Epistemological Foundations of the Indefinability of Good and Bad Morals in Ibn Sina and Moore views

In this article, by analyzing the opinions of Avicenna and Moore, about the indefinability of good and bad morals, their attitude is explained from the epistemological point of view, The main problem of the research is Avicenna and Moore's attitude about criticizing the naturalistic criterion and criteria for carrying moral characteristics such as good and bad in moral issues. Avicenna states in his opinions that moderation as a metaphysical and natural matter cannot be a criterion for the good or badness of moral issues in all fields, and Moore, by analyzing the naturalistic fallacy, considers pleasure or harmony with nature as the criterion and criterion for carrying good and bad. He does not know moral issues. The results of the research show that the approach of these two thinkers to prove their claim is to pay attention to the logical problem that occurs in the comparison of knowing good and bad with things such as moderation, pleasure, and harmony with nature. To answer the problem, Avicenna and Moore defend the non-naturalistic realism of moral propositions, in the meantime, emphasizing the intuition of the characteristics in the intellectual intuition of the people to find criteria and criteria for the truth and falsity of moral propositions makes it possible to discuss the opinions of these two thinkers. The research method is to analyze the content of the opinions of these two philosophers in order to create a dialogue to compare their opinions.