جستجوی مقالات مرتبط با کلیدواژه "dominant position" در نشریات گروه "فقه و حقوق"

Competition in trade is the cause of economic growth and is considered as one of the principles of economic development in countries and it leads to commercial success,which has caused the creation of laws under the title of commercial competition rules by the legislator.One of the main topics of competition law is the abuse of a dominant position.Contemplation among different legal and criminal laws indicates the existence of many legal articles that are charged to the wrongful company or manager according to the type of crime or violation. In the current research,the limits of the powers of thecompetition council in terminating the contracts that are based on the dominant position and everything related to the abuse of the dominant position are examined in order to clarify the guarantee of the implementation of the abuse of the dominant position compared to the contracts concluded based on the powers of the competition council.How is that?Are such contracts can be terminated or not and who are the beneficiaries of such claims?Finally, in which authority can the appeal against the decisions of the competition council be made in terminating the contract?Through the investigation,it was found that the competition council has the authority to terminate the contract in different ways and regarding the possibility of appealing the decision of the competition council, it should be acknowledged that the decision issued by the appeals board of the competition council can be contested and finally as an administrative decision can be contested in the court of justice.

Intelligent transportation systems as a new context for the transfer of urban travel applicants have a platform economy model, gig-based and sharing, and technology based on artificial intelligence and big data, that attracts the most.resources in the market operate on two sides. Some players prefer to use these resources exclusively, so they will apply this restriction to drivers as a partners to service provider in order not to cooperate with competitors. The findings of this research show that the identification and analysis of this restriction by the regulator or the competent authority will not be as simple as the previous cooperation restrictions, such as non-competition agreements.Issues such as the placement of hyperlinks to create a legitimate agreement, the direction of travel sending algorithms, matching and pricing for action, or inducing limitations, or software justifications, are all actions that indicate the creation of limitations. After identifying and analyzing the legitimacy of their actions, it is not as simple as identifying the nature of their legal relations. We do not accept this prevention due to their self-proclaimed nature as intermediary, but the main focus of the actions will be on the market power and the scope of the prevention by the systems between the simultaneous use or simultaneous installation of platforms, which will often result in illegitimacy. By respecting the freedom of competition and not giving unreasonable support to competitors, the business structure and the issues of maintaining the two-sided market network and examining the actual barriers to entry, we will show that the creation of this restriction under the rules It is acceptable or based on the above variables, it will lead to a change in the burden of proof. This situation can be seen in the realm of legal forms known for obstruction as well as competitive procedures.

One of the subjects of the argument in the competition law is discriminatory transactions; the meaning of discriminatory transactions is any contract that, even though their situation is the same, there is unjustifiable discrimination in one of them. These transactions are anti-competition, and they are prohibited actions in competition law. The authors surveyed the basics of prohibiting discriminatory transactions in this article. This article showed the basics of the prohibition of discriminatory transactions in the USA, containing: Consumer welfare, the fight against monopoly, and market support in a free market system. Also, in the European Union, the basics protect the subscriber market and competitive structures. In Iran, these transactions are prohibited based on not being allowed to abuse the right, public order, and Jurisprudential rules such as the rule of no harm and the prohibition of disrupting the system. Therefore, despite the economic viewpoints against the prohibition of these contracts, there are still solid legal reasons and grounds that it is necessary to prohibit these transactions under certain conditions. The research method is comparative, and the economic and legal grounds for banning these transactions have been examined in the three legal systems of the United States, the European Union, and Iran.

Conclusion of codeshare agreement between international and domestic airlines at first was emerged as a way to advertising, but currently it is used as a strategic approach to gain market share and consequently creating a dominant position for airline services market. One of the legal issues of these agreements is doubt raised about their anti-competitive nature. The results of this research, that is a comparative study of the subject in related legal systems in a descriptive-analytic method, indicate that based on the type of the agreement and its specific characteristics, scope of activity and parties’ share in the market, both aspects-competitive and anticompetitive- are probable in these agreements. Furthermore, although competition law has no clear position as to these types of agreements in various legal systems, legally speaking, such agreements should be investigated case by case and a general rule should not be prescribed for all of their examples.

Normally, the common intention and goal of the parties to the contract is the full implementation of its provisions. To prevent breach of contract and fulfill the common will of the parties, there are several performance guarantees that One of them is the provision of a certain amount in the contract as a liquidated damages. The purpose of this study is to investigate the effect of this performance guarantee on general and competitive rules. In this regard, the nature and legal effects of this method have been studied to answer this main question that What is the nature and legal effects of liquidated damages in applicable legal systems, and which approach is more compatible with reciprocal justice and the purpose of the contract? In addition to the general rules, in competitive rules, the application of anti-competitive practices upsets the relative balance of power between the parties to the contract.The effect of including this performance guarantee in accordance with the general rules is three approaches: Absolute application - such as Iranian law and French law before the 1975 reforms; The invalidity of the condition - in the system of common law and the application and execution of partial damages with the possibility of adjusting it to unreasonable and exaggerated conditions (UNIDROIT principles, PECL and French law after the 1975 amendments).

