جستجوی مقالات مرتبط با کلیدواژه "moore" در نشریات گروه "فلسفه و کلام"

Today, although the debates related to knowledge have expanded, the question of the possibility of knowledge and certainty is still the starting point of epistemological debates. Wittgenstein and Moore are two influential philosophers of the 20th century who stand in an important position against each other. Moore is the only philosopher that Wittgenstein mentions in the book On Certainty and it was Moores view on knowledge that is the basis of the Austrian philosopher for further discussions about knowledge and certainty. In response to the problem of the possibility of knowledge and the problem of skepticism, Moore claims that there are facts that we know and have knowledge of. He lists a list of propositions whose knowledge is certain. Wittgensteins approach to this claim has a negative and a positive side. According to Wittgenstein, Moores propositions such as here is a hand are not correct examples of knowledge or knowing Moore does not use them correctly. There is a difference between knowledge and certainty. Knowledge and certainty belong to different categories. On the other hand, Wittgenstein is with Moore in attributing a different role to the mentioned propositions in the epistemic system. Wittgensteins criticism of Moore does not weaken the epistemological status of Moores propositions, but gives a more fundamental basis to such propositions.

In this article, by analyzing the opinions of Avicenna and Moore, about the indefinability of good and bad morals, their attitude is explained from the epistemological point of view, The main problem of the research is Avicenna and Moore's attitude about criticizing the naturalistic criterion and criteria for carrying moral characteristics such as good and bad in moral issues. Avicenna states in his opinions that moderation as a metaphysical and natural matter cannot be a criterion for the good or badness of moral issues in all fields, and Moore, by analyzing the naturalistic fallacy, considers pleasure or harmony with nature as the criterion and criterion for carrying good and bad. He does not know moral issues. The results of the research show that the approach of these two thinkers to prove their claim is to pay attention to the logical problem that occurs in the comparison of knowing good and bad with things such as moderation, pleasure, and harmony with nature. To answer the problem, Avicenna and Moore defend the non-naturalistic realism of moral propositions, in the meantime, emphasizing the intuition of the characteristics in the intellectual intuition of the people to find criteria and criteria for the truth and falsity of moral propositions makes it possible to discuss the opinions of these two thinkers. The research method is to analyze the content of the opinions of these two philosophers in order to create a dialogue to compare their opinions.

This article explains and compares the views of Ibn Sina and G.E. Moore in the field of realist ethics and while discussing the method of intuition in recognizing moral characteristics. Realism in ethics means the objectivity of moral propositions, and therefore moral properties are intuitive. The main issue of research on the formulation of Ibn Sina's views, along with the principles of realism and the method of intuition, is whether the moral propositions under popular opinion follow the same principles that Moore put forward in the discussion of realism in ethics and how they can be intuitive. Moore's moral realism is based on the intuitionism of moral qualities such as good and evil, which are unacceptable to the natural or metaphysical. According to Ibn Sina, moral realism is defined and intuitive based on the moral presuppositions such as good and bad. In this attitude, the good and the bad for the soul are explained as a being whose exaltation and happiness is a real thing. The results of this study show that for Moore, the relationship between moral issues and predicates such as good and bad is an intuitive thing, which is defined as a good relationship with the greatest possible good, and this combination and understanding requires reflection and intellectual maturity of the moral agent. According to Ibn Sina, the relationship between moral issues and moral presuppositions such as good and bad is explained on the basis of the reputation of moral propositions and the intuitions of the wise of the people.

Nagel and Williams have identified the problem of moral luck as arising from a tension between the control principle and our moral practices. Some believed that there is a real and unsettling problem has been stated in contemporary philosophy. Not all agree, however. Michael Moore has claimed that the problem of moral luck is not a genuine problem in its own right, but that it boils down to the classic problem of free will. The second claim of Moore is about Nagel’s notion of control; Nagel is wrong about his idea of control – to control a result is to control all factors necessary to that result. This incompatibilist notion of control, according to Moore, has no usage in the ordinary activity of moral assessment. The aim of the first section of this paper is to formulate and discuss the problem of moral luck, thereby dealing with the question: ‘how to understand the problem of moral luck?”. The second section deals with the analysis and examination of the compatibilist concept of control as presented by Moore. In this study, these two claims have been separated and concluded that the first is right and the second is wrong.

