جستجوی مقالات مرتبط با کلیدواژه "badness" در نشریات گروه "علوم قرآن و حدیث"

Since miracles are considered as a way to prove prophethood from the point of view of religious people, proving the inability of human beings to create something like the Qur'an is a reason for the divinity of the Qur'an and a reason for the validity of the claim of the Holy Prophet prophethood. The inability of human beings to create something like the Qur'an proves the claim of prophethood of the Prophet if its implication is accepted as the validity of the claim of its creator. The proof of this implication is based on the rational explanation of goodness and badness, and after believing and confessing the existence of Allah, the Almighty, the Wise and the All-Knowing. In this article, this issue has been examined via a descriptive, analytical and library method and according to the rules of "obligation of grace", "ugliness of exaggeration with ignorance" and "refusal to violate the intention" of Allah. The result of the present article is the proof of the rational and logical reason for human inability to create the Qur'an indicates its divinity.

It is necessary to take account of the theoretical foundations of ethics and their role in moral instructions. Moral epistemology deals with the epistemological foundations of ethics. To be more precise, in moral epistemology, moral judgments and propositions are explained and justified while the sources and processes of acquiring moral knowledge are analyzed and evaluated. In this article, relying on Feyḍ Kashani’s works and ideas, we seek to explain the epistemological foundations of ethics and the extent to which moral knowledge is influenced by them. Reason, revelation, senses, and intuition are considered to be the important sources of moral knowledge by Feyḍ Kashani. He regards reason as superior to the other sources of knowledge because they take their validity from it. Feyḍ Kashani believes that the perfect rationality is peculiar to the prophets and saints, and others have to prefer revelation to reason because revelation explains not only general matters but also the issues in detail, and therefore, one can realize the unique role of revelation in recognizing moral obligations and in the ability to fulfill them. Feyḍ Kashani explains and analyzes the epistemological foundations of ethics, on the assumption that senses and reason are next to revelation and there is a close connection between them. This outlook can have an impact on various areas including ethics.

Philosophers have offered many meanings and descriptions for morality. Morality is not an alien factor to the world, in fact it is interweaved with every aspect of the world. This becomes apparent in metaphor and materialization of moral deeds in word views. The purpose of this research is to use analytical and literature review methods to compare and analyze the “Badness” metaphor in two famous Persian texts, . We also aim to understand the source domains of this metaphor based on the contemporary metaphor theory. Lakoff and Johnson (2003) believe that metaphors are cognitive tools that humans use to make abstract concepts more comprehendible. Our analysis showed that the "Badness is a thing" name-of-mapping n both Mēnōg- ī- Xrad (with 60%) and Golestan (with 67%) has the highest occurrence frequncy. This shows that even although Mēnōg- ī- Xrad is a pre-Islamic text and Golestan post-Islamic, their moral content are in fact two aspects of a singular world view when looked through a philosophical lens. Both texts believe that the world has multiple orders (the material life and the after life) and the materialization of each moral act will manifest itself in th next order of being (after life)

Goodness and badness are one of most important subjects of the Islamic theology that have different results in areas and branches such as ethics and beliefs. The Ash'arites consider goodness and badness as the religious and product of Shari'a rules, and the Mu'tazilites and Shiites consider it as one of the rules of reason and prior to Shari'a. According to the second category, goodness and badness of rulings are subject to their interests and corruptions. The verdict of goodness is subject to expediency and the verdict of badness is corrupt. Of course, due to the limitations of human intellect, finding supporting materials and corruptions or the good and bad of rulings is achieved only for some rulings and not as a general rule. The present study, with an analytical-descriptive approach based on a library method, seeks to investigate the attitude of Nahj al-Balaghah to the issue of goodness and badness and answer the question whether it can be used as a reason for the theory of goodness and badness? In answer to the central question of the research, some may claim that this book is not concerned with the issue of goodness and badness and does not refer to this principle. However, some of its interpretations can be used to prove and confirm the claim of this important theological principle. Therefore, with the help of Nahj al-Balaghah's attitude to the issue of nature, the role and position of reason, as well as parts of Imam's (as) statements, the answer to the research question can be found; Given that the rationality of goodness and badness is a conscience. Presenting narrated reasons and evidences on it is mostly punitive and negligent.

