جستجوی مقالات مرتبط با کلیدواژه « رورتی » در نشریات گروه « فلسفه و کلام »

Criticizing and rejecting the Western metaphysical tradition, which searches for an absolute notion of Truth, Rorty describes the truth of beliefs as relative and dependent on the context of their origin. On the other hand, Allameh Tabatabaʾi, with a fundamentally metaphysical background, presents an innovative theory within the tradition of Islamic philosophy with similar consequences. This theory considers some valid perceptions in the sphere of action, namely, ‘Iʿtibārī perceptions,’ which, he specifies, play a central role in the historical evolution of human life. Unlike true perceptions, Iʿtibārī perceptions are relative and constantly evolving depending on environmental and social conditions. In this paper, with a comparative-analytical approach, we will show that Tabatabaʾi’s theory of Iʿtibārī perceptions has a significant affinity with Rorty’s view on relative truths. Although Rorty, unlike Tabatabaʾi, does not leave room for the absolute notion of Truth, we will investigate this difference to explore the possibility of congruence and compatibility between the thoughts of these two philosophers.

Most of Hilary Putnam's influential ideas are referred to his two fundamental commitments: pragmatism and realism. These two commitments caused the proximity and, at the same time, his intellectual distance from the other contemporary pragmatist, Richard Rorty. While committing to pragmatism, they have very different positions on realism. Their difference is so problematic that the meaning of pragmatism will not be apparent if we count Rorty and Putnam together in the group of pragmatists. Reviewing these two philosophers' thoughts will help us determine how broad the horizons of pragmatism can be. Intellectual opposition between Rorty and Putnam is discussed in this research. This research does not consider the intellectual opposition of these two philosophers based on non-pragmatist ideas. It is aimed to examine their intellectual coherence regarding their philosophical positions.
This research evaluates the intellectual opposition between Rorty and Putnam. The information cited in this article has been collected using the library method. Furthermore, the method of information processing is comparative-analytical.
(1) Despite the common pragmatist positions of Rorty and Putnam, what they really disagree with each other is what can be preserved from the realist tradition. In the recent period of his thinking, Putnam, by defending "common sense realism" among his pragmatist positions, tries to find a place to preserve a notion and meaning similar to the nonlocal and nontransient "rightness" that realist philosophy provides. According to Rorty, pragmatist positions are acceptable only to the extent that we want to practice without such meanings and notions.
 (2) The philosophical opposition between Rorty and Putnam is based on their metaphilosophical disagreement on pragmatism. Putnam is convinced that the mere pragmatic "convenience" is not a suitable criterion for "practice." According to Putnam, "common sense realism" provides a minimally realistic insight into the "truth" that can guide pragmatic convenience in the "right" direction. In contrast, Rorty believes that "more" and "better" convenience is the only condition that can provide us with a criterion for modifying current procedures while remaining within the limits of the anti-platonic commitments of pragmatism.
Pragmatism is the mainstream of Rorty and Putnam's thoughts. According to the results of this research, Rorty takes a more original process in the path of pragmatism. Putnam's realistic concerns contradict his pragmatist positions. Even though these concerns are followed in the framework of the minimal truth of "common sense realism." By resorting to the determined "truth" lies at the heart of "common sense realism," Putnam loses the coherence of his thought. Such a "truth" does not indicate particular pragmatic "convenience" except if used in a metaphysical, ahistorical sense. While the characteristic of pragmatism's anti-absolutism means that the common sense, realistic intuitions will also be subject to historical changes. Based on pragmatism, the Hegelian historicization of philosophy is essential precisely because it grasped the emptiness of Kantian attempts to regard "truth" as an ahistorical matter. Putnam's view is a return to pre-Hegelian attempts to find something ahistorical to which philosophers can be committed to follow.

