جستجوی مقالات مرتبط با کلیدواژه « intersubjectivity » در نشریات گروه « فلسفه و کلام »

In today's philosophy, the possibility of harmony, closeness and mixing of different fields, including the field of literature and philosophy, has been provided. The purpose of this article is to examine the phenomenological aesthetics of the works of Simon de Beauvoir, a famous philosopher and writer of the 20th century, and to explain the positive consequences of this creative attitude. In fact, de Beauvoir writes philosophically and in the form of writing a metaphysical novel, he brings literature and philosophy closer to each other. More than a writer, he is an artist who cultivates ideas about art and literature through his thoughtful texts and fiction works. Simon de Beauvoir is not a phenomenologist, but his thoughts have the talent of phenomenological reading, as his attention to intentionality, inter-subjective relationship, individual, experience, other and self-loneliness, has made his works worthy of phenomenological study and research. The present article aims to provide the possibility of such a reading of his works by briefly reviewing the concepts raised in de Beauvoir's works.

Kant argued that in order to bring about validity for knowledge we have to make a paradigm shift. The paradigm shift which was well known as copernican revolution was based on this assumption that the one who observing could be able to determinate objects. For Kant subject as observer has the ability to determine the world transcendentally. For Hegel the Kantian paradigm shift count as subjetivising the objectivity. He blames Kant for not seeing this basic fact that, subject himself become in the objectivity and the relation could not be as Kant was assuming. Hegel by replacing the transcendental I with Giest attempts to instead of making objectivity, subjective, do the reverse. In this article we argue that by objectivizing the subjectivity, Hegel not inly became able to overcome the problems posed by Kantian philosophy but also assumes subjectivity as intrinsically intersubjective

Focusing on the criteria of truth and falsity and what it is as one of the most key topics in the field of epistemology has always been discussed. Correspondence, coherence, pragmatism, relativism and assertively redundancy are the main theories of truth in the history of thought. In matching perception, meaning depends on matching with reality. Avoiding logical coherence and focusing on organizational and institutional coherence is the focus of the second approach. Pragmatists also think that function is the criterion for evaluating propositions. The diversity of relativists' perception is also the result of focusing on the difference of perceptual structures in passivity from external belonging. Finally, assertively redundancy's theory of statement does not give independence to truth. The root of the diversity and difference of the mentioned theories should be found in the quality of explanation of the relationship between the subject and object. The present article aims to analyze and examine the concepts that have been influential in the development of the theories of truth and have played the greatest role in the transformation of the concepts of subjectivity and the world into intersubjectivity and lifeworld by focusing on some influential currents in both continental and analytical currents. And how the relationship between the subject and the object has changed from relationship to inter relation.

The concept of reality is one of the challenges we are concerned about nowadays in the philosophy of physics. In fact, this challenge has risen with the advent of quantum mechanics, a challenge that frustrated Einstein with quantum mechanics, of which he was a co-founder, and led him to consider it incomplete (EPR, 1935). According to Einstein, due to this "incompleteness", quantum mechanics -in addition to the standard variables- needs complementary variables that are hidden. These kinds of hidden variables theories are not discussed here. The purpose of this paper is to study the concept of reality in standard quantum mechanics that considers its dominant interpretation, i.e. the Copenhagen interpretation with the principal contribution of Bohr and Heisenberg. This interpretation is very close to logical positivism and the Vienna circle; but it is not. Therefore, in this article, we will examine the views of Bohr and Heisenberg and scientific positivism and their interpretation of "reality." There are elements of reality that are not affected by our knowledge, they have been criticized by empiricist and positivist philosophers, who believe that in any case "physical reality" cannot be more than what we know about it and we are talking about it. This interpretation of "reality" which is based on intersubjectivity, in the second half of the twentieth century, has been influential in other sciences from chemistry to literature and has become a paradigm, also it has affected the human mind. In modern social science "construction of social reality" can be made by something that everyone knows or a "collective intentionality". In reality, this criterion leads humans to the creation of "hyperreality" -a valid forgery or a copy without origin- instead of "reality". "hyperreality" is defined as the conscious inability to distinguish between "simulation" and "reality", especially in advanced postmodern industrial societies, where reality and imagination are entangled and indistinguishable (Baofu, 2009).

Method of Study: 

A comparative method has been used between physics and social science to show how the concepts and paradigms in physics could affect the human mind.

As a result of this research, base of some misconceptions in the modern era have been extracted and also shown their effects, for example, bliss is misunderstood, and a high rate of suicide in modern countries is a consequence of it.

