جستجوی مقالات مرتبط با کلیدواژه « ارزش های غیرمعرفتی » در نشریات گروه « فلسفه و کلام »

Non-epistemic values in scientific reasoning bring many discussions. One way to justify the role of these values is the argument from inductive risk. The aim of this article is to examine a version of this argument that is presented by Douglas. By raising the question about "evidential sufficiency", Douglas advances her argument to justify the influence of non-epistemic values. Assuming the correctness of Douglas' argument, we try to determine the answer of "evidential sufficiency" based on the conclusion of her argument. Even considering both epistemic and non-epistemic values, we will show that the question of sufficiency will not have a proper answer. Because to determine evidential sufficiency, we will either confront circularity or force to add other ambiguous things. Also, we will explain that Douglas should have sought the "evidential sufficiency" by emphasizing more on the practice of scientists in actuality, in which there is no requirement to incorporate scientific claims with policy-making claims. This criticism is sympathetic to some other criticisms of Douglas, according to which she incorporated pragmatic and epistemic domains of science.

The Value-Free Ideal of science (VFI) is the view that non-epistemic values can play no legitimate role in the epistemic evaluation of scientific theories. The VFI, which once was defended as a regulative norm guiding the course of scientific inquiry in dealing with non-epistemic values, has been the target of some forceful attacks lately. One of the main objections is an argument called the Inductive Risk Argument (IRA). The validity of IRA, though, has been questioned. Moreover, it can be shown that even if we assume its validity, IRA is not successful in routing out the VFI. The core idea behind the VFI is the illegitimacy of any role non-cognitive values may play in determining the evidence, so to undermine the VFI, this very claim should be denied. Accordingly, there have been attempts in the literature to point out cases of the proper evidential role of non-cognitive values. By examining these cases, we argue that non-epistemic values should not play any evidential role for scientific theories, and thus the VFI can be defended. In the end, a more accurate interpretation of the VFI will be provided.