جستجوی مقالات مرتبط با کلیدواژه « subject » در نشریات گروه « فلسفه و کلام »

The rule "the subject of every field of knowledge is that whose essential properties are discussed in that field" is stated by logicians in logic and discussed in more detail in the discussion of the subject of a field of knowledge and its essential properties, and finally it is used in other fields, such as philosophy and medicine. The question is whether this rule embraces all fields, including the principles of jurisprudence. What is certain is that with the expansion of disciplines, there have emerged branches of knowledge that are not included in the scope of this rule because they discuss topics that are -logically speaking- beyond the essential properties of the subject of that branch. One of these disciplines is the principles of jurisprudence. According to this rule, the scholars of this filed hold mixed opinions in determining its subject and have presented different ideas such as: considering the unity of issues based on the unity of the goal, denying that the issues are the essential properties of the subject, and offering a new reading of the essential properties. In this article, we are going to explain the origin of this confusion of opinions and we argue that ignoring the scope of this rule and other discussions related to this rule in logic, has doubled the effort of the experts of the principles of jurisprudence in justifying their opinion.

This article, emphasizing Peter Byrne’s thought, one of the most important figures of contemporary religious philosophy, in addition to explaining his views on realism and non-realism as well as theism, religion, and theology, analyzes the philosophical foundations of this issue. Byrne’s critical approach to various dimensions of non-realism contains a fundamental distinction between theism and theology in adopting a realist and non-realist point of view about them; considering the separation of the two fields of theology and theism, he believes in the unrealistic nature of liberal theology as an academic discipline and the realism of religion, God, and theistic discourse; the purpose of the theistic discourse refers to an extra-mental, extra-mundane, transcendent entity. Ultimately, has analyzed the philosophical foundations of this issue; and Peter Byrne’s brief reference in examining the origin of the distinction between realism and non-realism, and also highlighted the modern non-realistic interpretation of religion, and in addition to analyzing the roots of the problem of religious realism and non-realism and by emphasizing the relationship between subject and object-especially in Kant’s philosophy, he has reviewed this philosophical foundation in the opinion of Peter Byrne.

The relationship between term-subject and subject in the attrebutive theorem is (‘عقدالوضع’-Aghd Al-Vaz). According to Al-Razi pruport, the modal of that relationship in Al-farabi’s viewpoint is contingency but Al-Tousi says Al-Farabi’s viewpoint is possibility modal. So at last, two of them don’t accept Al-Farabi’s holistic view. On the other hand both of them say that Avicenna, however, accepts actuality modal for ‘Aghd Al-Vaz’ in every theorem and this is the true modal. So Al-Farabi doesn’t talk about the modal of Aghd Al-Vad completely but it is understood that he looks at the relationship as a kind of theorem which accepts modals. Therefore, Avicenna doesn’t accept actuality modal for all theorems. So in this article, first of all we are going to check that possibility modal and contingency modal as a modal of Aghd Al-Vaz is accepted by both Al-Farabi and Avicenna; in the second step we are going to show that the critic of Al-Razi and Al-Tousi in Al-Farbi is not seemed true.

In an article titled " Non-contradiction Paradox", Mahdi Azimi mentioned Mulla Sadra's words are in response to the non-contradiction Paradox. Azimi says that Mulla Sadra examines the statement “the aggregation of the pair of contradictories is impossible” then using the subject-predicate structure Mulla Sadra tries to solve the paradox by distinction between two type of predication called ‘awwali’ and ‘shayi’. Azimi considers the paradox to be the result of its structure and proposes the structure □~(A&~A) for the statement “the aggregation of the pair of contradictories is impossible”. In this structure, there is no need for a subject for a paradox to occur. But firstly, he rejects the subject-predicate structure for that statement without any reason. Secondly, Muslim philosophers mention the proposed structure along with the previous structure for the principle of Non-contradiction but the proposed structure does not produce a paradox that requires a solution. Thirdly, with a closer look, there is a paradox on the proposed structure. Fourthly, □~(A&~A) is not a complete translation of the principle of Non-contradiction.

