difference in linguistic symptoms, the confrontation between Russia and Ukraine has not only not decreased, but has also developed strongly in the West's support for Ukraine's policies. On the other hand, considering that the issue of discretion or the will of Russian policymakers in the post-historical world is still based on two elements of historical (geopolitical) and ideological mentality in the region, it has eliminated the possibility of a quick regional solution against Russia's interests. Having said that, the question of the article is expressed in this way that according to the will of the power to develop the foundation with different forms of linguistic text; What has been the consequence of deconstruction against the interests of Russia by Ukraine in the near abroad? With the help of linguistic propositions, the answer to this conflict is proposed in such a way that Ukraine's attempt to separate from the centralist regional security complex led by Russia has the same consequences as the separation of the Crimean Peninsula from Ukraine and the declaration of independence of the Russian-inhabited regions and the tearing of this country into pieces in 2023 had. The method of writing the article is explanatory-analytical and the necessary information has been collected using library sources.

After the collapse of the USSR and the development of new Russia, the areas that impacted directly on Russia’s security, came into a higher significance. The dominance of geopolitical discourse in Russia and a reliance on historical visions made the near abroad doctrine a priority in Russia’s foreign policy. Russia’s new security strategy also shifted from a global strategy with restrictive approach to a regional one applying an unrestrictive approach. In order to secure its security in the new era, Russia has defined three security circles which respectively are a) Russia; b) Russian Federation (Russia plus the autonomous but dependent Republics); c) near abroad (Central Asia). The present paper tries assess the role and nature of Russian – oriented institutionalism in its policy makings in Central Asia, using Volker Rittberger’s theory. The authors argue that the three cognitive, hegemonic and question oriented factors of the mentioned theory are all applied in Russian institutionalism in Central Asia, each with a different weight and effectiveness. In other words, Russia had mostly been focused on the latter two. Using explanatory - analytical methodology and library resources, the authors try to tell why the research findings provide an answer for the mentioned question.

The “soft power” as an important concept was firstly entered to the political discourse of Vladimir Putin in February 2012; This concept, which is now of great concern for Kremlin, is derived from diverse and somehow contradictory resources with mostly governmental and formal natures. While focusing on Russia’s soft power towards its near abroad, using Nye’s conceptual framework, the present literature tries to study Kremlin’s goals of developing soft power and its soft power resources and instruments towards near abroad. Through studying Russia’s soft power resources in culture, economics and politics, the authors conclude that Russia’s political values are traceable in all the three mentioned areas. In fact, the purpose of this paper is to answer the following questions: what are the resources and instruments for Russia’s soft power that have empowered Russia regionally? And what are the constraints for Russian soft power in the region? The proposed hypothesis is that Russia's soft power in near abroad encompasses Russian language, culture, media, Orthodox Church, Russian compatriots as well as trade diplomacy. But instrumental look at soft power resources in this strategic region, as well as ineffectiveness, have weakened Russia's desirable convergence in near abroad. Using descriptive-analytical method, and based library and internet resources, the authors try to find an answer for the research question.

Russia has tried to conceptualize its buffer zone as near abroad in post-Soviet era. Ukraine has am important position among the countries of this region because of numerous cultural and historical affinities. Therefore the security and political issues of this scope are important for Russian Federation. In 2013, Ukraine has faced to an erosive crisis and this issue has incited Russia to harsh reaction in order to manage the crisis automatically and immediately. The article intends to answer this question that how and by which tools and technics, Russia has managed the Ukraine crisis. The hypothesis is that based on Russia approach to international crisis management, crisis occurrence in near abroad usually followed by Russian military reaction. The results indicates that due to the geo-economics, geostrategic and geopolitical importance of Ukraine, Russia mange the Ukraine crisis by using hardware tools collection including military invasion of Crimea, dispatching army troops to the east of Ukraine, delivery loads of super heavy war equipment to oppositions and supplementary software tools such as holding political-diplomatic meetings, imposing energy sanction against European competitors and adopting advertising actions.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the US and Russian Federation relations have been experienced obvious ups and downs. The period of believing the end of long-lasting competition between the two countries after the cold war was too short enough to approve the optimistic analysis of Westerners politicians. The next developments showed quickly the distance between Moscow and Washington’s views on issues of international peace and security. On the one hand, Russia’s growing concerns about the former republics on its own periphery were intensified by the increasing effects of the Global War on Terrorism. On the other hand, the US growing presence in West Asia, Afghanistan and Iraq, and then Syrian crisis, Iranian nuclear program and deployment of the US Missile Defense System in Europe, prepared the ground for creating more confrontation between them. A decade after the independence of the former Soviet Republics, Russian president, Vladimir Putin, crafted and fixed a pragmatic foreign policy. Dmitry Medvedev, the next President of Russia, put this policy on the path of “reset”, which is now facing with complicated problems. However, the question raised by this article is: “What internal, regional or international factors changed the Russian and US relations during Medvedev’s presidency? This paper is based on a descriptive-analytic method, and to examine the mechanisms of this change from the Russian point of view, it studies the positions of its experts.

The U.S. proposal in 2008 for Ukraine's adhesion to NATO in order to integrate it into European military wing and Brussel's attempts for the membership of Ukraine in the EU in order to integrate this country into European economic wing, created much sensitivities among Russia's leaders. Given the ruling of the logic territorial power among Russian decision makers, it was evident that efforts made at integrating Ukraine into European military and economic complexes would fuel the insecurity sentiment of Moscow's ruling elite. The question is that what are the factors shaping Ukraine's crisis? Historical considerations and geopolitical imperatives of Russia regarding Ukraine as well as the Western and especially American inability for convincing Russia that policies pursued in regard to Ukraine would not pose any threat to Russia, has made Ukraine's crisis inevitable.

Russia’s relations with Hamas organization are very important. On the one hand, the organization is on the list of terrorist organizations in the United States and Europe while, on the other hand, Moscow’s relations with this Palestinian group are characterized by a host of political contradictions. Hamas, at least in words, has always supported Islamist movements across the world, including the Chechen separatist movement in North Caucasus. Following the second war with Chechnya, the Kremlin has been always warning about a new plot to establish Islamic caliphate. However, despite opposition of the United States and Israel, which have close ties with Moscow, relations between Hamas and Russia have been on the rise since the organization was established. The present research tries to answer this question: Why Russia considers relations with Hamas important? To answer that question, their relations as well as various grounds, factors, goals and consequences of those relations have been studied. Evidence shows that by expanding ties with Hamas and playing the role of a balancing factor, Russia has been trying to disturb the United States unilateral world order and improve its position as an effective international power.