جستجوی مقالات مرتبط با کلیدواژه « divine providence » در نشریات گروه « فلسفه و کلام »

The necessity of a prophet's presence in the leadership of Medina and the intricate relationship between prophecy and politics have long captivated scholars in Islamic philosophy. Avicenna, recognizing this connection, linked the prophet to the active intellect as a singular entity independent of the self. He established this relationship in developing a theoretical framework for the leadership of the citizens of Medina. Consequently, Avicenna's exploration of the nexus between politics and prophecy, grounded in religious sources and Avicennan philosophy, stands as a noteworthy achievement in political philosophy. This study endeavors to answer a pivotal question: On what basis did Avicenna validate the connection between prophecy and politics, and which theoretical framework did he rely on to deem the prophet fit for leadership in Medina? Employing a descriptive-analytical case study, this paper delves into a specific facet of Avicenna's political views. Applying Wilhelm Dilthey’s methodological hermeneutics in an interpretive approach, it concludes that the prophet's connection to the active intellect, serving as a link between the perceptible and rational worlds, justifies his political and religious leadership in Medina. Avicenna posited that, with strong intellectual, imaginative, and creative powers—the sources of miraculous acts—the prophet becomes indispensable for guiding Medina toward salvation in both the worldly and the hereafter. The prophet's leadership reaches its pinnacle by aligning his imaginative power and intellective soul (acquired intellect) with the active intellect, along with the realization of the revelation phenomenon, ultimately leading the people to happiness. According to Avicenna, the prophet's intellectual power is inclined to receive the light of the active intellect, attaining a level akin to the holy intellect. This connection prompts people to recognize its absence within themselves, compelling them to adhere to the laws of Sharia. Avicenna thus demonstrated that for citizens to attain salvation, the prophet's leadership is imperative due to his profound connection to the active intellect.

One of the long-standing Kâlāmī problems in Islamic thought has been the problem of “predestination and freewill”, which has occupied the minds of many thinkers. This problem has two sides. On the one hand, a human being has freewill. This means that a human being, by his will and reason, chooses either the path of salvation and prosperity, or the path of wretchedness and destruction, and becomes deserving of reward or deserving of punishment. On the other hand, a human being is completely lake of any freewill in some matters such as determining his parents, the place and time of his birth, and so on. In the Holy Qur’an both these two sides of the problem have been referred to. There are verses in the Qur’an that refer to the human freewill, such as the verse: “SAY: ‘Truth comes from your Lord. Let anyone who wishes to, believe, and let anyone who wishes to, disbelieve.’” (18:29); in which the Qur’an speaks of anyone’s voluntary believing or disbelieving in Truth; or the verse: “We have guided him [= the man] along the [right] path, whether he is thankful or thankless” (31:3); in which the Qur’an speaks of the Lord’s guidance, and points out that people have a state of gratitude towards the Lord’s guidance, which means the “acceptance”, or a state of ingratitude to it, which means the “rejection”. At the same time, there are verses in the Qur’an that refer to the concept of “predestination”, such as the verse: “Anyone whom God guides, remains guided; while anyone He lets go astray will never find any patron to set him straight” (18:17); in which the Qur’an refers to divine guidance and going astray; or the verse: “God guides anyone He wishes to a Straight Road” (2:213); in which the Qur’an speaks of God’s Guidance to the Straight Road for whomever He wants. Âsh'ârītes insist on predestination by appealing to some Qur’anic verses, without paying attention to other verses of the Qur’an and the premises needed for correct understanding of the Qur’an. Mû'tâzîlītes, by appealing to some Qur’anic verses about the human will and matters such as God’s commandments and prohibitions, or His rewards and punishments, know human freewill as certain. This paper aims at answering, by a descriptive-analytical method, two main questions: (1) according to the Shīʹîte Îmāmī Kâlām, is a human being a free being or a predestined being? and (2) what are the educational effects of considering a human being as a free being or a predestined being?The results of this paper are as follows: in explaining the incompatibility of “freedom of the infidels with their inherent wretchedness”, it was found out that attributing wretchedness to the nature of infidels contradicts both with freewill and with predestination. Its contradiction with freewill is obvious, but the relation of wretchedness with the nature of infidels contradicts with the deterministic view that God is the complete cause of all things, because according to this view, the nature of infidels is considered as the complete cause of their wretchedness. Regarding the objection of “the freewill and fate (qâḍā) and destiny (qâdâr)”, it was clarified that the act to which God’s fate belongs, God’s fate belongs to that act with the limits of that act, and one of the limits of that act is that it must issue from its agent freely. Also, it was found out that the fate and destiny contradict with considering them as the complete cause of human acts. About the objection of “the freewill and the order of causality”, it was clarified that not only the order of causality is not incompatible with human freewill, but also doing the actions needs many causes, one of which is causality. Moreover, about the objection of “the freewill and generality of creation”, it was mentioned that attributing the badness to the essences of things is not correct, but badness is due to the factors outside of the essences of things. In other words, a bad act is a permissible act that has not been performed through its legal channels. Besides, with regard to the objection of “the freewill and Divine Providence”, it was found out that the Divine Providence is an existential-legislative providence; i.e., God, by His existential providence, has willed that a human being be free, and the final cause of doing actions is human will. It should be noted that, based on the Shīʹîte Îmāmī Kâlām, sending the Prophets has had an important role in educating the human beings, and faith in the Prophets has given rise to the righteous action. Also, it should be mentioned that the tradition of trial and affliction is closely related to educating the human beings, and human beings are afflicted by pleasure and pain in order to grow. Besides, we must know that responsibility is one of the essential elements in human growth and upbringing, and to the extent that a human being pays attention to his responsibility, he becomes resolute in training and purifying his soul. These show that belief in human freewill plays a central role in educating a human being, and, therefore, the key to purifying the soul is to strengthen the will.

