جستجوی مقالات مرتبط با کلیدواژه "اخلاق تکاملی" در نشریات گروه "فلسفه و کلام"

Kant is known as a pre-evolutionary philosopher. Because the contents contrary to the theory of evolution are evident in his naturalistic system as well as in his moral system; In such a way that themes such as the centrality of the will and the broad role of rationality in his view can be recognized in a clear opposition to evolutionary ethics, which is based on luck, adaptation and natural leap. However, the possibility of an exchange of views with a relative agreement between Kantian and evolutionary morality is not inherently ruled out and depends on our understanding and hearing of the beginning and practice of morality in the narrative of the two theories. In this approach, if we consider nature as the desire to develop human moral life, or deny the free will, we have distanced ourselves from Kant. But by acknowledging the savage roots of nature, or, as Dawkins puts it, in view of the selfish resistance of nature against morality, and by reciprocally describing the superiority of the human will over natural inclinations, we have established an observable dialogue between the two theories. However, in exchange for modern ideas of Selfish Genes, Kant's moral law and the will that governs it are interpreted as a cultural-evolutionary product and a factor in the dignified survival of the human kind.

Richard Dawkins is one of the contemporary atheists greatly affected by Darwinism. As an evolutionary biologist, he has tried to justify all the complex phenomena of the world through his Naturalistic approach. He denies the relationship between ethics and religion following evolutionary ethics and strives to overrule the hypothesis of God as the Designer and Cosmic Mind. But the important thing is that despite the serious criticisms of Darwin's theory of evolution, it still holds great significance and appears to have caused many conflicts between religious beliefs and science. To many, the conflict with religion is not due to the conflict between the content of science and religion but to the assumption that scientific methods are the only way to know and discover reality. In the present research, we intend to defend this stance – through a critical investigation of some of Dawkins’ Naturalistic approaches from the viewpoint of Alvin Plantinga and others – that a true agreement between science and religion can be found via a true interpretation of experimental science theories and attention to methodological issues in science, and finally can use the scientific methods for recognizing the world as ways of divine management and action.

The naturalistic approaches to ethics try to find some solution to problems of moral philosophy with an emphasis on finding of empirical science. One of the most famous naturalistic approaches to ethics is evolutionary approach. Evolutionary explanations of morality have always been accused of committing naturalistic fallacy. The naturalistic fallacy has two Humean and Moorian versions. Hume's reading, also known as deductive version of the naturalist fallacy, suggests that the inference of values from facts is a kind of fallacy. Moore's version of naturalistic fallacy, says that defining moral properties based on immoral properties, and in particular natural properties, is impossible. In this article, after introducing Ruse's evolutionary ethics, his reasons for not having been committed to naturalistic fallacies are brought. Then we answer this question if he really avoided the fallacies. Our answer to this question is yes. But, along with critics like Rottscheafer and Martinsen, we will show that the cost of avoiding these fallacies has been to discarding the objectivity of ethics.Would Ruse without endorsing an illusionary and subjective account of morality avoid the naturalistic fallacy? We will demonstrate that such a reading can be offered by giving a greater role to culture. Thus, the purpose of the article is to oppose the Ruse's illusionary readings of morality and to defend an objectivist reading. In our opinion, elements of this reading can also be found in the work of the Ruse himself and will be offered at the end of the article.

In this research, by collecting information from library sources and describing the evolutionary approach at first and then, analyzing and comparing the two approaches, altruism has been studied. in this way, the differences and likenesses have been measured in a problem-based way. In evolutionary ethics, altruism ultimately does not go beyond the range of genetic relatives. Therefore, the justification of non-tribal altruism is one not solvable problems of evolutionary ethics. It is proved by the explanation that in Islamic ethics, however, one may not found such a problem at all. In the paper, the superiority of Islamic ethics in explaining the scope of altruism has been proved. In Islamic ethics, in contrast to evolutionary ethics, there is a wide range of charities, in the fields of both matter and scope. The matter of charity is very vast and include all cases from money, pen, step to forgiveness, intercession, and all. The issue of charity is drawn from the mental charity to functional charity, and the scope of the charity extends fromrelatives to enemies.

Contrary to what it seems to be, Social Darwinism is the result of Herbert Spencer's efforts rather than Darwin's. The advocates of social Darwinism used the idea of survival of the fittest, which was initially invented by Spencer, in order to analyze and explain social events and moral behaviors. Since Social Darwinism was a justification for removing the weak persons and boosting the survival of the rich, and also justified many of the great wars, including World War II, it has become a notorious philosophy, and many critics have tried to reject it. Michael Rus as a contemporary evolutionist and theorist of the moral philosophy, has reviewed Social Darwinism. The results of this review led him to a new evolutionary ethics. In this article we will introduce and review the social Darwinism from the viewpoint of Ruse. At the end, we conclude that common judgments about social Darwinism are hasty, and the critique of social Darwinism needs to think more.