Richard Rorty considers "liberal ironism" to be the best formulation of what the West has been pursuing since the Enlightenment, a position that works out the ideals of enlightenment ethics without relying on a metaphysical worldview. According to him, alongside Dewey and Wittgenstein, Heidegger can be considered one of the most influential figures in achieving such an optimistic perspective. This pivotal role can mainly be attributed to Heidegger's intellectual efforts to depict the finitude of human beings and the contingency of their ultimate vocabularies, an awareness that can dispel any illusion that one’s most important values are eternal and immutable, hanging on something beyond time and chance. Another skill of Heidegger, according to Rorty, is his emphasis on the most elemental words through which each period of human history has its own understanding of being. In a sense, Rorty's pragmatist critique of the epistemology-centered culture of the West owes much to these aspects of Heideggerian thought. However, it seems that Heidegger sometimes overlooks all of implications of acknowledgment of finitude and contingency of final vocabularies and identifies himself as a recipient of a call from Bing that is incompatible with his own facticity; on the other hand, he occasionally has a one-sided judgment regarding the capabilities of modern understanding of Being, alongside its damages and threats: 1) Like other ironist theorists, Heidegger constantly tends towards spreading his self-creation project to others and prescribing his own special version for existence, even its political fatal consequences. He believes that the most elemental words he has discovered in re-describing the past - words like "Plato," "Aristotle," "Parmenides," "alétheia," "will to power," and similar ones - should resonate the same for anyone in contemporary Europe because it is these very words that have shaped Europe's destiny.In addition, it seems that Heidegger considers words such as "ethics," "technology," "striving for the greatest happiness of the most individuals," and similar elemental words as lacking a "constructive force" and discredited in modern understanding of being. However, a liberal ironist can still use them towards the main ideals of enlightenment, namely freedom and equality, even by removing their metaphysical halo. 2) Heidegger's strong inclination towards a kind of fatalism and a descending trajectory of human understanding of being can be considered another inconsistency in his thinking. On one hand, he believes that being is revealed solely through the passage of "understandings of being," and therefore, as soon as elemental words of each period are found, one can determine that the understanding of that period is equally revealing of being in its successive revealing and concealing, just like the pre-Socratic understanding for example. On the other hand, he places the Greeks in a better position throughout his works for their relationship with being and considers their understanding to be more primordial. Since according to Heidegger any understanding of being in any historical epoch is a gift of Being itself, it seems that this evaluation accompanied by valuation is only possible through fatalistic reasoning. If we accept Heidegger's fatalism, concepts such as "forgetfulness of being" or "neglecting being" become problems that humans have no possibility to solve. 3) According to Rorty, it is possible to interpret the concept of "primordiality" of an understanding of Being as our acknowledgment of the contingency of ourselves and our own final vocabularies, facilitating our readiness to be changed as much as possible. In other words, it makes us more cautious about false self-confidence and the illusion of control over the field of all beings and their possibilities, and strengthens our ability to be skeptical about our final vocabularies and be more sensitive to their potential falsehood. If we accept this interpretation of the concept of "primordiality," then from Rorty's perspective, Heidegger's evaluations of the possibilities of modern understanding of being have been unfair and one-sided because it cannot be denied that human beings have been increasingly eager and deliberatively receptive to alternative possibilities and radical changes in their thinking, actions, and way of life since enlightenment.

An example of Rorty's confrontation with the analytical philosophy is his opposition to Davidson's attempt to propose a semantic theory based on truth. According to an anti-metaphysical approach to Truth, Rorty believes that the use of the phrase "p is true" is simply to confirm a claim that we consider ourselves or others justified in making. Although Davidson is against the metaphysical approach to truth, based on a Tarskian truth definition, he believes that a notion of truth more robust than Rorty will admit is required to propose a theory about meaning. Rorty's Wittgensteinian response to Davidson is that not only the conversation between the speaker and the interpreter is not conditional on knowing a theory of meaning based on truth, but the attempt to say something more than what we can say about truth leads us to the confusions of the metaphysical tradition. This article, referring to Davidson's writings, shows that Davidson's effort to propose a semantic theory based on truth inevitably leads him to express metaphysical interpretations.