Although quantum mechanics has had experimental successes, its interpretations have fundamental and unanswered problems, and these two (experimental successes of quantum mechanics and interpretations) are two completely independent and separate things that it is wrong to equate them. This mistake has led to the authenticity of anti-realist philosophies. Thus, "weak objectivity" has become the criterion of all reality. The requirement of weak objectivity is communicable", that is, the reality is intersubjective. Hence, in science, "communicability" is the measure of existing scientific reality. Regarding this definition of scientific reality, for example, the media can construct a "social reality" in what is made as "collective intentionality" which is not real, it is a "hyperreality".

This article proposes of analyzing and investigating Husserl's approach to other’s constitutions, as alter ego. What emerges from Husserl's statement in the fifth meditation of Cartesian meditations is the other’s constitution as a commencement for the foundation of a world in which objectivity is available to all. Husserl calls this world intersubjective. Husserl's account of this constitution includes two basic steps: In the first step, the second reduction implements, by which all intentions, motivations, meanings, etc., aimed at others other than me, are neglected. Then, by expressing the character of the other’s perception as an indirect presence, the meaning of the other is transferred from my body to the other’s body, through an assimilative apperception and by a meaning transfer in the pairing process. At least three serious criticisms can make of this description: (1) The second epoché removes all the meanings directed at the other from the ego. Therefore, any reference to the other that is supposed to acquire its meaning from the ego excludes. In the transcendental sphere, the second epoché takes place by abstracting from everything gives to me as something other than myself; therefore, what remains after the execution of this epoché is only "I." In the second epoché, everything that concerns explicitly I leaves me in what Husserl calls "the special sphere of ownness." This reduction includes the decision only to consider what belongs to me; therefore, to find how "I" gives meaning to the subjects who are bodies as perceptual objects belonging to this reduced sphere of "ownness" and also to discover those capacities that transcended as subjects, this reduction implements. (2) Husserl's description of the body leaves out many aspects of it, And even at the starting point, it does not consider the perceptual difference between the perception of my body and the body of others. He emphasizes the claim that a person's own body is uniquely separated from other animal and human bodies. A person may be supposed to experience this body as an organism when he attributes to its feelings, perceptions, and meaningful actions. Husserl's description of a person's experience of his own body seems to be a particularly limited experience, because Husserl fails to explain the vast part of physical experiences that are known as experiences beyond one's control. Such descriptions of the body seem to be more suitable for mechanical beings that rely on the governance and control of the body.(3) Husserl's statement to distinguish between organism and pseudo-organism is unclear, obscure, and unsatisfactory. Expressing ambiguous terms such as variable but harmonious behavior, as well as not providing a criterion to recognize the harmonious behavior of an organism, are among the things that make Husserl's description difficult. First, in this type of reasoning, it is usually not clear how much improvisation - that is, how many observers apart from the revealed other - is needed to ensure a sufficient number of cases of harmonious behavior. Second, it is also unclear what one should do when faced with another person without having the opportunity to observe their behavior several times. That is, it is unclear to what extent single behaviors or limited behaviors can demonstrate the criterion of behavior harmony.As a conclusion, regarding (1), (2) and (3), despite Husserl's remarkable insights, suggest that the constitution of alter ego appears to have problems that are far from being resolved.

Kant considers the nature of rules of the taste to be interested, but at the same time believes that an objective basis can be found for the totality of these rulings in the power of judgment. First, given the coexistence of subjective and intersubjective elements in Kant's theory of interest, what relation does he establish between the subjective and the intersubjective judgments of taste? To answer this question, in the first part, while examining the logical features of the aesthetical sentence, we show that this sentence, in his view, is an aesthetic sentence that is issued in complete freedom and autonomy of the subject and by the other has a certain kind of general validity in its content. This kind of general validity, since it is purely based on transcendental structures which are common among all judgmental subjects, also has an intersubjective aspect, which Kant calls the names of subjective generality, aesthetic generality, and universal validity.  Second, how does Kant strike a relation between the subjective and the intersubjective? To answer this question, in the second part, we argue that Kant, although he believes in the subjectivity of the judgment of taste, considers this subjectivity to be of a special kind, which is the other aspect of intersubjectivity. For this purpose, we first try to explain the meaning of the subjectivity of the judgment of interest, and then to clarify the intersubjective aspect of this meaning. Finally, we show that Kant, based on the intersubjective validity he finds in the judgment of interest, considers the faculty of interest as a capacity for empathy between subjects and to bring them out of isolation.

Life-world, means the world as it is experienced and lived, is a concept that was first born in Husserl's phenomenology and later used in various fields. Alfred Schutz, the founder of phenomenological sociology, who sought to establish a theoretical basis for interpretive sociology, applied the concept to study of mental structures in everyday life and used it in sociology. The present article seeks to answer the question, what changes did life-world undergo in Schutz's thought. The result of this study shows that Schutz establishes a dialectical relationship between individual consciousness and life-world, in such a way that each constructs and influences the other. Unlike Husserl, who saw life-world as the only comprehensible reality, he referred to the multiple layers of reality and considered Husserl's term transcendence appropriate for rotation between these layers, while Husserl used “transcendence” only to awareness of another experience. In addition, Schutz does not consider transcendental phenomenology as a proper basis for the social sciences, and instead of the transcendental ego, he uses the mundane ego for his plan.

