جستجوی مقالات مرتبط با کلیدواژه « Shams Al-Dīn Samarqandī » در نشریات گروه « فلسفه و کلام »

In both of his logical books, Qisṭās al-afkār</em> and its self-commentary Sharḥ al-Qisṭās</em>, Shams al-Dīn Samarqandī presents two versions of mixed ḥaqīqī-khārijī syllogisms. In previous papers, we discussed these two versions and demonstrated that both contain numerous errors. As a result, neither version provides a correct and comprehensive analysis of mixed ḥaqīqī-khārijī syllogisms. In this paper, we aim to present the accurate conclusions of mixed syllogisms. By adhering to the principles accepted by Arabic logicians, including Samarqandī, our version should be beyond objection and can be considered a wholly correct interpretation of mixed ḥaqīqī-khārijī syllogisms. We will examine the khārijī-ḥaqīqī and ḥaqīqī-khārijī mixes separately within each of the four traditional figures of syllogism. We will determine the sterile and productive mood-mixes on a case-by-case basis and elucidate the true conclusions of each productive mood-mix individually. The systematic study of counterexamples for the sterile mood-mixes will be deferred to future research.

Hypothetical logic has a special place in the tradition of Avicennan logic. In this tradition, various opinions have been presented about the conditions of the truth of hypothetical sentences and the conditions of syllogisms with hypothetical premises. One of the most prominent Avicennan logicians who discussed it is Shams al-Dīn Samarqandī.  The truth of singular cogent hypotheticals is a special topic of Samarqandī about hypotheticals. His analysis of this type of hypotheticals finally led to limiting the number of hypothetical syllogisms. In this article, I compare the opinions of Samarqandī about the conditions for the truth of singular cogent hypotheticals with the opinions of Fakhruddīn Rāzī and Abdullah Jīlanī. I show that the origin of the differences between these logicians is the difference in their interpretations of Avicenna's texts about quantifiers of hypotheticals.

In this paper, we show that the extant manuscripts of Shams al-Dīn Samarqandī’s logical books Qisṭās al-afkār and Sharḥ al-Qisṭās exhibit a double version of exposition of mixed syllogisms which are composed of khārijī, ḥaqīqī and mental readings of quantified categorical propositions. This duble version presents different or even conflicting judgements on those mixed syllogisms. Because of the chronological precedence of one group of the manuscripts over the other, we call these two expositions "first version" and "second version," respectively. In addition, the manuscripts of both versions are divided into two groups. In one group, at the beginning of the section of propositions, when introducing the division of propositions into khārijī, ḥaqīqī and mental, a phrase is added to the manuscripts, which is only consistent with the contents of the second version. Since in the logical tradition in the Islamic world we have found the issue of mixed syllogisms composed of the three propositions only in these two works of Samarqandī, the importance of these two versions and of the added phrase is doubled and it must be examined whether the added phrase and the second version are from Samarqandī himself or from another scholar. In the present article, we will introduce the differences between the two versions and try to explain their relationship. In the end, we will critically edit the texts of these two versions in full.

Shams al-Din Samarqandi in his books Qistas al-afkar and Sharh al-Qistas presented two new analyses of the khariji, haqiqi and mental propositions which are different from those of his predecessors. He held relations among these propositions which have new consequences on the inferential relations between them. Samarqandi conditioned the khariji proposition on the "external existence" of its subject and predicate, also conditioned the haqiqi proposition on the "possibility" of the external existence of its subject and predicate, and considered the mental proposition unconditional to these two conditions. He has also regarded the khariji as implying the haqiqi and the haqiqi as implying the mental, all these in the affirmative propositions and the converse of these relations in the negatives, without distinguishing the universals from the particulars. These inferential relations claimed by Samarqandi are different from those expressed in the works of other Muslim logicians such as Afzal al-Din Khunaji and Qutb al-Din Razi, who seem to be the only Muslim logicians who have explicitly discussed this issue. In this article, we have analyzed and critiqued the claims of Samarqandi and shown that the inferential relations claimed by him do not correspond to the examples he gives for khariji, haqiqi and mental propositions, and are therefore not accurate enough.

Shams al-Din Samarqandi, a seventh Iranian logician, has proposed a new theory on conditional syllogism against Avicenna. Avicenna believed that conditional syllogism had only 19 valid moods; but Samarqandi, denying this similarity, validated only 7 moods. Samarqandi considered in his analysis only the quality conditions of the syllogism and did not pay attention to quantity conditions and in providing counterexamples for the invalid moods, he ignored their quantificational differences. If we consider just quality, as Samarqandi did, we’ll find a surprising similarity between his valid moods and the contemporary relevance logic, so that all Samarqandi’s valid moods are valid in relevance logic and vice versa. But if we look at the quantity of the propositions involved, we’ll encounter some difficulties, which are rooted in his interpretation of conditional quantifiers.