جستجوی مقالات مرتبط با کلیدواژه "secondary intelligible" در نشریات گروه "فلسفه و کلام"

Mulla Sadra has demonstrated "The Principality of Existence" as the basis of the Transcendent Philosophy based on solid arguments and by studying the scholars before him, he considered the peripatetics to believe in The Principality of Existence and the Ishraqi in the principality of Quiddity. Although the question of the principality of Existence or Quiddity has not been raised in this way by early scholars, by examining their works and expressions, one of the parties to the issue in question can be attributed to them. This research seeks to find the opinion of 'Ghias al-din Mansur Dashtaki' on this matter. By examining his texts and expressions in a descriptive-analitical method based on Sadra's philosophy; while providing convincing evidence, the belief in the 'The Principiality of Quiddity' can be deduced from Ghias al-din Mansur. The above evidence will be presented and the claim will be explained in this research. Ghias al-din considers the concept of 'Existence' as one of the validations of the secondary intelligible and redundant on quiddity, denying the realization of any individual and external instances for it.

In al-Suhrawardi's philosophy, there is a fundamental turn in the attitude towards the secondary intelligible. Mulla Sadra examines Suhrawardi's views on intelligibles, especially philosophical secondary intelligible, and takes them into a new system, and so far there is a popular opinion about these intelligibles. In the commentaries of philosophical books, Motahhari has made this discussion explained completely and expressed implications, and he has used this topic in his critiques of Marxism. In this article, while comparing the views of Master Motahhari and al-Suhrawardi, we intend to establish a dialogue between these two thinkers and specially to examine the objections of Master to al-Suhrawardi. In this way, the intellectual framework (paradigm) of al-Suhrawardi and Motahhari should be considered in the secondary intelligible, and in transferring concepts from any approach to another, its implications should also be transferred. It seems that according to al-Suhrawardi's approach, Motahhari's objections not acceptable, but Suhrawardi invalidates the opposite opinion due to the occurrence of a circle paralogism of in it.

In the contemporary Islamic philosophy, the intelligibles (universal concepts) fall under three categories: primary or essential intelligibles, philosophical secondary concepts, and logical secondary concepts. In this study, the term intelligible is the characteristic of mental concepts. A glance at the philosophical references proves that in the past, the term intelligible was sometimes used to describe the very real entities, rather than the concepts, and were merely divided into two primary and secondary ones. Suffering from the primacy of quiddity and some other doubts, the illuminationist philosophers made existence and its attributes fall under secondary intelligibles and thus be regarded as merely mental concepts. Having made the illuminationist's errors correct, later philosophers divided secondary intelligibles into two categories of logic and philosophy and thus they put attributes of existence under philosophical secondary intelligibles. They have also proposed criteria to distinguish those three categories one from another. In his present study of the historical development of the issue, the author has come to the conclusion that putting the concepts as the subject of description, classification of the intelligibles into three categories, and bringing philosophical entities under "secondary intelligibles" are not recommended, and in some cases are incorrect. Like previous references, we ought to consider the very entities as the intelligibles and to classify them into two categories of primary and secondary intelligibles. In this classification, the philosophical entities go under primary intelligibles and they are divided into three: those of quiddity, philosophical ones, and those mentally-constructed.

With regard to the concepts, Suhrawardi is quite influenced by the sphere dominant on the peripatetic school of thought. That influence is quite evident both in the very formation of universal concepts and their classifications. Concerning the criterion for distinguishing concepts from one another particularly classifying philosophical concepts under secondary intelligibles as the first step for the formation of philosophical secondary intelligibles, Suhrawardi is quite obviously and largely influenced by Bahmanyar.     It is much important to examine such mechanism deeper and deeper for it has brought about a unique success in the course of flourishing and systematizing philosophical enquiries particularly considering the ground paved by the preceding philosophers. In what follows, the author has made use of a philosophical-analytic method to study the viewpoints of both peripatetic and illumination philosophers (from al-Kindi, al-Farabi, Ibn Sina, Bahmanyar to Suhrawardi) in order to explain the qualification of that influence.

Primary intelligibles, philosophers hold, are general concepts whose referents exist in the external world. On the contrary, secondary intelligibles or mentally constructed concepts do not have referents in the outside world. People like Suhrawardi who believe in the real primacy of quiddity consider existence as a secondary concept because they hold that existence is merely constructed by the mind and thus is not real. On the other hand, after Mulla Sadra who vindicated the real primacy of existence, his followers were to consider existence and its attributes as primary concepts, because according to them it is existence that really exist by itself in the external world, rather than the quiddity. Nevertheless, they still believe that existence and its attributes are secondary intelligibles. A few solutions have been proposed to dispel that contradiction. Ayatullah Fayyazi holds that the correct view is that existence as an infinitive is a secondary intelligible and mentally constructed, but as a verbal noun is a primary one and real. Other views are: 1-the general concept of existence qua its generality is not real; 2- the fake concept of existence -viewing the fact that the reality of existence does not come into the mind- is regarded as a secondary intelligible; 3- the secondary philosophical intelligible is interpreted as a concept lacking any independent referent, or as concept secondarily understood, or as a concept made through comparison. All those solutions are invalid .