In modern philosophy, Hegel recognized the crisis which he believed arose from the finitude and particularity of the subjective approach to consciousness, and the skepticism and alienation of consciousness from reality as a result. Thus, one of the things that Hegel considered a fundamental issue for philosophy, especially in the Jena period of his thought, was the resolution of this crisis. By focusing on the chapter of self-consciousness in Phenomenology of the Spirit, this article examines and analyzes one of the most important aspects of Hegel's attempt to eliminate this crisis that emerged in the theory of mutual recognition and intersubjective approach to consciousness. This paper will show how adopting an individualistic view of consciousness and acknowledging the immediacy of transcendental consciousness as a condition for the possibility of consciousness always causes fundamental conflicts in cognition. I will also show that mediation provided by the supposed recognition of intersubjective interactions is needed to overcome these conflicts. Finally, the claim that subjectivity finds the possibility of universality in which the gap between consciousness and reality is disappeared, not in some kind of internal relationship with itself, but through its acceptance and recognition, is introduced as Hegel's important vision in phenomenology for resolving this crisis.

Husserl thinks of philosophy as a general, fundamental and apodictic science of world. He set out to found transcendental phenomenology as general philosophy or apodictic science, but he ought to explain the possibility of objective knowledge of world as to reach to this point. Concerning about crisis in modern western culture, Crisis projects his view of philosophy and of duty of philosopher in context of a critics of modern philosophy and science concerns about crisis in modern western culture. So he introduces the original concept life-world that is a novel idea for the philosophy as general science. The paper is to consider the Husserl's point of view on relation between philosophy and crisis of modern culture and to review the question if life-world can introduce Husserl's transcendental phenomenology as a fundamental philosophy and general science. We consider the problem of possibility of objectivity of world, a problem that proposed in late philosophy of Husserl in more extensive and innovative form.

From a phenomenological perspective, we review the concept of empathy in medicine to identify the theoretical obstacles which have prevented reaching intersubjectivity and proper understanding. Where medicine has failed are: attending to subjectivities of patient and physician, recognizing the dynamic nature of empathy and acknowledging context-dependency of empathy. We also review the problematic practical consequences of this theoretical failure including serving medical paternalism, hindering medical practice, and being used as a tool for counterbalancing inadequate health budget and serving political power. Thus, using and interdisciplinary approach, we argue why the concept of empathy in medicine needs to be reviewed under the light of phenomenology and progress in line with second wave of medical humanities; put philosophy at its core to once again integrate proper understanding of the patient with the concept of medicine .

Fichte, In the book of the foundations of the natural right, in a Double-sided dialectic, not only deduces the concept of the right in beginning from abstract terms such as rational being, activity, freedom, consciousness, another, and the concept of intersubjectivity, but, at the same time the inclusion of all those terms is realized on the basis of the concept and principle of the right. Therefore, in the intellectual system of Fichte, all these concepts form a complex set understood only with each other, because they are created dialectically from each other and can only be realized with each other. But at the end of the way, due to the inference of the law of right and all its proportions through reason, we will show the free rational being Timely and logically as the head of the pyramid of the strategic terms of the philosophy of right and politics of Fichte. In the following, to realize its law of right and guarantee it to people in the outside world, Fichte deduce the commonwealth (as the will of the public) and politics as the state science, and consider this new science as a servant of right that The basis of its essence has a priori been derived from free rational being.

One of the main issues in explaining the phenomenon of diversity of religions in the world is the issue of religions ranking; i.e. the question of whether religions are essentially comparable or not! And if it is comparable, what is the criterion and criterion of this comparison? It seems that the border between two different positions in explaining the phenomenon of religious plurality, namely relativism and religious pluralism, comes from the accuracy of the issue of religions ranking. In this article, we will speak of two main representatives of these two trends by proposing and examining this problem and among the religious relativists we refer to Ernest Troeltsch and to John Hick from religious pluralism. This article seeks to put these two theories together and remind them of their similarities and reveal their fundamental differences. Briefly, it can be noted that the major similarity between Troeltsch and Hick is to rely on cultural categories in the consistency of religious awareness, while the fundamental difference between them is the observation of objectivity or subjectivity in their grading criteria. In the end, Hick claims that although religions are comparable in principle, but practically the result of this comparing is the equivalence of religion’s Truth-claims, while Troeltsch says it's basically impossible to compare religions, اowever, in his original statements, he clearly states that in practice, Christianity is superior to other religions. Of course, in his later remarks, he reviews this result and claims that religions are only relative in absolute terms and he claims absolute religions are relative only.

