جستجوی مقالات مرتبط با کلیدواژه « بداهت » در نشریات گروه « فلسفه و کلام »

Mulla Sadra has categorized incorporeality into two types: imaginal incorporeality and intellectual incorporeality. Accordingly, he has differentiated the arguments for the incorporeality of the soul into two categories. In the context of proving intellectual incorporeality, Mulla Sadra relies on arguments grounded in the perception of universals. While these arguments are valid and acceptable, they do not apply universally to all human souls according to him.Another group of arguments for the intellectual incorporeality of the soul is presented by the previous philosophers. In these arguments, an attempt is made to prove the incorporeality of the faculty of reason through the independence of the intellect from the body and bodily faculties. This conclusion is made through different means such as: by negating the occurrence of cognitive disabilities concurrent with the aging process of the body, by relying on the unequal effects of thought on the soul and body, and by the independence of certain cognitive functions of the intellect from bodily faculties.The truth is that these arguments, apart from being inadequate in establishing the intellectual incorporeality of the soul, are rooted in the common understanding or experimental knowledge of previous centuries. Therefore, a final judgment regarding them depends on their reinterpretation based on the findings of cognitive sciences. However, some of these arguments can at least be applied in proving the imaginal incorporeality of the soul.

The attainment of infallible knowledge is a constant concern of philosophers. Accordingly, fundamentalists divide propositions into theoretical and obvious ones, and the reason for the truth of theoretical propositions is their reference to obvious propositions. But why are obvious propositions infallible? These are the questions that this article has tried to address by referring to Sadra’s and Descartes' different views on intuition (Sadra considers intuition synonymous with presence, but Descartes considers simple essences to belong to intuition) and certainty (Sadra believes certainty, as an existential event, is bestowed by the endower of forms (al-Ṣuwar), but Descartes means by certainty the epistemological certainty.) It reveals the fact that knowledge by presence is the criterion and the secret behind the immediacy of the obvious propositions. The difference between the two scholars is that Descartes considers knowledge by presence to be limited to the affective (al-wijdānī) propositions and believes the innate and primary propositions [awwalīyāt] are infallible on account of conceptual clarity. As for Mulla Sadra, it seems that according to him not only the affective and primary propositions but also every acquired knowledge is based on the knowledge by presence. The method of this research is collection, categorize and then analyze and explain the theories of the two philosophers. Finally, inferring ideas of these two philosophers

Some Islamic thinkers have contended that the belief in the existence of God is self-evident by presenting arguments such as the argument of Fitrah, the truthful argument, and the argument of religious experience. The purpose of this research that has been done by theoretical-library and analytical-critical methods, is a critical study of the claimed self-evidence in the three mentioned arguments. The importance of paying attention to the distinction between the self-evidence and the basis of a belief and understanding their difference from each other can also be extended to propositions such as "God exists" and will help us to examine the claim of the self-evidence of the existence of God. The present article seeks to state that knowing the basis of belief in the existence of God does not mean that it is self-evident. Thus, by conceptual analysis of each of the contents of this proposition and also by examining the sources of knowledge, the relation of such belief with the meaning of self-evidence will be explained and the result is that none of these arguments have the power to prove the self-evidence of God; Ultimately, what these three types of arguments prove is to justify the claim that belief in God is basic, and to speak of the self-evidence of such a belief in the above arguments is unreasonable.

In this research, we firstly reconstruct the Aristotelian categorical syllogism using the concept of inclusion(=subset). Then, we prove the soundness of the equation “Aristotelian syllogism= Inclusion properties + Proof by contradiction + Existential import”.  The proof of this equation will be formed by reconstructing the Aristotelian syllogism. There is a consensus view among the old logicians in favor of the usage of existential import as an assumption. Also, the proof by contradiction is considered as a general logical principle. Consequently, it can be concluded that the inclusion and its properties are the core important elements of the Aristotelian categorical syllogism. In the end, after introducing the concept of complexity of syllogism based on the properties of inclusion, we point out the concepts of self-evidency and groundability and their relationship in the Aristotelian categorical syllogism setting. We clarify that the relation of being self-evident and groundability is not equality and the groundability is a more general concept with respect to being self-evident..