Concept of being, by most of MullaSadra’s predecessors, considered simply to be as a derivative and secondary intelligible, to which could not be ascribed any concrete objects or properties, as the referents. The specific problem that we want to address is that if one accepts fundamentality of existence, then how the concept of existence would relate to being (wujūd) itself. In fact, there is an affinity between primacy of being and the way in which concept of being signify things in real world, namely the criterion of subsuming it under first or second intelligible classes. We will argue that rendering the concept of being as a secondary intelligible is inconsistent with MullaSadra’s account of being, based on two different definitions presented traditionally for first and secondary intentions, and the concept, in the sense which characterized by MullaSadra should be subsumed as first intelligible. By exploring the elements of fundamentality of being, one admits that Primacy of being results in the fact that concept of being belongs to first intelligible class.

Murtaḍā Mutahharī believes that ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī is the first philosopher in the history of Islamic philosophy who has addressed the quality of abstracting secondary intelligible. He does not mean that this issue has not been paid attention to before ‘Allāma; it can even be said that the main elements of ‘Allāma’s explanation are available in Ṣadr al-Muti’allihīn’s words. The elements inspired by Ṣadr al-Muti’allihīn’s doctrines in ‘Allāma’s explanation include: 1. Secondary ineligibles are acquired knowledge preceded by presential knowledge; 2. Self-mental knowledge, its faculties and actions as well as sensual perception, are presential knowledge; 3. Studying the process of abstracting secondary ineligibles should be started with one of these presential knowledge; 4. The secondary ineligibles are the product of independent look at the relation between the found phenomena, mental or external.

This paper examines the epistemology of the secondary intelligible, in general, and the quality of the truth of philosophical secondary intelligibles, in particular. It does so relying on an analytic study of the modes of the “accidence” and “qualification” of the secondary intelligibles in the views of such great philosophers as Farabi, Ibn Sina, Suhrawardi, and Mulla Sadra. The results of the present study indicate that all the above thinkers argue for the prevention of epistemological errors in the light of a clear explanation of the ontological existence of secondary philosophical intelligibles in the outside. Nevertheless, each of them has pursued a different approach towards attaining his goal based on his own philosophy. Finally, the writers conclude that Mulla Sadra’s epistemological analysis of philosophical intelligibles is a great step towards justifying the presence of such intelligibles in the outside. His analysis in this regard ultimately leads to his idea of the principiality of existence.

The solution Agha Ali Muddarris presents for the problems of 'copulative being' is based on certain precise ontological and epistemological foundations some of which the present study aims to unveil. Discerning modes and understanding them is the intrinsic right of philosophy and that is why in his Treatise on Copulative Being, Zinoozi, the sage, sheds light on this issue. According to this study, the application of the rule of 'mode's allows Agha Ali, who himself discovered it, to reconcile between conflicting philosophical views on the one hand and to avoid the flaws and setbacks of having conflicting readings and dry logical and lingual reductionist analyses. Introducing reason as an active analyzer and relating the importance of mental modes, he used an approach which is knowingly or unknowingly followed by later philosophers for solving philosophical issues.

Through clarifying the complex concepts in Aristotelian logic in his masterful commentary on all chapters of Aristotle’s Organon, as well as through his unprecedented innovations in the field of logic, particularly in his division of knowledge into “concept and judgment”, Farabi developed the Greek logical legacy in the world of Islam. In the present paper, the writers initially refer to and explore some of his ideas in the field of logic, such as the division of different types of knowledge into two categories of concept and judgment, his view of the particular and the universal and the origin of man’s knowledge, his division of universal concepts into the first and the second intelligible, his synthesis of Aristotle’s theory of predication with Porphyry’s five-fold universals, his definition of essentialism, his view of the inconsistency of modal negation with permissible negation, his specific theory of future possibility, his idea of induction and analogy, and his innovation regarding fallacy and the explanation and expansion of the different stand-points in this regard.

The present paper aims to compare Allameh Tabatabaei''s view on the issue of secondary intelligibles with Suhrawardi''s. For this purpose، after describing the views of Suhrawardi and Allameh Tabatabaei on the definition and classification of objective and subjective concepts، how these concepts exist outside and inside mind، the criterion of truth، comparison of the two concepts، manifestations of subjective concepts، etc.، their views on the above issues are compared. The topics discussed in this paper reveal that both philosophers have achieved an understanding of subjective concepts and distinguish them from objective ones. However، Suhrawardi has not made any distinction between different kinds of subjective concepts and has mentioned philosophical and logical concepts on the same plane. As a result، he has founded logical convictions upon philosophical concepts; Allameh، however، makes division between secondary intelligibles and places philosophical and logical concepts in two separate groups; As such، he makes distinctions between their convictions.

Cause and effect, essence and accident, existence and nonexistence, unity and plurality and necessity and contingency are among the concepts which do not enter the mind through senses. This has caused controversies among the philosophers. Some consider them to be innate. Others seek to justify their acquisition through senses. A third group believes them to be rooted in the nature and mankind’s soul and, thus, illusive. Muslim philosophers consider them to be secondary intelligibles and real concepts. As a Muslim philosopher, Allameh Tabataba’i holds a noble theory about the acquisition of knowledge. Moreover, Kant has a theory about the said concepts. He considers them to be mental categories or a priori forms of knowledge. This paper investigates the possibility of Kantian and non-Kantian a priori forms of knowledge and concludes that they do not exist at all.