جستجوی مقالات مرتبط با کلیدواژه "جان هیل" در نشریات گروه "فلسفه و کلام"

By accepting the role of human will in accepting and forming, maintaining, and using belief-forming procedures, John Heil emphasizes the responsibility of man towards beliefs. Despite Heil's defense of indirect doxastic voluntarism, he follows a graded process from the directness of the will's role in the procedure of forming and maintaining belief to the indirect influence of accepting and forming belief. In the formation of beliefs, Heil does not accept the direct will to believe, which is based on the famous idea of Cartesian. However, by distinguishing between direct doxastic voluntarism and indirect doxastic voluntarism, explaining the concept of basic and non-basic acts, and expressing procedures and techniques such as behavioral change, he tries to interpret the acceptance and formation of beliefs under the voluntary but indirect control of people. In this research, by using the analytical-critical method, we aim to show that by modifying Heil's view, accepting epistemic responsibility based on the view of indirect doxastic voluntarism is meaningful.

Causation can be regarded as one of the most important and fundamental notions in the history of philosophy. It is arguable if we consider causation is bounded with Hume. His Empiricism led him to be skeptical about modal notions. Hence, he sought to eliminate them from his ontology. His efforts paid back. By his challenge on the classical view on causation, the image of the causal relation as necessary relation was pushed aside. At present, the majority of analytic philosophers have accepted this Humean understanding of the world known as the Humean mosaic. Despite these facts, there is a minority who still defend the classical or, more accurately, the Aristotelian account of causation. In this essay, first, I try to introduce the basics of the Humean view based on Heil and Martin’s view. Then, I am going to explain the Aristotelian view with a focus on Charles Martin and John Heil’s view. Besides introducing Heil and Martin’s views on causation, this article attempts to demonstrate an Aristotelian view of the world is preferable to the Humean one, this would be possible by appealing to evaluate the distinction between categorical properties and dispositional properties. In the end, I investigate that if we find the Aristotelian view more plausible, and if we want to pick up Interactionist Substance Dualism in the philosophy of mind, the best option for us is Lowe’s Non-Cartesian Substance Dualism.