The problem of "other minds" as one of the most serious epistemological problems in philosophy derives from Descartes' dualism. Since then, several solutions have been proposed for this issue. But each of these solutions faced with some problems. In contrast to the classical philosophy and the tradition of analytic philosophy, Heidegger describes the origin of this problem and the solutions, to which it has been addressed, Heidegger's inaccurate analysis of man, the world, and the relation between the two, as well as many other epistemological issues. Heidegger transmits and dissolves the problem of other minds from the scope of epistemology to the ontological domain. His approach shows how an unrealistic and illegitimate problem arising from the inaccurate analysis of man and the world, and the relationship between the two, has become an epistemic and undisputed problem. Heidegger shows that not only this issue, but any other epistemological problem, can only be found in a particular kind of ontology. Self-disciplined subject is only in traditional philosophy that wanders in determining its mission to the world and others. According to her analysis, every human being is with others and he faces others in practical life. This encounter does not leave an epistemic controversy in others.

Husserl، besides Dilthey and Heidegger، is one of the most important philosophers who had big influence on Gadamer and is the philosopher who is frequently referred to in his works. Gadamer’s encounter with Husserl، in spite of his greatness in the eyes of Gadamer، was always a hermeneutical one. Considering and criticizing Husselr’s phenomenology، Gadamer tries to discover his unspoken thoughts. Few scholars have even considered Gadamer and Husserl’s relationships، which among them much more are people who tried to trace the influence of Husserl in Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics. Instead، here، we will reveal and highlight the Gadamer’s critical views of the key concepts of Husserl''s phenomenology such as subjectivity، pure perception، intersubjectivity، transcendental ego، and alter ego. We believe Gadamer practically remained loyal to his hermeneutical approach. Instead of just repeating the thoughts، he goes behind them and opens new horizons.

Phenomenology of religion، especially in 20th century، as a method or an approach in study of religion، was applied like a Supplementary method for history of religion to discover a unit “essence” from plural phenomena. On the other hand، for commitment to methodology basics is required _ which is mostly influenced by Edmund Husserl`s phenomenology _ “reality” of religion is considered as an intersubjective reality that is substantively different from theological reality. In this essay، it is attempted to explain the distinction between firstly “essence” and “reality” of religion in phenomenology of religion and secondly phenomenological and theological reality of religion by expressing distinctions and similarities of phenomenology of religion and phenomenology of Husserl. In Conclusion، it is pointed that paying no attention to this important distinction leads to failure in religious studies، including phenomenological studies.

Donald Davidson seriously criticizes the Cartesian conception of the dichotomy of the subjective and the objective and treats it as the root of some significant problems of modern philosophy. This dualism, he thinks, is based on a certain conception of the relation of man and the world which pictures an essential divergence and disconnection between them; a divergence the clear presence of which is in the abyss between objectivity and subjectivity. Davidson argues for a firm and intrinsic connection between man and the world. In this paper I refer to the idea backs this argumentation with the title of "the worldlihood of man" and try to explore the roots of this idea in Davidson's philosophy. I concentrate specially on three basic characteristics of human beings by analysis of which Davidson takes us directly into the world: having mind, rationality and agency. I will argue that in Davidson's view the constitutive characteristics of human beings develop only in the world, and a human being only in the world can be a human being.

The present article studies Husserl’s solution about the possibility of knowledge. This solution expresses itself in the constitutive analyses that he has made. By using Decartes’methodic doubt، Husserl establishes pure consciousness. Then he describes phenomenologically its data and shows how to be constituted phenomena in consciousness. After explaining the process of the constitution of material nature and of animal nature and of spiritual world، I argue about the criterion of truth and objectivity

Transcendental Ego is the principle of principles that philosophizationof great philosophers such as Husserl has been based upon it. Husserl,too, as a follower of Descartes meditations and philosophy withattemption in intentionality of transcendental ego accepts it as the baseof principles of philosophization and declares himself as a NewCartesian. In this study, the author develops an original reading of theCartesian Meditation. This text, far from giving rise to a“Transcendental solipsism”, leads to a constitution of intersubjectivityon various levels (“primordial”, “Intersubjective” et “Objective”). In itscenter, a “Phenomenological Construction” operates, i.e. amethodological piece that masters the genetic approach ofintersubjectivity. Closely following the “almost mathematical” rigourof this crucial text of Husserl’s phenomenology, in this way equallytackles the issue of the constitution of the experience of the other andthe truly intersubjective structure of transcendental subjectivity. Thisstudy concludes with the metaphysical results of the analysis of theexperience of the other.