جستجوی مقالات مرتبط با کلیدواژه « قرینه گرایی » در نشریات گروه « فلسفه و کلام »

Evidentialism posits that the epistemic value of propositions lies in their evidence. However, alternative approaches, independent of evidential support, have emerged to maintain validity when competing viewpoints falter. This phenomenon, often termed "epistemic presumption," serves as both a procedural starting point and occasionally holds substantive truth-value. In discussions surrounding the existence of God, differing presumptions—whether theism, atheism, or non-belief—are contentious. Theists and atheists assert positive claims necessitating evidence, while agnostics posit that both positions lack support, contingent upon evidence provision. Thus, the burden of proof rests upon all three perspectives.

The question of religious belief and its rationality has become a serious issue in the philosophy of religion due to the claims of modern philosophers. One of the most controversial positions in this regard is evidentialism, which emphasizes that our beliefs should be accompanied by evidence and reasons. In modern times, Clifford, by introducing the idea of "the ethics of belief," advocated evidentialism in its most extreme form. William James, by emphasizing the role of will and emotions in the formation of belief, criticizes Clifford's theory and tries to defend the rationality of religious belief. This paper attempts to answer the question of how James, based on the same evidentialist principles of the evidentialists, criticizes Clifford. It also examines whether his view can respond to the criticisms raised. The aim is to analyze and evaluate James's approach to evidentialism from a non-fideistic perspective using a library-based research method. Considering James's views, especially in his essay "The Will to Believe," it can be concluded that his position in defending the rationality of religious belief against evidentialism is relatively coherent. According to William James, Clifford's evidentialist position is, contrary to its claim, irrational and dogmatic, and desire and will logically play a necessary role in truth-seeking.

This article is an effort to show that during the history of philosophy – both in the epistemology and ethics domains – evidentialism based on extreme rationalism has tremendously influenced the true mechanism of the formation of faith in God. In the light of a kind of determinism, it has averted attentions from the role of other functions such as emotions, passions, and especially volition in the formation of faith in theists within the common understanding framework. Among the contemporary thinkers, William James and Plantinga have tried to modify this deterministic approach and revive those practical aspects of the formation of faith that are always forgotten. The salient common point in the theories of these two thinkers are the attention to the practical aspects of faith within the common understanding framework and the emphasis on the significant role of volition – in line with reason – in the formation of faith. This way, it can be observed that the opinions of William James and Plantinga about the way the mechanism of faith in God is formed complete each other.

From the Age of Enlightenment to the present day, modern man has sought to analyze religious beliefs in new epistemological ways. Accordingly, the study of belief in God as the most important religious belief has emerged by examining the evidence of theism and has had a special occurrence among Western thinkers. Antony Flew, a contemporary philosopher based on evidence, is one of the thinkers who paid special attention to the analysis of theism and its rejection based on evidence. So much so that he was called the father of neo-atheism. The subject of this article is the study and analysis of his views in the first period of his scientific life, which he emerged as an atheist. In his atheistic works, Antony Flew states some basic points in rejecting theism, the more basic of which are discussed in this article. To this end, Antony Flew's prominent views on atheism, namely the meaninglessness of the language of religion, the incompatibility of the concept of God, and the principle of atheism, are examined, and then the strengths and weaknesses of each are examined. Thus, it will be revealed that although Flew has presented serious and thought-provoking problems in the field of theism, But many of these cases in the past have been suggested in other ways and of course can be criticized and have drawbacks and weaknesses that are considered.

The aim of this study is explain the position of critical thinking in epistemic deontology of ethic of belief. So¡ used from conceptual analysis method for analyzing epistemic deontology and critical thinking and explain the position of critical thinking in epistemic deontology. The findings show that for rationality to the beliefs and regard of ethic of Belief¡ should provide the necessary and sufficient reasons for belief (Evidentialism). Achieving to this reasons and evidences needed to investigate about the belief (Epistemic Deontology). For to conduct the research¡ should have rules that their application cause done efficiently epistemic deontology process. Critical thinking consists of skills that each can be as a rule and will use in the process of investigation a belief. These rules include "judge with clear criteria and avoid hasty judgments"¡
"questioning"¡ "self-correction"¡ "to distinguish strong from weak reason"¡ "Failure to follow the majority and truth-seeking"¡
"analyzing"¡ "perfect review"¡ "obvious and avoid ambiguity"¡
"avoid prejudice"¡ "comprehensive review"¡ " flexibility"¡ " follow up doubts"¡ "listening to opposite opinions"¡ "separate belief from the owner belief"¡ "review defaults" that with use in process of ethic of belief¡ cause epistemic deontology be lawful.

In this article the rationality of faith in Plantinga's three major works is studied – the three works in which the author, while responding to the critiques, presents his viewpoints. In this contribution, Plantinga's line of argumentation in these books is sought and then, having explained his views, they are being analyzed. Hence, first his analogical argument is criticized and then it will be discussed that there is incoherence in his critiques of the evidentialism and foundationalism. It will be mentioned also, in the end, that his idea that the belief in God needs no evidence is a kind of fideism.

