جستجوی مقالات مرتبط با کلیدواژه "ویتگنشتاین متاخر" در نشریات گروه "فلسفه و کلام"

The principle of contradiction in the three domains of epistemology, philosophy and logic is of incomparable importance, and it is necessary to examine the conditions of its realization in order to know the cases of its flow. Among the conditions of contradiction are the unity that must be maintained in two contradictory propositions. There has always been a difference between logicians in detailing the conditions and the number of unity conditions. The famous opinion, the requirement of eight unity is contradictory, but thinkers have always tried to correct this opinion, in such a way that they either added conditions to it or reduced the famous conditions to fewer cases. The present research, with the method of conceptual, propositional, and systemic analysis, examines the conditions mentioned in logic books and concludes that all these conditions are reduced to two conditions: "the unity of the subject" and "the unity of the predicate". In the second part, according to the late philosophy of Wittgenstein, it is proved that in the unity of contradiction, another condition is necessary that is not mentioned in any of the books of the predecessors and on the other hand, it is not an example of any of the aforementioned conditions, and that is the phrase From "unity of language".

The world-picture concept is one main doctrine of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy. As per this view, due to his participation in the language games, every individual develops some mental framework whose shadow is cast over his approach to the world and epistemology directing his reason and true-false evaluations. The world-picture concept comes from the ground of society and culture and from one’s practical kind of choices. In this essay, the author aims to make an inquiry into the foundations and outputs of the epistemology of theory and to show that its result is the negation of meta-standard in epistemology. By this theory, one fails to defend epistemological realism. The world-picture theory made the ground for the progress of social epistemology. Despite Wittgenstein’s efforts to explain it, the theory suffers from several disadvantages: first is that it is self-contradicting. Second is that Wittgenstein’s analyses to prove the role of society in the formation of world-picture concept is imperfect for he failed to take into consideration many other options. Furthermore, in his theory, Wittgenstein has confused language and concept thus failed to precisely illustrate the relation between practice and belief. His analysis that belief is involuntary is not sound; it leads to epistemological relativism. The method adopted here is descriptive-analytic.

The later Wittgenstein believes that if we want to understand religious beliefs, we should know and get involved with the two concepts of language games and forms of life (which he uses to describe his teachings). In fact, it can be said that his understanding of the rationality of religious beliefs is one based on language games and forms of life. In other words, the rationality of religious beliefs is given its meaning by these two metaphors. Therefore, if one wants to make rational his religious beliefs, he should understand this rationality in the context of forms of life. That is to say, if a religious person has based his religious beliefs in the context of forms of life, then his religious beliefs is rational from the viewpoint of the later Wittgenstein. As a result, the meaning of rationality in religious beliefs should not be taken and judged the same as the meaning of rationality in science. According to the later Wittgenstein’s viewpoint, our religious beliefs do not need any justification – either rational or historical – and an individual who tries to rationalize the religious matter based on another language game’s rules is in fact an irrational person, because he is totally unaware of the station of religious beliefs. In this article, we aim to both explain the later Wittgenstein’s viewpoint to the rationality of religious beliefs and explicate the current criticisms and shortcomings of the concepts such as language games.

“Form of life” is considered one of the most significant concepts in Wittgenstein's later philosophy. This term is one of his most ambiguous philosophical concepts. This paper tries to explain the specific and fundamental role of “form of life” as a cornerstone for the whole of Wittgenstein's later philosophy; a role that has not attracted much attention in Wittgenstein scholarship. From the author's perspective, describing the form of life as a condition for the possibility of language can put an end to some of the challenges in Wittgenstein's later philosophy such as Behavioralism, being trapped in general linguistic relativity and the reduction of all reality to linguistic principles. This study attempts to prove the fundamental role of this concept by studying Wittgenstein’s later position toward philosophical explanation in general and pictorial theory of language in particular, and by analyzing in detail the concept of form of life in his later works. Finally, the authors will provide a possible fifth path entitled “Phenomenological Interpretation” through a critical analysis of the four existing interpretations on the concept of form of life.

The present study was conducted to explain and elucidate the late Wittgenstein theory of language games, deduce its implications in the field of education and, then, analyze and criticize it from the perspective of AllamehTabatabai; conceptual analysis, inference, and critical analysis were used in the present study. Thus, the basics and principles of Wittgenstein's language games theory were initially extracted and deduced; then, these principles are critically investigated from the perspective of AllamehTabatabai. According to the findings of the study, the main concepts of Wittgenstein's epistemology, including applied theory of meaning, sociality of language and the negation of private language, emphasize descriptive rather than explanatory aspects, are context-oriented and follow the rules of relativity. On the other hand, in his epistemological theorizations, AllamehTabatabai emphasizes foundationalism, certainty and clarity of knowledge, and the determinism of the truth. Relying on Wittgenstein's epistemology reveals weaknesses and deficiencies which could be clearly criticized according to AllamehTabatabai's beliefs and ideas, including non-determinism of truth, founding the human epistemic system based on his life, the denial of the discovery of knowledge, and the nature of contingency and relativity.

