جستجوی مقالات مرتبط با کلیدواژه « Rejection on definitions of truth » در نشریات گروه « فلسفه و کلام »

Thought in Frege’s point of view is accompanied by innovations as well as ambiguities that have been examined from various points of view. But Frege's view of conventional definitions of truth and rejecting them is the main topic of this article. In his explanation of propositions containing thought and judgment, Frege doesn’t accept the conventional definitions of truth for their sequence, and in order to solve the problem of achieving the truth and value of propositions, he proposes "Thought" and tries to replace it. In order to clarify this claim, we first examine language and thought from his point of view, and then by entering into the subject of thought and discovering its characteristics, we will try to understand Frege's claim to replace it with the definitions of truth. Finally, with the plan of seven critiques, the author believes that this replacement is not possible and fruitful.