Kant argued that in order to bring about validity for knowledge we have to make a paradigm shift. The paradigm shift which was well known as copernican revolution was based on this assumption that the one who observing could be able to determinate objects. For Kant subject as observer has the ability to determine the world transcendentally. For Hegel the Kantian paradigm shift count as subjetivising the objectivity. He blames Kant for not seeing this basic fact that, subject himself become in the objectivity and the relation could not be as Kant was assuming. Hegel by replacing the transcendental I with Giest attempts to instead of making objectivity, subjective, do the reverse. In this article we argue that by objectivizing the subjectivity, Hegel not inly became able to overcome the problems posed by Kantian philosophy but also assumes subjectivity as intrinsically intersubjective

In this article with a study of the meaning of substance in empirical philosophers’ viewpoints, we show that Hume's negation of substance has influenced Kant's theory of knowledge. To solve the problem of knowledge, Kant, on the one hand, turns the substance negated by Hume into a thing in itself. In this way, he tries to provide a strong foundation for the phenomena and keep his philosophy from falling into the abyss of absolute idealism. On the other hand, with the Copernican revolution, he turned the substance into one of the categories and determinations of the subject. In this way, he kept its essential role in the formation of knowledge and paved the way for the object to correspond with the mind. Therefore, in a sense, Kant preserves the substance in the meaning of the predecessors, but no epistemic role is possible for this meaning; however, he tries to maintain the epistemic position of the substance in another sense. The reason why Kant, while transforming the substance of the predecessors into a thing in itself, did not abandon the substance, but presented another definition of it, was to be able to explain perception. Because he needed a permanent thing, of course, a permanent thing that can be pointed to its position with the subject, not an unchanging existence that is unknown with the objects.

Immanuel Levinas is considered one of the most important philosophers of the new age. The importance of his philosophy is more apparent in the field of ethics. Levinas's moral philosophy revolves around the "other". In the structure of Levinas's moral philosophy, one central subject is out of priority and another is given priority. For Levinas, the other is not a passive person, but an active person whose face indicates messages and moral commands, and the subject, by receiving these messages and moral commands, feels the duty to be accountable and responsible to the other. to know The continuity of this accountability and responsibility leads to a moral life. But the problem is that the approach to moral life in the structure of Levinas's moral philosophy is based on what basis? And in other words; What are the components of a moral life in the structure of Levinas's moral philosophy? Levinas believes that the subject finds an inner desire and pull towards the other when facing another's face. This internal desire and tension towards the other, which originates from the subject's desire for infinity and perfection, is a fundamental and metaphysical desire and leads to the subject's moral relationship and interaction with the other and ultimately to moral life. Within the moral life, the subject finds his true identity, which is a moral identity, and by cultivating his moral talents, he steps on the path of becoming infinite and achieving perfection.

The approach of Descartes and his subsequent philosophical tradition to consciousness did have epistemological consequences. The distinction between subject and object, and the question of how the mind and body relate, the entanglement of the mind in its ideas that led to the problem of “egocentric predicament,” the problem of the identity of the perceptual object, skepticism, and the issue of valuation regarding the gap between the mind and the object are some consequences of this approach. Consequently, alternative approaches have been proposed by philosophers to avoid such consequences. Among these approaches is phenomenology with the narratives of Husserl, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty. Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology with its intentionality, Heidegger’s doctrine of “being-in-the-world” and Merleau-Ponty’s idea of conscious bodies tried to explain the mechanism and characteristics of consciousness. The present article seeks to examine the problems of the Cartesian-European epistemological system, to show how to deal with these problems, and finally to analyze and critique the characteristics of each approach to see whether these alternative approaches could have managed to solve these problems or not.