The problem of goodness and badness is an important problem in theology, philosophy, and principles of jurisprudence (uṣūl al-fiqh). Moreover, judgment of goodness and badness depends on variables such as the “agent’s intention.” One problem with which both Muslim jurists and moral philosophers are concerned is the intention’s role in the value of action and its goodness and badness. The views of Muḥammad Kāẓim Khurāsānī (known as Ākhūnd Khurāsānī) about the role of intention in goodness and badness of actions is very significant. In this paper, we deploy a descriptive method of research to conceptualize goodness and badness, and provide an account of different views here to analyze the view of Ākhūnd Khurāsānī about the role of intention in moral goodness and badness. For him, “goodness and badness” are respectively the agreement and disagreement of an action to the intellectual faculty. This means that any action confirmed by reason is agreeable, and any action rejected by reason is disagreeable. The agent’s intention is a criterion of such agreeability and disagreeability. Thus, a good intention has agential goodness, just as a bad intention has agential badness; that is, reason does not like bad actions and judges that they are bad, and the action is also judged as bad following the badness of its intention.

The problem of human deed`s Goodness and badness is one basic problem in theology, usuli fiqh and ethics; it may be studied in different aspect of semantics, ontology and epistemology. Whether goodness and badness are essential to deeds or not is ontological; but whether it is rational or not, is epistemological. Often, these two aspects are not properly distinguished and it leads to some fallacies. This paper, having distinguished the two aspects, deciding the place of dispute and describing epistemological consequences, has argued for rationality of those propositions of goodness and badness by giving three proofs. Upon the first, if the goodness and badness are not rational, one may not be of any knowledge of the goodness of human deeds at all, even by way of religion. The second proof proves that these propositions carry certainty and, therefore, are used in the premises of logical demonstration; they are not among those known only as well-known used in dialectic. On the third reason, the validity of certain deeds is known as self-evident and, thereof, certain and rational. Although numerous epistemological objections have been given against the proofs, finally the paper, giving certain arguments, has defended rationality of the goodness and badness of these propositions.

Shaykh Muḥammad Ḥusayn Iṣfahānī, the Shiite scholar of Ūṣūl al-Fiqh (principles of Islamic jurisprudence), has appealed to remarks by Muslim philosophers in order to give a common-sense picture of the moral propositions being types of “mashhūrāt” (generally held) propositions and provided a new theory. According to his view, moral goodness and badness amounts to being praiseworthy or blameworthy, because semantically speaking, moral value is meant to refer to being worthy of praise and blame. There are two elements in Muḥaqqiq Iṣfahānī’s ontological account of moral goodness and badness: praise and blame by rational people, and an instrumental view of the praise and the blame, that is, rational people praise or blame an action because moral actions are ways to protect the social system, gain interests, and prevent harms. We criticize Iṣfahānī’s view in that, first, our evaluations of the moral are made in terms of discovery, rather than construction, and second, the value we perceive in the moral is one that can be perceived by seeing their essences, and so, they do not have an instrumental nature. In this paper, after an analysis of the gist of Muḥaqqiq Iṣfahānī’s claim and its implications, we will criticize his view.

Exploring the question of goodness and badness, Martyr Sadr has aimed to explain the meaning of goodness and badness and their status in the station of realization and affirmation and typology of statements of goodness and badness. According to his view, interpretation of goodness and badness as “expediency and aftermath”, “deserving reward and punishment”, “deserving praise and blame”, “desire and instinct” is not correct but the authentic meaning of goodness and badness is the moral necessity which - regardless of the realm of conventions - has had actuality in the tablet of reality and is other than cosmic necessity. According to him, the difference between essential and canonical goodness and badness is substantial and is not limited to the quality of ascription. He has criticized some of justice-oriented ('adliyyah) theologians for proving essential and rational goodness and badness and regarded the two propositions of “justice is good” and “oppression is bad” as assertoric propositions. According to him, the propositions of goodness and badness are indemonstrable and are among certainties and Muhaqqiq Isfahani’s argument for their being among conventional proposition is not valid. Beside its strong points, Martyr Sadr’s view has some weak points which have been dealt with in the present article.

Considerable emphasis of the Qur'an and Sunnah on the role of reason in guiding people indicates the significance of this gift of God. Since there is a heated debate among theologians and the Salafis about authority of reason and Albania, on the other hand, is one of the Salafi leaders who has his own school and followers, we decided to investigate and explain reason from Albani's perspective and display the weaknesses of his view. Research shows that Albani has not proposed a specific definition for reason; he believes that reason is twofold: real reason and virtual reason. In his view, narrations are virtual reason because David Bin Mahbar is present there in the chain of the narrators of most of the narrations about reason. Albani believes that God cannot be known by reason and common sense is not supposed to conflict with reliable and authentic narrations. Thus, good and evil are originated in Shar'a not reason.