The purpose of this research is to provide a new concept in Aristotelian categorical syllogism which is called groundability. A valid mood is called groundable if one would derive all the 24 valid moods in the Aristotelian’s syllogism by assuming only the valid mood and applying a chain of the following rules: simple conversion, reduction-ad-absurdum, sub-alternation, obversion and quantification negation. In this paper, we will prove that only the fifteen valid moods have the groundability property. Because Aristotle proves all the valid moods of other figures based on the four moods in the first figure, he considers these moods of the first figure as moods having the groundability property. We show that the groundability is not restricted to the first valid moods of the first figure--they are fifteen moods as stated. Thus, it can be shown that Aristotle's purpose from the self-evidence of the first figure is not the groundability of the four moods in the first figure. This important logical result in Aristotle's system is gained through the introducing the concept of the groundability of the moods in syllogism. We show that unlike the common view in the Aristotelian tradition, it is not the case that the groundability of the first figure must be the basis for explaining of being self-evidence of the four moods of the first figure. Regardless of what lies behind the evidence of the first figure valid moods, this paper will eliminate one of the options which is somehow a common wrong interpretation for answering the problem

Understanding Fakhr al-Razi’s logical thoughts is very important in understanding the views of seventh and eighth-century logicians. His role in the development of Avicennan logic and his new challenges to this logic are undeniable. Composite of judgment, believe in all concepts are self-evident, expansion and development of a variety of definitions and specific approach to the nominal definition, the mutual implication of concordance and obligation signification, six kinds of universal and to be clear than the particular, unpredicatablity of the partial concept, minimalistic view in the conditions of contradiction between the theorems, differentiation between categorical propositions and real propositions, modality of conditionals, extraction result of the forth syllogism and determining valid mood and valid conditions in fourth figure of Syllogism are Fakhr al-Razi’s logical innovations. This paper is an attempt to explain such innovations.

The issue of the “world outside the mind” is among the important and controversial discussions in philosophy in a way that some philosophers do not accept the existence of such a world, some maintain that it must be proved, and some others believe in its being self-evident. The present article first reviews the most important theories in this regard and investigates them. Then it accepts the view that the distance between mind and the outside world cannot be bridged through argumentation. However, by an existential explanation for the principle of non-contradiction, we may reach a point wherein the agent finds himself the same as objectivity, and thus the outside world finds a philosophical explanation.

Among the arguments presented to prove God is Seddiqin argument. The advantage of this argument to other arguments is that it does not use any creatures of God to prove the existence of God. Tow versions of this argument are Mulla Sadra's and Allameh Tabatabaees. This paper depicts that these arguments - contrary to their apparent difference and common understanding - are not essentially different, and both - after admitting the principiality of existence - are nothing but reflection in the truth of absolute pure existence, the existence of which is an eternal necessity and thus necessary being. Furthermore the paper shows that Allameh Tabatabaee's argument is based on the principiality of existence and not on the principiality of reality. Also neither of the arguments is, in fact, an argument (becase they have no midle term). The Seddiqin argument is just a statement of the evidence of the existence of God.

Definition, as the logicians say, is a mechanism for getting the unknown part in imaginations. For knowing something truly, there is no way except resorting to definition. Now the question is where and when definition can have such a usage. Finding a part of the answer will derive us to discussion about the conditions of definition, some of which are the formal conditions. Among the most important formal conditions of definition are the composition and the way the elements of definition are formulated. However, accepting these conditions necessitates more discussions; this shows the complexity of this discussion and leads us to the fact that definition is not just a logical discussion; rather, it has a philosophical and epistemological identity as well as linguistic dimensions.

Husserl believes that under the impact of modern science as inaugurated by Galileo, the Life-world - i.e., the world of common experience - has been replaced by the objectively true world of science which, in the thinking of modern western man, passes for reality. On the one hand, Husserl in opposition to the objective view of the world insists that the Life-world is the meaning-fundament of scientific thinking and the sphere of original evidences. On the other hand, he maintains that the theoretical results of science take on the character of validities for the Life-world, adding themselves as such to its own composition. Husserl, at first, considers the Life-world in the context of the objective science critique, but describing the subjective-relative Life-world, which includes science, it would not remain as a partial problem within the general problem of the objective science. The invariant and common structures that abstract from the subjective-relative Life-world yield the universal Life-world a priori. Therefore, the Life-world which firstly appeared as a partial problem within the general problem of the objective science, namely, functions as the foundation of sciences. Eventually, it is disclosed, in terms of Husserl, as a universal and genuine problem for philosophy. This paper deals with the view of the relationship of the Life-world and science, and demonstrates the Life-world conception as a universal problem

This paper has studied David Ross`s solutions for ethical mutual competitions. For Ross, the mutual competition happens in ethical duty of the present, and one should give priority to those duties with more emphasized obligation. He has considered special relationship as the foundation for ethical duties upon which the norm for priority and the degree of obligation are based. As is understood by the views of Ross` critics like Palmer, and by the comparison made between his view and religious teachings, the view would not seem fully correct. Such concepts as essential expediency and evil in religious texts, the part by agent`s motivation, considering the consequences of acts and the priority of the consequences upon which the degree of action`s state of being valuable is based (of which the highest is Divine approximation) can be regarded as the ground for a complete solution in the field. Ross` view, therefore, may not be accepted as a complete solution.