Does freedom, without the concept of truth, have a meaning? The idea is that deceiving people can be considered as an attack on their freedom. How can you detect deception without Truth? Rorty's famous answer to this question is that if we take care of freedom, the truth will take care of itself. For him, freedom comes before truth. Conant, unlike Rorty, believes that the concept of truth is the fundamental basis of freedom. He refers to Orwell's novel 1984. Conant sees the cruelty of the world of the novel 1984 as the result of removing the concept of truth in this world. Conant, according to the framework of postmodern thought, tries to argue with Rorty non-Realistically. This essay examines the confrontation between these two thinkers and the special strategy that Conant has adopted to present his criticisms against Rorty. It seems that Conant is not successful in designing his critical structure. Because he introduces cryptoRealist statements in his discussion, which is against his critical structure.

The argument between Habermas and Rorty is directed toward organizing justification relations based on the Truth. Both of them suggest a pragmatic turn to avoid Truth deadlocks of the epistemological approach. Their difference of opinion is formed from the fact that Rorty takes the pragmatic turn to the extent that eliminates the concept of Truth, but Habermas considers a Kantian meaning for Truth, according to which Truth is merely a regulative and transcendental idea that assuming its existence is necessary for the possibility of organizing justification relations of actors. Rorty, on the other hand, believes that Truth even in its regulative and transcendental sense, does not offer any useful meaning. Because nothing can be targeted and achieved unless it is recognizable how to gain it or how to get an approach to it. The criterion that Rorty offers to organize justification relations is not a Truth in the future, but a narrative of the experiences we have had. It seems that Rorty is successful in rejecting Habermas' criticisms against the possibility of eliminating the concept of Truth in organizing justification relations; in the sense that his thought is more compatible with a pragmatic turn. But Rorty's alternative for Truth also implies that no specific goal virtually is conceivable for the human being. The worthiness of narratives in organizing the relations of actors is recognizable only in the realm of experience. According to him, we should only hope to follow a better path than the previous one. This ambiguity in Rorty's thought is perhaps the most important challenge in accepting his views.

Criticism of the history of philosophy and epistemology certainly requires great courage Because the effects and consequences of this can have dangerous consequences. When we ignore any metaphysical and meta-human being and explain any epistemological issue in general in explaining our knowledge strategy the result can then lead to nihilism, nihilism, disorder, and anarchism, which can be dangerous and toxic to both the individual and society. While we expect to encounter such nonsense in Rortychr('39')s thought, On the contrary, the philosopher in question claims that his thought will not lead to what has been mentioned. Rather, it is the percentage of pleasure, happiness and bliss for human beings; Because, however, there is no more talk of truth and goodness But by widening the solidarity between the human "us" as much as possible, it seeks to change this path and lead to a human utopia. Our purpose in writing this article is to examine and analyze the place of the epistemological foundations of ethics in Rortychr('39')s thought.

According to Rorty the problem of our philosophical tradition to be the Platonic notion that man has the Glassy Essence by which we reflect the world around us, and this view of man results in the duality of mind and body, and ultimately the separation of human from the world. This paper is a descriptive method and content analysis and the main issue of this paper is how the nature of man and the world is described in Rorty's thought which leads to monism and Mulla Sadra's critique on what basis. The findings of this study indicate that in Rorty's Non- reductive physicalism, all lines between human and the world are removed and only the causation is established, which is a materialist view of man and the world. But Mulla  Sadra does not accept the dualism of body and soul on the basis of the principality of existence, substantial motion, the gradation of being, and finally with theory of ”Theophany”, and assumes a kind of human existential relation with the universe where the soul is nothing but the perfected body and the body is the cheap of soul.

Richard Rorty gives a descriptive-historical account of philosophical views. He criticizes fundamentalism and representationalism which, since Descartes, have dominated epistemology. The fundamental assumption of philosophers is that philosophy has a prominent role in our understanding of the world, and that philosophical issues are permanent. This means that philosophy is regarded as the ground for our knowledge. Rorty is against that, and so he is in fact against epistemology. Now, the question is whether Rorty is successful in freeing himself from representationalism. Rorty declares his pragmatism according to which knowledge requires dialogue and social action. He calls this view epistemological behaviorism. Charles Taylor describes Rorty’s view as a secular viewpoint which leads to unethical consequences. Taylor says that Rorty’s view is still under sovereignty of representationalism.

