جستجوی مقالات مرتبط با کلیدواژه « فایرابند » در نشریات گروه « فلسفه و کلام »

I examine the characteristics and justifications of rational disagreement in science. It explores the relationship between the justification of rational disagreement in science and the justification of rational disagreement in the epistemology of disagreement, specifically religious disagreement. In this regard, I focus on the views of two famous philosophers of science from the second half of the 20th century, namely Thomas Kuhn and Paul Feyerabend. The views of these two philosophers on rational disagreement in science can be seen as significant, concrete, and tangible examples of the main approaches in the epistemology of (religious) disagreement, in which rational religious disagreement is justified. I bring together insights from both epistemology and philosophy of science and show reflection on disagreement in science can improve our intuitive understanding of rational disagreement in epistemology. To better understand the existing approaches in epistemology, I utilize intuitive ideas found in rational disagreement in science.

Paul Karl Feyerabend is one of the extremely influential philosophers of science in the second half of the twentieth century that his controversial works and opinions have reduplicated his reputation. This is his provocative works led to a misunderstanding for some academics and experts in philosophy, so that someone called him the Worst Enemy of Science. In this article I'm going to show that this idea isn't true: Feyerabend feels hostile towards neither science, nor any tradition else. He fights only against dogmatic and destructive ideologies. Generally speaking, Feyerabend's ideas express only his hostility to technocracy and chauvinism of science. According to Feyerabend, modern science has a lot in common with the Medieval Church. He would maintain that nowadays science has been turned into a rigid religion whose prophets are scientists, whose miracles scientific discoveries and whose judgements scientific statements. Then it's up to us to put science in its place in order to make room for other traditions and human knowledge.

The viewpoints of Kuhn and Feyerabend، as two philosophers of science، are similar in many aspects، even the same in certain problems. They do not believe in any objective and universal rationality، hence، their views are regarded relativistic by many other philosophers. These two philosophers، belong to the second half of the twentieth century and are considered as a response to positivism and negativism. Despite the extensive correspondences، there are some significant differences between them. In this paper، we have tried to derive and analyze the criticisms of Feyerabend to Kuhn''s viewpoint on science، such as critisizing the Kuhn''s ideological approach to history، the domain of his incommensurability، the ambiguity in normativeness and descriptiveness of his ideas، unjustifiable transition from tenacity to proliferation، failure in discriminating between science and non-science via theoretical entities such as paradigm and normal science، and finally restricting the scientists’ freedom throughout the normal science.