جستجوی مقالات مرتبط با کلیدواژه "ایده آلیسم استعلایی" در نشریات گروه "فلسفه و کلام"

Schelling's goal is to find a total consciousness for human; therefore, in the philosophy of nature, he tries to reach from the real to the ideal. On the other hand, the conscious spirit is a product of human subjectivity, so, an unconscious spirit manages things. Therefore, Schelling's transition from natural philosophy to the system of transcendental idealism occurs. Reaching this level of consciousness is possible when [I] goes through different stages. The first stage is sensation, then reflection and after that comes praxis. But since the will of the subject of and the will of nature are the same, and ethics is in the realm of practical reason, then the subject of action does not have free will. Therefore, there is a gap between theoretical philosophy and practical philosophy that Schelling must somehow fill. He solves this problem with the free and creative will of an artist, a will that acts not out of necessity but freely. Schelling reaches the absolute from the identity of natural philosophy and transcendental idealism. The absolute is the result of identity of the real and the ideal. It is crystal clear that expounding how to objectify the absolute leads to a better comprehension of Schelling's philosophical system. In this article, it is investigated that among theoretical wisdom, practical wisdom and art, which one Schelling deems the most functional mechanism to objectify the absolute, and what are the roles of genius and the beauty through this path.

The distinction between Kant's idealism and dogmatic and material idealism is quite clear in the first critique. Another kind of idealism that Kant denies; Problematic idealism is that which considers human knowledge of the outside world through this inner experience and concepts, which also requires analytical reasoning. In contrast to this idealism, Kant argues for transcendental idealism, although he generally agrees fully with idealism formal idealism and its method. The fundamental question here is what is the difference between different types of idealisms? And what is the advantage of that type? And in what aspects is the reason for this superiority? In this article, we discuss the superior aspects of transcendental idealism over absolute idealism, while at the same time expressing the new problems that arise in this regard; Schopenhauer and Nietzsche also have winning critiques of the debate itself that have been addressed in this study, especially Nietzsche, who believes that Kant played a kind of game in this regard. In the final analysis, I came to the conclusion that Kant: has serious problems with the validity of recognizing and explaining certain foreign beings.

Husserl thinks of philosophy as a general, fundamental and apodictic science of world. He set out to found transcendental phenomenology as general philosophy or apodictic science, but he ought to explain the possibility of objective knowledge of world as to reach to this point. Concerning about crisis in modern western culture, Crisis projects his view of philosophy and of duty of philosopher in context of a critics of modern philosophy and science concerns about crisis in modern western culture. So he introduces the original concept life-world that is a novel idea for the philosophy as general science. The paper is to consider the Husserl's point of view on relation between philosophy and crisis of modern culture and to review the question if life-world can introduce Husserl's transcendental phenomenology as a fundamental philosophy and general science. We consider the problem of possibility of objectivity of world, a problem that proposed in late philosophy of Husserl in more extensive and innovative form.

Our effort in this paper is to present some important and traditional criticism about Kant’s “Transcendental Idealism” and their Evolution to presentation of ‘Separability Thesis’ - a thesis that propose the separation between “Transcendental Idealism” and “Transcendental Theory of Experience". Then we will present Henry Allison reading of transcendental idealism according to his book of “Kant’s Transcendental Idealism”. In this interpretation, he presents an epistemological (or meta-epistemological) reading of Kant’s Transcendental Theory and attributes an ontological reading to Kant’s critics. By this, he both providing a solution to this trend of criticism and making the separability thesis impossible by introducing fundamental connection between transcendental idealism and transcendental theory of experience. At the end of this paper, after presenting some sides of his reading and its approach for answering to traditional criticism, we will express some question about possibility of this interpretation of questionable texts of Kant and power of this reading against same criticisms.