In Kant's philosophy, the concept of "transcendental" is so important that he has coined such a term as a core index for his philosophy to distinguish his in contrast to other philosophical systems. Professor Fatemi has tried to base his view about the theoretical principles of human rights on Kant's philosophy considering the concept of "transcendental man" as the fundamental condition for the realization of contemporary human rights. The concept of "transcendental man" in professor Fatemi's system of thought seems far cry from that in Kant's philosophy. Accordingly, his efforts to do that are open to a major objection. Failing to consider the wide range of this concept in the light of Kant's Copernican Revolution and system of transcendental idealism, professor Fatemi has adopted a pre-Kantian approach to use the term which entails an approach of substance to man neglecting the transcendental conditions of the subject. This is while, the concept of "transcendental" in Kant's philosophy concerns terms of the possibility in the light of subjectivism and has no relation to professor Fatemi's attitude towards "transcendental man" as an abstract man along with no accident.

The main topic of the present article is whether the theory of intertextuality - in its classical form and narration formulated by Julia Kristeva, the author of the word intertextuality - can be used as a way to understand the meaning of language and religious texts? And that using intertextuality can achieve a single, complete and final meaning? And assuming meaning, what will be the state of objectivity in understanding the language of religion and religious texts? We have also answered the question that by emphasizing the intertextuality of texts, such as the dynamics and continuous processing of texts, during intertextuality, can the meaning of the text be equated with the author of the text? To gain meaning, Kristeva emphasizes the two components of subject and language alongside structure. Based on these two important components of Kristeva, which form the basis of the formation of intertextuality, the discussion is examined in two axes. Given that meaning is the result of cooperation and connection between language and subject, what is the purpose of understanding the meaning of religious propositions and basically the language of religion in both written and spoken forms? Does intertextuality provide a way to understand the meaning of the language of religion? As a result, we find that the use of intertextuality in the Valley of the Language of Religion cannot achieve a single meaning due to the dynamics of the language and the subject matter of Kristeva.

It is widely known that Kant refers all the three basic problems of philosophy to the single ultimate question “what is man?”, the task of finding a solution for which is assigned to the philosophical anthropology. One considers Critique of Pure Reason in this regard, however, one surprisingly finds that this question is entirely absent from Kant’s own magnum opus. By its very nature indeed, transcendental philosophy is incapable of arising this question thus formulated, since it eventually leads to a subject, not to a human being. Heidegger’s exegetical reading of Kant notwithstanding, one should not simply conclude, however, that the question of the essence of man eventuates by Kant in the formation of a metaphysics of subjectivity. Kant’s doctrine of transcendental unity of apperception is not so much a subject-centered metaphysical theory, of the sort that Heidegger assumes, as it denotes a transcendental formulation of Kant’s general anthropological conception. What lies at the core of this anthropological view is the twofoldness of human place in cosmos, in terms of which the tension between the marginality and, simultaneously, centrality of man in relation to the world can be articulated. We refer to this anthropological conception as “anthropological tension”, due to the irreducible duality that lies at its core.

Husserl in his method of phenomenology casts a new light on the discussion of experience through a new definition of cognition and avoids the error of preceding philosophers, classic empiricists, in particular; thus the cognition is no longer based on the immediate experiences of the world but it is based on intentional experience which relies upon immediate intuition of objects. The result of this perception is a live experience. Therefore, for Husserl, knowing the world around us is based on the lived which is based on the intentionality of consciousness. For Husserl, talking about this intentional world happens through ideal meanings and this group of meanings rests around the axis of a transcendental ego which is the center of intentional actions and moods. Therefore, the analysis of the speech act of this “ego” is done through semantics and based on transcendental logic and it is separated from syntactic theory. Husserl makes this new change to move the transcendental subject into the intersubjective world. In the present research, the objective is to analyze the effect of logical semantics on speech and transition to the intersubjective world.

