جستجوی مقالات مرتبط با کلیدواژه "moral luck" در نشریات گروه "فقه و حقوق"

Moral luck is a relatively new concept in the philosophy of ethics,the moral intuition of many people in the society dictates that people should be evaluated only because of the things under their control,but when we deal with countless minor cases,the agents are evaluated morally in terms of cases.We grant that they are not in their control,so luck occurs when an important aspect of what a person is evaluated for depends on factors beyond his control - such as the results of a person's actions,situations and circumstances,institutions and who a person is and circumstances. antecedent-dependent,but we still consider him responsible.The question that arises here is whether we can blame people for actions and results that are not under their control. be responsible?In this regard,the types of consequential,situational,institutional and causal luck have been examined, which,due to their connection with the subject of coercion and free will,considered the approach of compatibilists to be more suitable with moral luck,and the moral responsibility of the agent has also been examined in terms of accountability and attribution.and considering that one of the types of moral luck is the resulting luck and the result element plays an important role in determining the criminal responsibility and punishment in many crimes, the analysis of the effects of acceptance and denial of luck and the opinions of opposing and agreeing thinkers have been analyzed. Moral luck has been criticized,therefore,if we accept the approach of the opponents of moral luck, we must witness many changes in the legal systems and criminal laws,and by accepting the arguments of the proponents of moral luck, the current procedures of the laws will be preserved. It is believed that the results of people's actions, which are beyond the control of the person, are effective in the responsibility and punishment of the person

The criminal field in Law study has long been open to many ethical debates. The emerging issue of moral luck quickly reflected itself in criminal law conversations. This article has discussed one of the types of moral luck, that is, consequential luck, in the discussion between the moral philosophy and criminal law. Consequential moral luck means that the result of the perpetrator's behaviour is effective on his moral evaluation. Consequence criminal luck is also defined as the result of the perpetrator's behaviour is effective on his criminal fate. In this article, after precise conceptual demarcation, an attempt has been made to correctly determine the center of ambiguity and to process the question of the topic of discussion carefully. The present article shows that there is no consequential moral luck, unlike consequential criminal luck. In ethics, blameworthiness is the ultimate point. In criminal law, blameworthiness is the beginning; It is a necessary but insufficient condition. This important feature, along with other rules such as expressiveness of punishment and minimality of criminal law, distinguishes the path of criminal law from moral discussions in the issue of consequential luck.

The term ‘moral luck’ refers to the influence of factors based on luck on moral judgements about human actions. Hereditary and regulative characteristics, temporal and spatial situations, as well as unforeseeable or unmonitored consequences, are among the most distinguished factors based on luck. Scholars of ethics have proposed different answers to solve this challenge that how to make a fair moral judgement despite the existence of luck-based factors. In a similar challenge, the Uṣūlīs have also tried to analyze the issue of deserving afterlife punishment according to the influence of involuntary factors on human actions. This study has identified and criticized the approaches of Uṣūlīs regarding the mentioned issue. As a result, Uṣūlīs often accept that things based on luck, which are involuntary and out of control cannot be considered involved in punishment. But, their understanding of these concepts is different. The beliefs, classifications and solutions presented by the Uṣūlīs in this issue have significant similarities and commonalities with the beliefs of scholars of ethics regarding the issue of moral luck.

Moral luck, which is a new concept in moral philosophy, challenges our ordinary moral evaluation. According to human's moral intuition, people are only evaluated for their controllable behaviors. However, while people have no control over results of their behaviors, results are effective in our moral judgments. This issue, in its turn, raises an essential question in criminal law: are people responsible for their behaviors in cases they have no control over the results of their behaviors? While theorists who agree with moral resultant luck are trying to theorize the existing and prominent practices in penal codes, others who oppose this idea attempt to neutralize the role of results in criminal responsibility. As a result, they believe that criminal legal systems should impose equal punishment on offenders who commit the same conducts regardless of different results as far as they simply stem from moral luck. Consequently, if the proponents' arguments in favor of moral resultant luck are persuasive, the prominent approach in criminal law would be established. On the other hand, if the opponents' opinions against moral resultant luck are stronger, then significant changes would happen in penal code and criminal titles.