جستجوی مقالات مرتبط با کلیدواژه « communicative action » در نشریات گروه « فلسفه و کلام »

Jürgen Habermas, as the best-known defender of Enlightenment’s ideals in contemporary times, thinks that any adequate defense of those ideals, particularly the ideal of emancipation from oppression and domination, depends on formulating a theory unbound by local contexts and capable of justifying a discourse ethics on universal foundations. In order to map out such a theory, he mainly appeals to metaphysically loaded notions such as “truth” and “universality”. On the other hand, he considers himself as a post-metaphysical thinker and counts his theory of communicative rationality as a consequence of the linguistic turn. In this essay, I would argue that the way in which he appeals to notions of “truth” and “universality” is not consistent with his post-metaphysical commitments and requirements of linguistic turn.

Though altruism has been of a strategic part in the formation and development of Islamic civilization, it has not been study separately and in detail. Muslim scholars, in particular those in moral and mysticism, have spoken of its what-ness. Predecessors have regarded donation in the state of need as its essential part of meaning while those of latter-day has intended by the word preferring others to oneself. Of the meanings, the former has been more accepted. Yet, these definitions would not be able to include such cases as jihad, martyrdom and sacrificing. The study, having studied and mentioned the two definitions critically and with a historical approach, has given a more comprehensive definition as: a communicative action in which a person with good intention prefers another one, being in need or not, to himself/herself for something of his/her needs or concern.

Rationality is considered as one of the main elements of modernity. Habermas is among the thinkers of Frankfurt Critical School who believes that critical rationality dominates communicative rationality. He proposes communicative rationality as a means for removing the restrictions of modernity. As for his criterion for removing these restrictions and gaining freedom in communicative rationality, due to his limitations, it can be no more that public culture or common sense. This is because he does not rely on the criteria of sacred intellect which the highest form of intellect and is unable to provide value and normative criteria based on practical intellect derived from sublime human values and ideals. So, we could not help accepting Habermas's criteria to free ourselves from these limitations if Islam had not provided a criterion which goes beyond common sense, based on divine teachings. Using the cognitive and ontological principles of Islam and applying principal methodology, the present paper criticizes Habermas's principles of communicative action and tries, through an overview of the principles of his theory to find what, according to Islam, position it has. In other words, does Islam accept the criteria proposed by Habermas in his critical ideas by using communicative action for obtaining freedom?