Among various readings of late Wittgenstein, Bernard William's interpretation has been noteworthy and a matter of controversy among commentators. Based on William's point of view, moving from Tractatus to Philosophical Investigation, Wittgenstein passes from "my language limits equal my world limits" and in other words from transcendental solipsism to transcendental idealism or "our language limits equal our world limits". His main goal is to explain that in transition from "I" to "We", one cant get rid of transcendental idealism concerns. It should be noted that Williams regards Wittgenstein as a transcendental idealist in a special meaning. This article first of all tries to present an accurate explanation of William's interpretation. Regarding this, some great Wittgenstein commentators who pay attention to this interpretation, i.e. Ilham Dilam, Dereck Bolton and Norman Malcolm, are appealed for help. Following this, the interpretation is going to be analyzed and criticized.

Kant is the first thinker who investigated the contradictions of reason at a higher level and tried to solve them. These contradictions led Kant to criticize reason. Kant believes that these contradictions cannot be overcome by the predecessor's dogmatic methods. On the other hand, he tries to emancipate reason from these contradictions. Therefore, he did his best to find a solution and finally found it in transcendental idealism. Using an analytical method, the present paper discusses the causes of the development of the contradictions of reason from Kant's viewpoint and solution he proposes for them in order to precisely identify how, according to his view, his method is successful. The research findings show that these contradictions result from reason's transgression beyond its legal limits. In order to be free from these contradictions, he developed transcendental idealism and reached a conclusion that the two extremes of math contradictions are incorrect and those of dynamic contradictions are correct. In doing so, Kant faced internal and external challenges which made his thoughts subject to serious criticism.

Kant’s Copernicusian revolution is a well-known topic in history ofepistemology, though its implications and impacts are not welldiscussed enough. No need to mention that analysis of knowledge wasKant’s first philosophical self-commitment. Aspiring of Copernicus’srevolution in astronomy, he changed the centrality of subject/object inhis epistemological approach and maintained that mind (cognitivefaculties) must be departure of metaphysical analysis; that was arevolutionary idea. Doing so, he, as it is well-known, divided alljudgments from two different aspects: first, analytic/synthetic; andsecond, apriori/aposteriori. He, then, argued that there are apriorisynthetic judgments – by which the possibility of knowledge iswarranted – are universal and necessary. These judgments not onlyrefer to external world, but also belong equally to physics,mathematics, and metaphysics. He believed that his doctrine could(dis)solve the old long-standing epistemological problem in modernphilosophy such as the debates on source of knowledge(reason/experience), dogmatism/skepticism, etc., among rationalistsand empiricists. Although his ideas, specially stressing on aprioriconcepts as a key, help him to (dis)solve some epistemological puzzles,either reveal a few new problems in newly changed epistemologicalscope.

Husserl’s Idealism is a theory capable of being explained in special fields as a concrete science. It does not deny the natural objective world, but its view of nature and the world differs from other epistemological viewpoints. In this article, the authors try to falsify a view that considers Husserl’s idealism as absolute idealism by analyzing his terminology, and to show that in a careful analysis, it should be called transcendental idealism. He employs such concepts as “awareness and sympathy”, “reduction”, “intentionality”, “intuition”, and “idea-eidos” in his special sense, each of which explains the transcendental nature of Husserl’s phenomenology. The authors show that in Husserl’s phenomenology, every thing belonging to this world attains its full particular meaning as well as its ontological condition. This is why Husserl in his Ideas tries his best to differentiate between phenomenology as method, and phenomenology as knowledge. His phenomenology covers all philosophical as well as scientific aspects of reality.

According to Kant, knowledge includes matter and form. Its matter comes form the sense, and the forms are drived from perception and understanding: In perception we have two intuitional categoties that called space and time, and in the stage of understanding 12 other categories. What we know in this process is phenomenon not nomenon (the thing in itself). However, our reason, by its nature, transcends from the realm of phenomenon, and constructs ideas, which are, in fact, illusions. Such an idea is the idea of the soul. Reason is intended by means of four paralogical demonstrations, proves four subjects about the soul: Substantiality, simplicity, identity, and its distinction from matter (the soul has certain existence but the matter has doubtful existence). "I think" or "I", which according to Kant is an apriori and formal condition of knowledge, is the origin of all these paralogisms, and assums an objective thing or a subject of knowledge. Moreover, in the Fourth paralogism, Kant disagrees with idealism in its current meaning, by proposing the theory of transcendental idealism, and considers the ideas of the mind as external in a particular sense.