جستجوی مقالات مرتبط با کلیدواژه "categories" در نشریات گروه "فلسفه و کلام"

Causality and time are the most central subjects in Kant's philosophy. He considers phenomena as objects of experience that are possible only with the law of causality and determines them in temporal relation. Kant responded to Hume who considered causality to be purely empirical and habit-based, and saw the causality to be a priori. For Kant, there is an order among human representations; the current state in this order is correlated to a prior and past state, and this correlation is still undetermined. Determining the current phenomenon from the past phenomenon is possible through time; so this mental sequence becomes an objective sequence, and phenomena are determined through their temporal determination. This process for Kant makes possible an empirical understanding of the time sequence. Causality does not occur through sensory perception and comparison of phenomena by repetition, uniformly, and through a succession of previous phenomena; rather, causality is an a priori concept. Kant introduces time in any transition from one state to another state and thus deals with the empirical determination of time. From Kant's point of view, the relationships are not in the phenomena, but the links of time have an empirical structure, according to which we determine objectively these phenomena as perceptual objects of a single experience with the help of A Priori Principles.

Substance is one of the fundamental concepts in the history of philosophy that has a history as long as the history of philosophy itself. Although this concept has underwent profound developments and assumed different layers during the centuries, because of its firm linkage with common-sense, never lost its significance. Since the birthplace of the concept of substance is ancient Greece and Greek philosophy, this essay intends to narrate an analytical history of the genesis of the concept in ancient Greece; then to trace its course of development in Christian and Islamic middle age; and finally, to investigate its remnants in modern philosophy. The purpose of this essay, however, is not merely a philosophy-historical narrative, but its secondary purpose is to place the concept of substance under a critical light and to report its fundamental critiques. Hence, we will consider the most important critiques, mostly proposed by Anglo-Saxon philosophers, and will conclude that this concept in order to have a legitimate presence in philosophy, must submit a fundamental reformulation.

It is a universal and partial of the issues discussed in philosophy and logic. Whereas, in order to avoid intermingle the issues of each science, their boundaries are Located through their subjects; The question arises why in both the sciences of logic and philosophy, both universal and partial are discussed? The present article seeks to find the distinguishing feature of this discussion in this scientific field. By studying the historical course and using the analytical method, it is concluded that from the beginning of the formation of this discussion in Aristotle's system of thought, there is no significant difference between his metaphysics and logic. Muslim philosophers, including Ibn Sina, although at first acting in the method of Aristotle as a commentator, later considered some issues, such as the categories in which the Five Universals as an entry of categories, to be outside the scope of the science of logic. On the other hand, the discussion of the Five Universals is one of the inevitable issues in logic due to the need for it in the subject of notions and definitions. There are also differences of opinion among philosophers regarding the source of division of the five generalities, which indicates the intermingle of the issues in philosophy and logic. Some views, in distinguishing this discussion in the two mentioned areas, have proposed different considerations and modes, and some have relegated the ontological discussion of generalities to philosophy and the study of its rules to the field of logic.

I examine the philosophical and historical merits of Avicenna’s Dānešnāmeh-ye ʿAlāyī. With this aim, I briefly discuss the structural characteristics of the Dānešnāmeh and situate it within Avicenna’s oeuvre in respect to his other summae. I argue that in the Dānešnāmeh Avicenna takes serious steps towards the ideal order and pedagogical sequence of the philosophical sciences, the foundation of which he has laid in the Kitāb al-Šifāʾ. For supporting this claim, I concentrate on Dānešnāmeh’s expositions of the two doctrines of the categories and body and show how the development of Avicenna’s views on them reaches its climax in the Dānešnāmeh. Arguing for the significance of Dānešnāmeh as a comprehensive summa and its constructive role in the post-Avicennan tradition, I will draw attention to its neglect and marginalization by contemporary scholarship, and suggest reasons for this regrettable underestimation. I provide an overview of the editorial genealogy of the Dānešnāmeh, and then relying on the previous discussions, reason that Mawlā’s earnest edition of it is informed by a major structural error which has entirely ruined one of its most significant philosophical innovations, and is consequently unusable for research purposes. I conclude my piece by suggesting that the Dānešnāmeh still stands in need of a new critical edition based on sounder editing techniques, and informed by consideration of a wider range of manuscripts. If we are to gain a more comprehensive picture of the development of Avicenna’s philosophy, I urge the scholarly community to pay this work the careful attention that it deserves.

This Kant’s sentence that “Understanding is uncontent without Intuition and Intuition is blind without Understanding” is very famous. On this opinion, some contemporary commentators as Strawson, Warnock, Ewing proposed Kant as leather of positivism and folk language in which them transcendental metaphysics rejected as some meaningless sentences. In this paper I want to show there are some principal sentences as “Reason’ Ideas are belonging to faith”, “they are thinking” and “hierarchical use of ideas” that prove meaningful of transcendental metaphysics. Moreover, we can believe to transcendental metaphysics, however we say “Understanding is uncontent without Intuition”.

Ernst Cassirer's Philosophy of Symbolic Forms is one of the theories that offers a new possibility to rethink how human knowledge has evolved, especially in primitive human minds and mythical thought. The stages of knowledge, according to this philosophy, start from mythical thinking, and pass through religion and mysticism into art and science and reach Kant's transcendental perspective. But despite his emphasis on the importance of art in his works, Cassirer had no specific explanation of artistic knowledge. For this reason, the present article seeks to examine the characteristics of mythical thought, including its categories and perceptual forms and by focusing on Cassirer's disputed views on art, defines art as one of the symbolic forms. This paper is written in a descriptive-analytical method and with a library-attribute checklist in the theoretical framework of philosophy of symbolic forms. By trying to explain or compare the data, it examines the possibility of the continuity of mythical categories and forms of perception in artistic thought or the possibility of reconstructing them. Finally, based on the results, the work of art is introduced as a concrete emergence of mythical thought which, with the need to make such a transformation, extends the categories and perceptual forms of mythical thought in artistic thought with necessary modifications.