Rorty's goal is to criticize the Cartesian conception of philosophy that has led to its increasing specialization and departure from the other aspects of culture; a view that in his opinion is the end result of accepting the Cartesian mirror-like mind. According to Rorty, this point of view is the culmination of accepting the mind as a mirror that reflects the external affairs and philosophers as the guardians of this mirror act as judges who try to recognize the factual reflections of the mirror. Philosophy Claims that this judgment is based on its understanding of the mind and knowledge. In other words, culture is a combination of multiple cognitive claims which are judged by philosophy. Rorty as a neo-pragmatist endeavors to set aside the mirror concept of nature and its corresponding philosophy with the aim of entering philosophy into a dialogue with other spheres of knowledge.

According to Rooty's version of the tradition of western philosophy, truth, namely, the correspondence between mental beliefs and objective facts , is the main subject of the history of philosophy ; so on this point of view, " truth was detectable, not constructible." However, Rorty says, since we have no way of describing facts but to use language, truth cannot be separated from our practical usage of language for articulating our claims. Because sentences might not exist outside of the mind. Therefor,"truth is constructible, not detectable". Although Rorty rejects the traditional meanings of truth an objectivity, our assumption is that he partly falls right into the realism and objectivism trap, and again truth in the forms of other conceptions appears in his philosophy.

Rorty, as an analytic philosopher, is working in the context ofpostmodern thought and pragmatism. His main attempt has been toanalyze of the traditional problems of philosophy. Based on his readingof the history of philosophy “truth”, as the original genre in the historyof philosophy, has been regarded as the correspondence betweenbeliefs in our minds and fact out there. The duty of philosophers was toreveal the criteria of correspondence. Rorty’s interpretation of thistraditional view could be summarized as the slogan "Truth wasdiscoverable not making". While, according to Rorty there is not anyway to describe the facts without the use of the language. Thereforetruth cannot operate independent of human use of language. Hence"Truth is making not discoverable". This article investigates whetherRorty can explain their beliefs in a purely linguistic manner. Theanswer is that although he rejects Truth and Objectivity in traditionalmeaning, but he cannot deny Objectivity altogether.

In this article, Rorty’s theory of philosophical paradigm is considered in two stages: at firstwe describe and analyze his historical view about philosophical problems. In this stage, Rorty shows that philosophical history consists of three paradigms; metaphysics, epistemology and philosophy of mind, each of which has its own special problems. Rorty pointed with his therapeutic method to the errors of philosophers in applying philosophical problems that related to one paradigm to another one, and he criticized representationalism. After that, his original view about knowledge was considered; he finally comes to this conclusion that philosophical problems should be set aside rather than solved. In the second phase of examining his view, we express some important criticisms including those of Habermas and Tailor. The latter disagrees with Rorty about discontinuity of philosophical paradigm. In the conclusion, Rorty’s view about philosophical paradigms is examined and criticized.

This article attempts to consider critical analysis of richard rorty's interpretation on relation between self and world. Rorty believed in three models of relation between self and world. In first model, self and world are dividing to two layers. In second model, self has various layers and it is complex, but world has only one layer and it is not anything but atoms and void, which is subject to mechanical laws. Although there is representational relation between self and world in first and second models but there is not the same relation in the third model because there is not reality for representing. In this model, there is environment that we have causal, and not representational, relation with it. Rorty wants to avoid realism in interpreting of this relation but some traces of realism have been seen in his thought.

This article deals with the influence of pragmatism and postmodernism on the formation of Richard Rorty’s neo-pragmatism. Naturalism, Darwinism, and instrumentalism are among the foundations of the classical pragmatism which had also influenced Rorty’s neo-pragmatism. Dewey and James have had great impact on Rorty. Postmodernism and its basic ideas, such as the death of the subject, irrationalism, and the denial of reality, can be seen as active players in the making of Rorty’s ideas. This is why he sympathizes with most of postmodern thinkers, such as Derrida, the latter Wittgenstein, and Lyotard in their critique of modernism.