جستجوی مقالات مرتبط با کلیدواژه "direct realism" در نشریات گروه "فلسفه و کلام"

The perception is one of the new fields of contemporary philosophy, which focuses on the main object of perception and the possibility of ordinary conception of perception. The core of the problem of perception is illusion and hallucination; In such a way that the response to the problem of illusion and hallucination is considered to determine our response to the true object of perception. Aristotle and Muslim Peripatetic Philosophers, especially Ibn Sina, paid attention to sensory error, but they did not consider it as a basis for the theory of perception. In this paper, relying on the argument of sensory error, we show that there are two meanings of sensory error in Aristotle, which lead to two conceptions of perception: The meaning that requires the sense data interpretation leads to the acceptance of indirect realism, and the meaning that requires the material object interpretation leads to the acceptance of direct realism. Commentators and philosophers after Avicenna, especially Tousi, often considering something similar to sense data interpretation, have promoted a kind of indirect realism interpretation from Avicenna’s views, which has finally been accepted as the theory of mental existence. We show that according to Razi’s considerations, it is possible to interpret a material object interpretation for sensory error in Ibn Sina, just like Aristotle, and therefore, a kind of direct realism can be attributed to Ibn Sina, which is consistent with sensory and imaginary perception being material in Ibn Sina’s philosophy.

In the contemporary epistemology, many theories have been advanced about the nature of sense perception and the way it represents the external world. As one of such theories, “epistemological realism” argues that knowledge of the external world is possible and this world exists independent from man’s knowledge; and, our knowledge is a description of this world. Epistemological realism may be classified under two groups: “direct” and “indirect”. At the first look, it seems that there are some common points between Mulla Sadra’s theory of sense perception on the one hand and each of direct and indirect realism on the other. When one reflects upon the case, however, he will find that there are some differences between them and Mulla Sadra’s theory regarding his views about ontology; and, inevitably, some sort of “indirect Sadrean realism” will emerge which will be explained in this paper. In the doctrine of “unity of the knower and the known object”, immaterial reality of knowledge has been introduced as an intermediate between the knower and the external known object; and, “the correspondence between the vertical beings of the same quiddity” explains how the sense perception represents the external world. It will be argued in this paper that perceiving a material object in the light of perceiving an immaterial and Ideal being in a world other than the world of nature (even though it is internally consistent with other Sadrean doctrines) is somehow far from ordinary understanding of sense perception