The issue of cosmos occurrence has always been one of the most essential philosophical topics. This topic was so many important for Proclus as well as the other philosophers. This paper has tried to make clear his special point of view about this topic by analyzing his fundamental ideas. The most important platonic cosmological concept is The Demieurgous, and this paper has analyzed Proclus' comment of Demieurgous and creation of material world.

The peripatetic tradition of reading Aristotle limits divine providence to celestial bodies and maintains that, according to Aristotle, there is just divine providence per accident by celestial bodies concerning sublunary world. Alexander of Aphrodidsias in his treatise titled as “On Providence”, however, tries to give an Aristotelian version of divine providence so that it would not be in contradiction with the exaltedness of divine causes in superlunary world and would not be per accident. We, in this essay, by pointing to the roots of his Aristotelian conception of divine providence in De Generatione et Corruption and De Caelo, shall show that his specific treatment of divine providence in Aristotle is based on a peculiar theory of causation which in turn will face him with other difficulties in denying providence per accident.

To answer the problem of incompatibility between divine providence and creaturely freedom, Molinism suggests the theory of middle knowledge, a theory that claims by assuming God’s knowledge of counterfactuals of freedom, we can resolve the problem without giving up neither divine providence nor creaturely freedom. Through His knowledge of the conditionals and actualizing their antecedents, He knows what creatures will freely do. In this way, God’s foreknowledge and sovereignty can be compatible with creatures’ freedom. The present paper attempts to show that there is a sort of incoherency in Molinism. For, while Molinism presupposes divine immutability thesis, it attributes a will to God that requires moving from possibility to actuality in divine nature. We argue that because counterfactuals of freedom need to be actualized by divine will, claiming God's knowledge of counterfactuals of freedom leads to a rejection of divine immutability thesis which makes Molinism incoherent. We conclude that the proposed objection to the theory of God’s middle knowledge of counterfactuals of freedom is a crucial objection regardless of the success of its proponents in answering the objections concerning the truth-makers of such counterfactuals.