The main question of this article is that what are the important differences or similarities between Aristotle's and Frege's analysis of the categorical proposition? Based on the famous view, Aristotle analyzes the categorical proposition into three components: Subject, Predicate and Relation; while Frege analyzes the categorical proposition into two components of Variable and Function, and therefore; these two analyses are completely different and there is no similarity between them. In the other article, I have argued that in the Aristotle's viewpoint, in the logical analysis of the categorical proposition, against its linguistic analysis, it is divided into two main components of subject and predicate. At this article, I have shown that by accepting of this analysis and based on it, it becomes clear that: firstly, there are important similarities between these two analyses: 1) both are two-part analyses 2) Aristotle, like Frege, considers «to be attributed to something else» to be the essential feature of the predicate part; Secondly, there are important differences between them: 1) Aristotle considers «to be attributed to something else» to be merely the essential property of the Role of Predicate, but Frege considers it to be also the essential property of general concepts that replaces in this role, and therefore 2) Frege, against Aristotle, maintains that general concepts cannot be the subject of propositions. This viewpoint of Frege is based on the «Fundamental distinction between Object and Concept». Therefore the root of the differences between the two analyses should be sought in this assertion..

What is the role of Time in Heidegger's ontological interpretation of Kant? Heidegger's interpretation of Kant is a controversial and different one in current interpretation of Kant's philosophy. In the light of understanding the meaning of Being, Heidegger works out Kant and intends to consider Kant's project as an ontological one. Now with regard to the main question of this article, we want to show essential and basic role of Time in Heidegger's interpretation of Kant. The role which, in our view, is a connective thread in Heidegger's idea about Kant as far as we can't understand mechanism of Heidegger's interpretation without it.

Is doubt in axioms inconsistent with their being axiomatic? Is it possible to cast doubt on the most axiomatic realities while this not being inconsistent with their being axiomatic? What makes a difference between axiomatic and theoretical propositions is their being in need or being needless of definition and reasoning. This is the key point in the return of the theoretical knowledge to axiomatic knowledge. However, extending this needlessness to needlessness in other affairs has led to emergence of difficulties in knowing axiomatic propositions as well. So, it is necessary to discuss some points, posed among scholars, about this feature and its distinction from other features of this type of science. Through this investigation, it is clarified that the immediate affirmation of axiomatic propositions, contrary to the initial assumption –which seems easy – has some conditions that causes mistakes in identifying and affirming axioms if ignored. In this article, after investigating the definition and stating the features of axiomatic propositions, we have mentioned the conditions and affairs needed by the axioms.

The actuality of the soul in the emergence of perception accepted by Ibn Sina and Mulla Sadra. The acceptance of this view has two fundamental questions that shape the focus of the present research. The first question is how the power soul has a perceptual appearance, while at the very beginning it lacks it. And in the second question, considering that desires and sensual tendencies are in the direction of effective will, how can one between the selfish self-activity in the emergence of perception and the theory of conformity and the criterion of the truth of that collective form in response to The first question is expressed that the soul first accepts and after the study of the queen of the form, an object appears and in response to The second question states that self-determination in education is the basis of the emergence of perceptual forms. Also, self-actualization is related to the sensory forms of the subject matter, whose will does not interfere with it, and in relation to the first testimonies of the soul, it is necessary to make predicate proof for the subject and In the assertions of the theorem that returns to the axioms, when the initiation of analogy is put together, the result is derived from the causal principle, and the will of the soul does not interfere in determining the outcome, hence the inference does not conform to the viewpoint.

Western Philosophy has been preoccupied with the duality of subject and object and every modern philosopher has engaged with these concepts in accordance with their philosophical paradigms. Rene Descartes coined the modern conception of subject and Emanuel Kant expanded the Cartesian subject and provided a stable and non-negotiable theory of subject. Jean Baudrillard too has engaged with the duality of subject and object, though in implicit terms, through exploring simulation and simulacrum in the the three stages of symbolic, production and hyperreality. According to Baudrillard the image of reality has replaced the objective reality in the age of technological advancements and hyperreality is active to deny this very process. Upon the expansion of mass media in the twenty first century, Baudrillard added a new dimension to his theory: Fractal Reality, which is the result of the proliferation of images and the emptiness of meaning in the post-modern age. With the rise of cellphone technology and social media and endless inflation of images in the last decade, it appears that Fractal Reality has become even more intense. This “inflation,” has caused the dissolution of subject and object and with the demise of this duality, social media has replaced every reality and the subject has lost its meaning. This condition that is the result of the inflation of the endless images in social media may be called “inflated reality.” This concept furthers Baudrillard’s fractal reality and invites this French philosopher to the study of social media culture.