The family resemblance’s theory of Wittgenstein is the most influential contemporary theory of, or, to put it more precisely, against “definition”. The theory’s main opposition is towards essential definitions, whose leading theoretician is known to be Aristotle. In modern era, This theory have been considered a challenge to essentialism. In this essay, after expressing the theory of family resemblance and backgrounds of those in opposition to the Aristotelian definition, By extracting criticisms of the theory to essential definitions and answers them according to the text of Aristotle, I’m trying to show that expressing such criticisms to the Aristotelian definition due wittgenstein’s misunderstanding and ignorance than the Aristotle’s essential definitions. To achieve this thesis, will be used of phenomenology and analytical methods. Examining the philosophers’ own works was among the investigation’s priorities.

This article is an attempt to address a main question: is there any connection between Wittgenstein’s way and Descartes’ one in overcoming the problem of dualism? The discussion of the position of Wittgenstein on Descartes’ dualism here begins with the private language argument. For understanding Descartes’ position on the issue, one of his correspondences with Princess Elisabeth, and also the concept of the nature in his book the Meditation are examined so as to be shown this connection, regardless of many central differences between them. Moreover, it is shown here that the relatively similar ways of these two philosophers for facing the problem of dualism are in fact the ways for dissolving the matter, rather than solving it. It means that there seems to be no way to solve the problem of Descartes’s dualism on the basis of his own works, and this problem can only be overcome by getting out of his philosophy- the thing that both Wittgenstein and Descartes actually did. This article, therefore, takes this reading as its main idea that the Wittgenstein’s attack on Descartes’s dualism in particular, and on Descartes’s philosophy in general, is a fundamental criticism that comes from his critical point of view about the nature of philosophy itself; and the Descartes’s way which was mentioned above can be justified only in such a this context.

Wittgenstein's attitude to religious beliefs is known as fedism. From his point of view, the true origin of faith is human emotion and religious faith a deep tendency for a way of life. Wittgenstein considers the basic principle of the religious life not to be acceptance of doctrines or principles and beliefs, but one`s deeds. Religious beliefs are unbreakable because they have a regulatory role in believers life. Such different attitudes toward religion and religious beliefs in the two Wittgensteinian periods have made it well-known. This study taken as a qualitative research with a descriptive-analytical method and using library resources has focused on Wittgenstein's views regarding issues such as religious belief, realism, or religious non-realism, the role of action in religious beliefs, the what belief is for, and so on. As resulted by the research, it can be argued that the background of fedism in the West may be regarded as an inconsistency found between faith and reason in some of the fundamental teachings of Christianized distorted religion, and this problem is not seen in the teachings of Islam. On this basis, there may not be found any reasonable case for any conflict between faith and reason.

Saul. A. Kripke in his Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language reads Wittgenstein’s private language argument as an inference from the idea of rule following. He presents a sceptical paradox about rule- following, which purports to show all language, all concept formation, to be impossible, indeed unintelligible. In this paper we will examine one of the most important outcomes of Kripkenstein’s sceptical solution, namely “The Community view” according to which, the concept of a private language is inconsistent, because using language entails following rules, and following rules entails being a member of community. This view believes that solitary or private rule-following is impossible and language is essentially social; hence it’s impossible for someone isolated from birth to follow a rule or use language. At the end we will attempt to settle this longstanding and significant dispute, by shedding some lights on the terms used by these antagonists such as Wittgenstein’s conceptions of language, essence and Crusoe.

This article concentrates on the later Wittgenstein. The main problem is how we can apply his later philosophical thought to religion and religious belief. The result is that، according to Wittgenstein، religious beliefs are not such as scientific hypotheses and need not being supported by rational arguments and evidence، but they are pictures on which believers arrange and set out their forms of life. So، according to the article، Wittgenstein neither accepts nor rejects language game of religion. He just says that this form of life exists and has its limits and prejudices. Religion، like any other conceptual schemata، logically depends on bounds and frontiers or، in better words، on social or contextual rules. If this language game is to be played and adopted، we’ll have to adopt and follow such limits and rules.

By emphasis on cognitive aspect of moral realism, this article surveys various divisions in moral realism and anti-realism and, regarding later Wittgenstein's courses, it explores his views about this matter. Thus, after a short description of Wittgenstein’s courses in Philosophical Investigations which are related to this topic, ideas of his commentators in this area are studied. Since moral realism has a firm relation with cognitive and non-cognitive discussion in meta-moral, thus later Wittgenstein’s view about this topic is also investigated. At the end, it is shown that calling Wittgenstein a realist or anti-realist is due to the wrong usage of reality grammar and he cannot be categorized as such.

The topics of "religion" and "its language" had been one of the main issues that in recent centuries raised in the field of religious studies in the west.The semantics of divine attributes, wrangle of science and religion, and emersion of philosophical schools like positivism and logical positivism, should to be mention as factors raising the topic of the language of religion among philosophers and theologians.One of the remarkable challenges of contemporary study of religion concerning language of religion is intelligibility of religious propositions; and it is more important than question of meaningfulness or meaninglessness and positivistic attitudes. Wittgenstein presented in this respect two different views in two stages of his philosophical life. In his first conception, i.e. "pictorial theory of meaning", language is considered as picture of fact; while in his second and later view, i.e. "usage theory of meaning", he presented the "theory of language games".This article is going to beside Explanation of theory of language games; give a critical analysis according to primary sources.