جستجوی مقالات مرتبط با کلیدواژه "تبیین علی" در نشریات گروه "فلسفه و کلام"

Regarding the analysis of voluntary action, there are two general attitudes in Western philosophy: causal explanation and non-causal rational explanation. The first view has been the classic and common theory in the history of Western philosophy and thought, but the second has been formed in the contemporary century. According to the first view, the inner elements of the agent, i.e., desire, intention and belief, have a causal relationship with his action, and the explanation of the action based on them is an example of causal explanation. John Searle, a famous contemporary philosopher who defends the second view, lists six assumptions for the first theory and criticizes them. Based on the words of Searle and other proponents of the first view, this article explains, rationally analyzes and evaluates Searle's six assumptions and his criticisms.The mentioned assumptions are: the causality of beliefs and desires for rational actions, rationality as following certain principles and rules, rationality as a separate cognitive faculty, weakness of will caused by disturbance in the psychological antecedents of the action, denial of desire-independent reasons for action and realization of rationality in the assumption of consistent collection of previous desires. Searle believes that these assumptions are incomplete. Some of Searle's criticisms and his positive views are debatable, including that the agent himself is the cause of action, not his beliefs and desires, and that Searle's idea of the desire-independent reason is incomplete and there is a desire in this kind of reason. The rationality includes primary goals and beliefs.

The main issue of this research is to investigate the causal explanation of the action and its purpose is to discover the deductive-nomological model and to criticize it in the philosophy of Sadr al-Mutalahin. According to him, an intentional action is the volitional act of a person, of which he has second-order awareness; therefore, the causal explanation of it requires the discovery of the basics of these two elements. The main cause of creating volitional action is the recognition of its benefits by the imaginative faculty. The reign of the imaginative faculty in the creation of volitional action is moderated by the intervention of practical reason as the source of awareness, so that intentional action is volitional action that passes through the channel of practical reason. the cause of the creation of an intentional action is either the acknowledgment of one of the two rational or imaginative faculty to perform that action without the presence of the opposite confirmation, or the confirmation of one of these two faculty to perform an action and the overcoming of the enthusiasm caused by the contrary confirmation of the other faculty. Therefore, "confirming the usefulness of an action" in the case of "absence of confirmation of the opposite" or "overcoming the enthusiasm caused by the confirmation of the opposite" makes the deductive-nomological model regarding the action, in transcendental wisdom. The normativism, lack of causal explanation when passions conflict, and determinism are the three problems of Sadr al-Mutalahin's theory.

In Western thinking, one of the most important proofs of God's existence is reasoning through possibility and necessity. Analyzing the process of its various expressions, the characteristics of each of those expressions and their distinctions, as well as evaluating their cognitive validity and achieving a criterion or a solution for evaluation, is the motivation of the current research. The result of this research is that all expressions have been presented in two ways or with two approaches: 1. Expressions through causality or causal explanation; 2. Expressions through description and explanation or non-causal explanations. On the other hand, by examining Aquinas's and Locke's expositions, which are examples of causal explanations, we are led to the conclusion that those expositions are either reasoning through occurrence or reasoning through non-causal explanation, not reasoning through possibility and necessity, nor reasoning based on causal explanation. Therefore, their epistemological validity is under question. On the other hand, Leibniz's argument and other explanations through non-causal explanation fail to carry epistemological validity, and it is not possible to achieve certain knowledge, even based on the correct assumption.

Salmon claims that explanation is an objective affair، and is nothing more than descriptive knowledge of the world. A criterion which Salmon provides for causal explanation as scientific explanation has two foundations: 1. Statistical Relevance; 2. Causal relation. In this paper، first، we will argue that the explanation includes both objective and subjective components and scientists use inference to the best explanation. Second، we will state that causation is an intellectual and philosophical affair so that necessity of causal relation is its result. Therefore there is no ontological status for the probabilistic approach of causality.