Being is the first basis of recognition and the first issue for the metaphysics. Aristotle has said in different pages of the metaphysics on "being qua being" means “to on” and emphasized," Being has various meanings." He, rather than 'Being', has used "being" or existent. He, in the seventh book, has said: What has long been a source of confusion is that “what is being?” What does “being” mean? These meanings of existence, what effect does have on Aristotle's metaphysical system? Whether these meanings can be delivered to each or not? The meanings of "being” in Aristotle’s thought are controversial issue among scholars. Someone like Thomas Aquinas takes five senses and Farabi three senses and Avicenna five meanings for the existent. In this paper, while analyzing Aristotle's view based on metaphysics and looking at Thomas Aquino's perspective, we have delivered four meanings for "being" in Aristotelians. (Being of per accident, being of per true, being of potentiality and actuality, being of categories) And in fallowing, for the adventure of the meaning of "being", we will pay attention to the peripatetic philosophers, especially Farabi and Avicenna, according to their philosophical principles who have considered various meanings for the existent which are very different with Aristotle's meanings.

Aristotle considered being neither univocal nor equivocal, but as the third kind i.e. Pros hen because he believed that being is said being in relation to one point.  In other words, this term is applied to the beings for their priority and posteriority in being.   The first usage of the term signifies the substance and other beings are said "being" as they are in relation to substance. Reviewing Farabi's thoughts reveals that unlike Avicenna that believed in Tashkik of the concept of "being", Farabi followed   Aristotle's' thoughts and his argument about focal meaning which doesn't refer to equivocality or univocality of "being". Farabi was of the opinion that the term isn't applied equally to all beings, but based on their priority and posteriority in being. In addition, he extended the account of Aristotle's doctrine of the different senses of being in the different categories beyond Aristotle's own use to cover the relation between sensible substances and the First and Second Being.

For understanding origin and grounds of Hegel’s Logic, in addition to Science of Logic as main source employed by interpretations, we need to analyze First Hegel’s logical Treatise in his Jena period. There is no interpretation of this treatise available in Farsi while the English sources on the interpretation of the text are also scarce. The current paper will try to provide an account on process of the genesis of Hegel’s Jena Logic for the first time in Farsi. Thus, at first, it will consider the system as a whole briefly and then it will analyze three constituent parts of Jena’s Logic – ‘Simple Connection’, ‘Relation’, and ‘Proportion’, depending on English translation of the text (translated by Hegel Society of America). Finally, the study deals with a comprehensive outline of the remaining parts of the Hegel's System of Jena (such as Metaphysics, Philosophy of Nature and Philosophy of Spirit).

Nowadays، many scholars refer to humans as social actors. These scholars believe that the realization of humanity and، thus، flourishing of individuality depend not on divided action and abstract reflections of individual people but on responsible participation of each member of human society in his interactions with the world and other humans. The scholars see humans not as individual subjects but as social subjects. This article is an attempt to explain the theoretical basis of this approach. For this purpose، it will consider this ideain one of its most fundamental modes of occurrence، i. e. Hegel''s thought. Hegel''s notion of the individual subject in thethought of his intellectual ancestors and then his approach in showing men as social subjects will also be addressed

Cause and effect, essence and accident, existence and nonexistence, unity and plurality and necessity and contingency are among the concepts which do not enter the mind through senses. This has caused controversies among the philosophers. Some consider them to be innate. Others seek to justify their acquisition through senses. A third group believes them to be rooted in the nature and mankind’s soul and, thus, illusive. Muslim philosophers consider them to be secondary intelligibles and real concepts. As a Muslim philosopher, Allameh Tabataba’i holds a noble theory about the acquisition of knowledge. Moreover, Kant has a theory about the said concepts. He considers them to be mental categories or a priori forms of knowledge. This paper investigates the possibility of Kantian and non-Kantian a priori forms of knowledge and concludes that they do not exist at all.

The controversial division of the existent into substance and accident is the primary divisions on the contingent being. Although philosophers like Aristotle, Ibn Sina, Mulla Sadra, Descartes, Kant and… altogether defined the substance and the accidents into “existent without subject matter” and “existent in need of subject” respectively, there are disagreement about their types and numbers. However, some sensationalist and empiricist philosophers have denied the existence of substance altogether. Philosophers say that the diagnostic criteria for substance and accident are in the understanding of the essentials and the accidentals and their differential diagnosis come back in to the realm of epistemology and attitudes toward existence and that what is the origin of the knowledge. Expressing opinions and views about the categories, this paper has dealt with the criterion of the being substance and accident of categories.

In the present article, authors will study imagination and understanding in the first and third Critiques. At first, they will throw a glance on three syntheses in the first Critique (in his three syntheses, Kant shows that how faculties of sensibility, imagination, and understanding work together to acquire knowledge of an idea). Then, they will study each of these faculties in the first and third Critiques. While studying imagination, they will show that in the first Critique, this faculty follows understanding and acts based on its concepts, whereas in the third Critique, it will be freed from such function and schematize even without concepts. When the faculty of understanding is studied, it will be shown that in the first Critique, it acts as the faculty of concepts and only based on them. In the third Critique, it will be separated from its main function, and used by Kant generally and without its concepts.