In his so-called Open Question Argument, Moore (1903) argues that the concept of "good" cannot be defined on the basis of natural concepts as well as non-natural ones. Following Darwall, Gibbard and Railton (1992), Paul Bloomfield has explained the non-reducibility of the concept of good based on its normativity. Moreover, he claims that the normativity is commensurable and similar to the so called normativity of meaning. According to Wittgenstein's rule following argument, meaning is normative, namely, expressions' meaning have action-guiding role; in other words, meaning normatively constrains an expression's use in language. Our aim in this paper is to consider Bloomfield's claim and compare normativity in ethics with the normativity of meaning. In order to do so, we will elucidate the open question argument and the normativity of meaning. We will then reconstruct Bloomfield's argument, and finally argue that, contra Bloomfield, the normativity in ethics and the normativity of meaning are not similar.

The semantics, e.g. self-evidence and (in)definability, of moral concepts is one of the considered subjects on Ethics. In this article, we shall try to explore al-ʿAllāma al-Ḥillī's views, as a theologian (mutakallim) considering his moral viewpoints more clearly than his predecessors, on the subject and explain it accordance with the contemporary debates. Unlike Adams, the moral philosopher, although he does not distinguish between moral value and that of obligation, he believes, like Moore, that the moral values are simple and indefinable by ḥaddī definition. It should be noted that unlike Moore claiming that merely “Good” is indefinable, firstly, Ḥillī, I think, believes that both “Good” and “Evil” are like that. Secondly, he asserts a rasmī definition praise and blame desert (istiḥqāq al-madḥ wa al-dhamm). It can be understood from his views that the definability by rasmī definition and self-evidence are compatible. Besides, he takes apart moral values from that of aesthetic. His distinction is similar to that of John Lock separating Primary Qualities from Secondary Qualities.

Georg Edward Moore realized that although sentences like "p but I do not believe that p" and "p but I do believe that ~p" can have true content, their assertion can be absurd and paradoxical. Moreover, he realized that asserting the sentences in third-person or past tense forms are not absurd. Later on, it became clear that the sentences are not assertible nor truly believable. In this paper we will first introduce the most important features of the sentences; we will then, along with clarifying Moore's account for accommodating the sentences, argue that there are at least four criticisms against Moore's account and thus it is not tenable.

The open-question argument is a connecting point in contemporary Analytical Ethics, in response to which many new views were addressed as positive or negative reactions to this argument. In this article, we strive to study and critique the open-question argument and its semantic suppositions and to show that this argument is an application of paradox of analysis and descriptive theory of meaning on ethical concepts. According to the paradox of analysis, the constituents of things contribute to their concepts and therefore, the real definitions which include the constitutents elements are tautological and lack new information. Going forward, we address the semantic views of Frege, logical positivism, Suhravardi-Locke and Kripke-Putnam in order to resolve the paradox of analysis and show that none of these views can be applied to ethical concepts and cannot be considered as a satisfactory answer to open-argument paradox. Finally, we have explained that another solution can be suggested for the paradox of analysis by taking inspiration from the Kripke-Putnam theory and linguistic inspiration. According to this solution, the primary reference of ethical terms to external instances happens without the mediation of concepts and through common intuitions of the linguistics and the precise concept of these terms is gradually addressed and formed in the process of analysis and by considering primary intuitions

Focusing on language and attempting to derive the hidden meanings is one of the most important aspects of analytic philosophy to solve or resolve philosophical problems. All of the three founders of analytic philosophy، i. e. Frege، Russell، and Moore، trace this road differently. Ludwig Wittgenstein as the follower of them has his own ideas. In this paper، we will firstly explore theories of those founders briefly and then show that Wittgenstein، in some respects، such as; pitcher theory، logical atomism، and respecting to ordinary language is in agreement with them. However، he، in other respects، has own specific ideas: the meaning of states of affairs، critic of metaphysics and insisting on the ordinary language in a different manner.