Today companies acquire other corporations to overcome their competitors. Directors of companies use these strategies for obtaining more portions in competitive markets and increasing business power. But these policies can be regarded as destructive matters which damage market's competitive order. So in such situation we need restrictive policies of competition law. For controlling acquisitions, every legal system has its own policy. Sometimes these policies have fundamental differences with each other which result in diverse views. Differences between particular acquisition policies, are main factors which determine the way of confrontation by competition authorities. As much as these policies are more efficient, the control process of competition authorities would be more favourable. In this way the most important question is what is the best strategy for controlling acquisitions? This paper is going to analyze different approaches in U.S and E.U law in competition issues of acquisitions and compare them with Iranian law views, drawing an efficient strategy for controlling acquisitions in competitive markets. In this way, the most impressive policy is one which considers structural differences between merger and acquisition and provides exhaustive control on diverse aspects of latter one. It shouldn't concentrate on merely some competition disrupting aspects of acquisitions such as misuse of dominant position.

There are many agreements for transferring technology, but license agreement is the most important agreement in this regard. According to the mentioned agreement, the owner of patent or technology as licensor grants the license to licensee in specific duration and in a given territory. Exclusive rights of licensor and the objectives of competition law, including the welfare of consumers or preventing monopoly in competition may create a challenge between exclusive rights of licensor and competition law. In other words, it is probable that imposing some restrictions on licensee in using the technology may result in distortion of competition in relevant market, reduction of competitors and prevention of new entrants to the market. On the other hand, the failure to maintain the security of innovation of inventor and the lack of its legal support will destroy the incentive of the creation of new technologies and finally lead to market failure and absence of competition. Therefore, licensing agreements can provoke more concerns of competition law. Rules and aims of competition law must order the economic policy in a community in such a way that provide welfare of consumers and at the same time, the competition in the market does not confront restriction and the monopoly or misuse does not occur. On the other hand, in licensing agreements, intellectual property rights are accompanied by some kind of exclusivity which can allow the owner to impose some restrictions on the licensee. Although the exclusivity of intellectual property rights is desired, it should not endanger the welfare of consumers and aims of competition law. The restrictions on licensee could be price or non-price restrictions. The price restrictions are the ones that their subject is relevant to price or they directly affect the price of products in the market. However, the discussion of the current article is non-price restrictions that are the ones that their effects and subject are irrelevant to price but their main effect is on the other aspects of the market positively or negatively. The most important non-price restrictions are grant-back clause, tying arrangements, sale restrictions, output restriction, field of use restriction and non-compete clause. In fact, we regard these restrictions from competition law point of view and the main question here is whether the competition law looks at all non-price restrictions in licensing agreements in the same way and recognizes them as a distortion of competition or does not consider some of them anti-competitive due to their pro-competitive effects. Moreover, for comprehensive study of all of these restrictions it is important to verify whether the distortion of competition - regardless of its legal aspects- depends on various economic elements such as the market share of parties, kind of relevant technology market, dominant position or not and if the answer is positive what is the scope of such dependency and whether there is a specified standard or not. To answer these questions, three legal systems of Iran, the U. S. and the E. U. have been examined comparatively in the article. The current research is a fundamental study and exploits the analytical-descriptive method and uses the library method and digital or classic note taking for data collection. Of course, various legal systems take different solutions in meeting challenges due to their different frameworks. But, the comparative study of developed systems can open new horizons for some countries like Iran which has less than a decade experience in competition law legislation. The study shows that the Iranian legislation in this regard requires some amendments so that it can establish a more suitable equilibrium between competition regulations and technology transfer law. For instance, although E.U. regulations have provided some exemptions from competition law prohibitions for licensing agreements, Iranian statutes have not enacted any exemption in this regard and it will result in an illogical contrast between competition law in intellectual property law. Also, the mentioned subject may endanger the incentive for innovations and inventions. Due to the aforesaid concerns, the enactment of some exact and standard exemptions for licensing agreements by Iranian legislature is recommended in the current article. Also, the E.U. regulations have provided more clarity about the prohibition possibility of licensing agreements for activists in the intellectual property field because an exact market share has been mentioned as the prohibition border and thereby the duties of the license holders have been clarified. However, Iranian statutes have not provided any clear and specified border for economic dominant position or market share and therefore, it is not clear exactly that how much market share can put the licensor in a dominant position. So, it has been advised in the article that the Iranian Legislature enact the exact threshold of market share for dominance standard separately for vertical and horizontal licensing contracts. Unlike the U.S. and E.U. statutes that have provided some special competition rules for licensing agreements, Iranian legal system does not have any particular competition rules for such agreements and general competition standards apply in the field. Therefore, it has been suggested that Iranian legislature by tapping the experiences of two mentioned legal systems provide some special provisions in the field so it can result in more efficiency.