جستجوی مقالات مرتبط با کلیدواژه "naturalistic fallacy" در نشریات گروه "فلسفه و کلام"

In this article, by analyzing the opinions of Avicenna and Moore, about the indefinability of good and bad morals, their attitude is explained from the epistemological point of view, The main problem of the research is Avicenna and Moore's attitude about criticizing the naturalistic criterion and criteria for carrying moral characteristics such as good and bad in moral issues. Avicenna states in his opinions that moderation as a metaphysical and natural matter cannot be a criterion for the good or badness of moral issues in all fields, and Moore, by analyzing the naturalistic fallacy, considers pleasure or harmony with nature as the criterion and criterion for carrying good and bad. He does not know moral issues. The results of the research show that the approach of these two thinkers to prove their claim is to pay attention to the logical problem that occurs in the comparison of knowing good and bad with things such as moderation, pleasure, and harmony with nature. To answer the problem, Avicenna and Moore defend the non-naturalistic realism of moral propositions, in the meantime, emphasizing the intuition of the characteristics in the intellectual intuition of the people to find criteria and criteria for the truth and falsity of moral propositions makes it possible to discuss the opinions of these two thinkers. The research method is to analyze the content of the opinions of these two philosophers in order to create a dialogue to compare their opinions.

The present article describes the open question argument and while analyzing the semantics of ethics in Ibn Arabi’s view, deals with a critical comparison of these two views. From a point of view, the perception of good depends on the understanding of the truth of existence, and until existence is accepted as absolute good, the interpretation of the instance of good is not possible. However, philosophical ethics theory of Moore does not tend to such an ontological interpretation, and limits the good to the scope of semantic discussions. At first glance, the ontological interpretation of good, as a presupposition, seems to be hidden from Moore's view. But to formulate more comprehensive theory of ethics, it is necessary to moderate both views. With an acceptable interpretation of the theory of unity of existence, the mystical doctrine of good can be recognized as a basis for Moore's intuitionism. Also, by discovering the ontological assumptions from the inside of semantic theory of him, one can answer doubts about the objectivity and reality of ethics

The naturalistic approaches to ethics try to find some solution to problems of moral philosophy with an emphasis on finding of empirical science. One of the most famous naturalistic approaches to ethics is evolutionary approach. Evolutionary explanations of morality have always been accused of committing naturalistic fallacy. The naturalistic fallacy has two Humean and Moorian versions. Hume's reading, also known as deductive version of the naturalist fallacy, suggests that the inference of values from facts is a kind of fallacy. Moore's version of naturalistic fallacy, says that defining moral properties based on immoral properties, and in particular natural properties, is impossible. In this article, after introducing Ruse's evolutionary ethics, his reasons for not having been committed to naturalistic fallacies are brought. Then we answer this question if he really avoided the fallacies. Our answer to this question is yes. But, along with critics like Rottscheafer and Martinsen, we will show that the cost of avoiding these fallacies has been to discarding the objectivity of ethics.Would Ruse without endorsing an illusionary and subjective account of morality avoid the naturalistic fallacy? We will demonstrate that such a reading can be offered by giving a greater role to culture. Thus, the purpose of the article is to oppose the Ruse's illusionary readings of morality and to defend an objectivist reading. In our opinion, elements of this reading can also be found in the work of the Ruse himself and will be offered at the end of the article.

Undoubtedly, the problem of “fact-value” gap should be considered as one of the most important issues in moral philosophy. Drawing the problem of “fact-value” gap has been ascribed to the skeptic empiricist Scottish philosopher, David Hume. Hume claimed that it is impossible to derive the ethical propositions containing “ought/ought not” from the ethical propositions containing “is/is not”. The moral philosophers have regarded the Humean doctrine as the "is/ought” fallacy. After Hume, the English analytic philosopher, George Edward Moore, revived the Humean doctrine. Moore claimed that the concept of “Good” cannot be defined in terms of non-moral concepts/natural properties. He challenged the philosophers who defined this concept in terms of the non-moral concepts/natural properties to committing the “Naturalistic Fallacy”. Some of the moral philosophers have tried to confirm the fallacies proposed by Hume and Moore, while some others have attempted to refute those fallacies. The American neo-Aristotelian philosopher, Alasdair MacIntyre is among those who have tried to offer a specific explanation of how the theories of disseminating the “fact-value” gap have emerged. He has made some arguments to show the invalidity of that gap. In this paper, we will consider the doctrines of Hume and Moore on the “fact-value” gap, and then will examine MacIntyre’s considerations on the gap.

Moral reductionism attempts to simplify some moral concepts and beliefs into someconcrete concepts and beliefs to provide a more clear and verifiable explanations.Reductionism takes place sometimes in the same field and among compatible conceptsand beliefs; as in the field of empirical psychology which is under the empirical sciences.In this field, certain psychological findings are simplified into some neurological andbiochemical concepts. But sometimes it may be applied to two non-compatible realms,one of which is normative and the other one descriptive. Moral concepts, beliefs, andtruths are among the most important normative affairs. Epistemology and semantics areamong the normative sciences as well. Contrary to them, naturalistic cognitions are a setof descriptive, non-normative concepts and propositions that their truth may be verifiedby referring to the objective world providing a causal explanation. Now an importantquestion here is that whether the normativity of normative sciences, especially ethics, is apart of their essence and structure or they are like the other sciences, especially empiricalones, which are non-normative in nature or they could be non-normative. Put differently,is it possible for us to reduce their normative content to a set of non-normative truths?Ethical naturalism as a kind of moral reductionism has asserted that it is possible. In thispaper we examine this claim and its efforts and policies for reducing moral facts intonon-normative facts.