In classical philosophy, a collection of suppositions that man attempts to discover and explains their truth on the basis of conformity criterion is called ma‘rifa (intuitive knowledge). The desirable ma‘rifa is one which possesses the two qualities of objectivity and necessity. Such ma‘rifa should undoubtedly be conceived in a process that both guarantees the reflection of the realities of matters and enjoys a high power of resistance against skeptical attacks. In this case, the acquired ma‘rifa would hold the desirable excellences, i.e., objectivity and necessity. In order to achieve such ma‘rifa, the Muslim philosophers have brought up the discourses of evident attestations and the criterion for their self-evidence; and while believing in the objectivity and necessity of the self-evident, they have figured the reference of the theoretical to the self-evident as a condition for the objectivity and necessity of the theoretical.The main purpose of this article is to present a critical review of the Muslim philosophers concerning evident attestations and the criterion for their self-evidence, to explain and critically review the supplementary approaches in contemporary era, to discuss the degree to which each has succeeded in explaining the truthfulness of the evident attestations and the guarantee of the objective and necessary ma‘rifa. The article concludes by suggesting the ontological approach as a new approach, which, by relying on the notion of existence and the ontological analysis of basic attestations and the primary evident principles, solves the problem.

Objectivity is one of the most basic and difficult issues in modern and contemporary philosophy. The present paper is devoted to this issue from viewpoint of Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology. Since perception, particularly sense perception, in view of intentionality, as lowest level of objectivity can act as the base for perceiving the objectivity of other objects, whether real or unreal (ideal), it has been discussed in this paper. To do this, objectivity of the sense perception and its role in leading the mind toward essential and ideal objects, and conversely, the role of latter objects in objectivity of the perception itself will be explored. Because the concepts of objectivity and evidence are correlate in Husserl’s philosophy, and since evidence as the self-given manifests itself, from the very beginning, in the lowest level, namely the objects of sense perception, and considering that evidence and objectivity of sense perception concern this lowest level, the critical viewpoint of Husserl’s phenomenology provides a firm and new basis for objectivity if taken at its full competence.

Although Mulla Sadra followed the early theological and philosophical theories concerning the discussion of time, he still tried to create a tight relationship between time and being. By doing so, he corrected many of the ideas and theories of early philosophers in this regard and brought time from the domain of quiddities to the domain of being; he moved it from the soulless world of the body into the vast dimension of being and, finally, brought it into the domain of human mind and wisdom. In this way, human beings will be able to understand and experience changes not in the external world but in their own existence and all over the world of being. A study of the strong and weak points in his view of time is of importance to us because it provides us with a great insight into the future.

In Islamic philosophy four definitions have been represented about self evidence and speculative knowledge which its common definition is “required to think and not required to anything of think”.Explaining conceptual and extensional relationships of self evidence with concepts such as clarity or certainty would help us not to mistake and not to mix different aspects of epistemology together and so, protect ourselves from epistemic mistakes.In this article, self evidence has been compared with clarity & certainty from the conceptual perspective. It has been concluded that the common definition of self-evidence from the point of conceptualization has nothing to do with certainty & clarity, although this conclusion cannot be said about other uncommon definitions.Also, among the self-justified proposition, only the vejdanyyat propositions require these concepts and only the apriori & vejdanyyat & estimative propositions require the certainty and the others don’t have any relation with these concepts.

The possibility or impossibility of acquaired knowledge has been discussed for a long time by philosophers. Some of them consider it impossible, some others see it possible, and others consider it possible in a certain type of human knowledge and impossible in an another type. In Islamic philosophy, this problem has been discussed under the title of evidentiality or acquaintance of concepts and assents. Al-Razi believed that acquaintance of concepts is impossible and offered two reasons for it. In this paper, the author first outlines the history of the problem and then accounts and analyzes his reasons and critiques of other logicians and philosophers.