Nietzsche and Levinas are the most prominent contemporary philosophers who have emphasized on the necessity of passing over rational subjectivity. They tried to rethink the meaning of ethics in a world where neither religion nor other moral philosophies could create a strict and reliable source for the crisis of the contemporary human being. In an attempt to overcome rational subjectivism, Nietzsche and Levinas redefined concepts such as morality and the subject. The purpose of the paper is to describe the attitudes of Nietzsche and Levinas towards their critiques of rational subjectivism. Then examine Nietzsche’s naturalistic reading and Levinas’ transcendental reading of the subject and their encounter with the other and also introduce their critiques of traditional ethics and propose a new kind of ethics in their thoughts. We will then evaluate their alternative concepts in the problem of overcoming rational subjectivism and finally, we will compare these two attitudes. Although Nietzsche and Levinas initially adopted common points of view for the critique of subjectivism and traditional ethics and common criticisms in the field, they presented different results, goals, and methods. Based on these approaches, each has proposed different principles and conclusions about ethics and overcoming rational subjectivism. Nietzsche’s problem is the genealogy of values, and Levinas’s question is the possibility of a moral condition. The answer to the first question is not related to the second question. The present paper shows that both Levinas and Nietzsche have presented different insights into the meaning of subjectivity. Their efforts to find the meaning of subjectivity have also been accompanied by the necessity to destruct the meaning of morality. Accordingly, by focusing on the overman (Nietzsche) and the other (Levinas), they have sought to reevaluate values ​​(Nietzsche) and asymmetric moral responsibility (Levinas). In this regard, they have adopted a completely different view from the traditional view of ethics. Although both of them start with a common point of view, their methods, interpretations, and results are different. With a genealogical approach, Nietzsche considered the will of power in the active subject and the birth of the overman to be desirable and practical to end the history of the development of nihilism. And Levinas, with a phenomenological approach to the concept of asymmetric responsibility in the passive subject, has put an end to the history of neglect of the other and rational subjectivism. The final suggestion is that Nietzsche and Levinas are both looking for a new meaning of morality that resides not in the mind but in the body. In Levinas, the relationship between the body and morality is evolving and transcendental, with concepts of responsibility and suffering, but in Nietzsche, this kind of connection fluctuates between naturalistic and transcendentalist views and considers the concepts of power and instinct important. Nietzsche’s attitude about the human being is a combination of a naturalistic and over-humanist approach, and with the precedence of selfhood, he has expressed a negative view of the other. However, Levinas’ philosophy is more humanistic and inter-subjectivity because of ethical ideals, and ethics begin with recognition of the priority of the other.

Logical propositions are divided qualitatively into affirmative and negative types, and each of them is also divided into three attributive-predicate, privative-predicate, and negative-predicate types. Nevertheless, there are serious disagreements among philosophers and logicians regarding their structure and content, which demands more research. Neither is there any unanimity as to the number of the constitutive components of the truth of propositions and the components necessary for their realization. The number of components of a proposition is determined based on the difference between simple questions and affirmative and negative compound questions. Moreover, some thinkers maintain that the judicial relation is an affirmative and ontological relation in all propositions, whether affirmative or negative. However, some others believe that it is affirmative only in affirmative propositions, while it is negative and non-existential in negative propositions. Furthermore, the conditional or non-conditional nature of the actualization of modified affirmative propositions has been propounded, and the negative-predicate proposition has been debated. The structure of a negative-predicate proposition, when pronounced, is similar to a negative attributive proposition but is different from it regarding its content and signification. The content of a negative attributive proposition pertains to the elimination and interruption of the affirmation judgment, while the content of a negative-attributive proposition focuses on affirmation of negation. Khwajah Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī and ‘Allāmah Ṭabātabā’ī, the contemporary philosopher, do not accept such aproposition as a logical proposition.