Voluntarism and Evidentialism are two competing approaches to Ethics of Belief. Louis P. Pojman, the American contemporary philosopher, has taken a critical view toward these two approaches and proposed the theory of indirect prescriptive volunteerism.  Based on this theory, in belief formation, arguments are considered as important as background and contextual factors and rationality is considered the best criterion in evaluation of insufficient or conflicting evidence. Based on this sort of volunteerism, under specific conditions, it is morally permissible or even obligatory to defend a belief in spite of evidence pointing against it. In this article, an attempt is made to provide an accurate description of Pojman’s viewpoint concerning the ethics of belief, and an analysis of the theory and the conditions to be satisfied for a belief to be morally permissible based on volunteerism.

Alvin Plantingais is one of the most outstanding figures in the field of reformed epistemology. According to him, like the beliefs derived from perception, religious beliefs are considered to be fundamental; therefore, they need no justification. However, this viewpoint applies some tools that may be led to religious fundamentalism. Since Plantingas theory does not determine any criteria regarding the content of the fundamental beliefs and the conditions he defines for its legitimization, it also makes the entrance of the fundamental beliefs possible. Therefore, as the western people believe that Muslims are the promoters of religious fundamentalism, this study has indicated that the reformed epistemology which is derived from Christianity can justify the religious fundamentalism. Hence, in order to avoid accusation of expanding the religious fundamentalism, it is necessary for religious epistemology to continue not to abandon evidentialism Keywords: Alvin Plantinga, Reformed Epistemology, Fundamentalism, evidentialism, Religious Fundamentalism.

Rational explanation of the doctrine of IMAMAT (spiritual leadership of the Shi`ites) is one of the most important and efficient instruments that can prepare the ground for extension and propagation of this view in all over the world. So, in this article I want to study one of the first rational explanation of this view in Islamic world which proposed by AL- FARABI. In the world of Islam, FARABI is one of the first philosophers who toke into consideration the necessity of existence of first ruler and his successor (IMAM) in his Utopia (Madina al-fazila), and proposed a rational argument for it. His view is here to some extent in accordance with Shiites attitude. But for understanding whether his ideas is in complete agreement with Shiites works or not, I study this view point in two stages: First of all.

Fideism, evidentialism and pragmatism are three major models of theism in contemporary religious epistemology. Each of these major models includes minor models. In Fideism we find three models according to them faith is in contrast with intellectual reasoning, without any relation to intellectual reasoning or without any need to intellectual reasoning. Evidentialism covers syllogistic and probabilistic evidentialism and pragmatism can be world-centered or hereafter-centered. Surveying Muslim philosopher's thoughts and reconstructing their theories in a new way allows us to have dialog with contemporary theories in the realm of religious epistemology. For example with contemplating on Avicenna's philosophy we can reconstruct his theory in the frame of syllogistic evidentialism and studying Sadra's philosophy permits us to remodel his theory in the frame of the third model of fideism. We also can rebuild Ghazali's theory in the frame of pragmatism. Understanding models of theism in contemporary era and endeavoring for reconstructing Muslim philosopher's thoughts let us act well when we encounter atheism and its different models.

Pascal’s Wager is one of the most important and challenging arguments for the existence of God and the rationality of religious believes. According to this argument, where the rational and theoretical arguments for the existence of God are not satisfying, still in practice and decision-making, living on the basis of belief in God and other religious doctrines like life after death, is the most prudential and rational option and the best bet; although these believes are not rationally and certainly provable; Avoiding the probable loss of atheism, namely eternal and infinite damnation in afterlife – that is more important than certain utility and restricted and finite pleasure of life in this world, is the ground of rationality of this decisionmaking.The psychological use of this argument is very effective, but
the justificatory use of ithave many difficulties; This article is concerned with the most important criticisms of thisargument in terms of plurality of religions, rationalism, evidentialism, ethics of belief,voluntarism and probabilities calculus.

Over history, defending from rationality of religious belief has had different types, regarding to the kind of ruling philosophical and epistemic approach over human thought. Externalism expression in contemporary epistemology has caused some religious thinkers having externalist view to religious believes in a new way and prove its rationality through externalist perspective. In this externalist perspective, argument's role in justification of religious belief is weakened and argument-oriented ruling over natural theology and Locke and Descarte's evidentialism are refused. In this view, religious belief could be rational and justified without any argument. In other word, religious belief is included in basic believes. Both Alston's empiricism and Plantinga's claim that religious belief is properly basic stems from their externalist view on knowledge problem. Generally speaking, emergence of the school of reformed epistemology in religious thought is concurrent with emergence or revival of externalism in contemporary epistemology and profoundly owes that.