جستجوی مقالات مرتبط با کلیدواژه "رقابت بانکی" در نشریات گروه "اقتصاد"

Bank competition and financial stability is one of recent topics which researchers have paid attention since global financial crisis. This study is investigating the effect of competition on systemic stability in Iran’s banking system.Statistical population is all Iranian banks under supervision of centeral bank and our sample consist of 20 banks in period of 2009 and 2021. Lerner index and Herfindahl–Hirschman index are proxies of market power and concentration respectively. ΔCoVaR is our systemic risk measure which can be decomposed into its components.Lerner index had a statistically significant positive relationship with ΔCoVaR while HHI didn’t. Market power haven’t shown any effect on idiosyncratic tail risk and the risk caused by macroeconomic and financial factors, as well as the combination of the two, and in other words, it doesn’t affect the overall systemic risk through this channel. However, the HHI has had a positive and significant effect. Also, market power has a positive and significant relationship with the interconnectedness component, while the concentration index has not shown a significant relationship.This study has proven that the more competitive system, the more stable. Meanwhile, market power affects systemic risk through interconnectedness, but idiosyncratic risk is the effective channel for concentration.

The present study aims to investigate the effect of Foreign Bank Penetration and Banking Competition on credit risk in the banking system. In this regard، using a set of data taken from the Global Financial Development Database provided by the World Bank and the availability of data, 42 Asian countries during the 1999-2019 period as a research sample and using the correlation method through panel econometric models. The results showed: There are complex relationships between foreign bank penetration، competition and credit risk in banking، depending on the measurement of foreign bank penetration and competition. the increased number of foreign banks، not higher foreign banks’ assets، contribute to alleviating nonperforming loans and bank credit risk. However، the negative relationship between the number of foreign banks and nonperforming loans and credit risk is conditional on the measurement of the country's bank competition. The concentration and market power in banking exhibit a different impact on bank credit risk، particularly when both variables are interacted with foreign bank penetration. The increased presence of foreign banks is therefore detrimental for bank-asset quality in countries، particularly when the banking market is highly concentrated. The increased presence of foreign banks can reduce nonperforming loans when the bank is too concentrated. Therefore, providing incentives for the banking industry to avoid cross-selling strategies in boosting noninterest income is also worth considering, given the fact that changes in nonperforming loans due to foreign penetration and competition in banking can be partly explained by changes in noninterest income

The purpose of this article was to assess competition and financial stability in the country's banking system by assessing capital and losses in times of crisis. In this study, using statistical information of banks listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange for the period 2006-2018, using the method of panel autoregression data, the relationship between macroeconomic variables with banking stability and banking competition was examined. The results showed that economic growth has led to an increase in banking stability and banking competition among the country's banks. On the other hand, banking stability has had a positive and significant impact on economic growth and banking competition. Finally, the results of the action-response charts and analysis of variance showed that the shock of the banking competition led to a positive reaction to economic growth and banking stability. The results indicate a significant relationship between competition and stability and confirming the view of fragility competition in Iran's banking industry. Also, the results of Granjer causality test showed the existence of a two-way relationship between the variables.

In the case of a liquidity shortage crisis, illiquid banks start to compete in the deposit market to absorb liquidity, in order to prevent fire-selling their assets. This paper attempts to show that in such crisis, not only the competition in the deposit market does not improve the liquidity needs of these banks but it also raises the deposit interest rates in the market, increases the cost of fund for financial institutions and reduces their power to manage their other obligations. The findings indicate that with high liquidity shortages, there is a contagion in the market such that the liquid banks become illiquid too, declining their financial stability. From this perspective, the results provide a theoretical rationale in favor of central bank’s intervention. This study analyzes various central bank policies and regulation which can reduce these inefficiencies in the market and compare their effectiveness; these policies and regulations include: deposit rate cap, cap rates in the interbank market, excluding illiquid banks from entering the interbank market, interbank intervention by injection and short term bailouts.

Banking is one of the most important sectors in each economy. Not only can it affect economic activities but it can also have impact on the stability of economies. Hence, the stability of banking needs a remarkable supervision. Accurses of crises in banking will rapidly grow in other real sectors in economy, because the other sectors refer to banks for acquiring finance resources. Recent economic research focused more on factors that might induce banks to take more risks. Competition is one of these factors. Competition is desirable for maximization of social welfare and existence of Pareto efficiency. As in other industries, competition in banking system is also needed for efficiency and maximization of social welfare. However, banking sector has specific features that make it of particular importance to an economy and properties that may distinguish it from other industries. For example, there is a strong interrelationship between banks and other industries.
Theoretical Framework: Economic theory provides an ambiguous answer to the question how bank competition, bank concentration, and financial stability are related. There are two views about the effect of competition in banking sector on bank's stability: Competition – Fragility (Concentration – Stability) view and Competition – Stability (Concentration – Fragility) view. On the one hand, competition reduces the market power of banks, which reduces the discounted value of the profit that banks are expected to earn in the future. This enhances the incentives for banks to take more risk, because the opportunity costs of going bankrupt are lower (Competition – Fragility). On the other hand, market power in the loan market allows banks to charge higher interest rates. This increases moral hazard and adverse selection, which increases the probability of failure of banks (Competition – Stability). Hence, this paper tries to test correctness of these two views.
The main purpose of this research is analyzing and evaluating the effect of competition in banking sector from 2005 to 2011. The most important variables of this research are bank stability as a function of market structure, control variables at bank level (loans on assets, size and returns on assets) and control variables at macroeconomic level (growth rate, economic freedom and inflation). In order to estimate this model, panel data method was used. When there are repeated observations in the same set of cross-section units, panel data technique is applied. Our model has balanced panel. That is, we have the same number of observations on each cross-section unit.
When a researcher wants to use panel data technique, he faces with three types of models, namely, pooled model, random effects model, and fixed effects model. The pooled estimation is the simplest case, which proceeds by essentially ignoring the panel structure of the data. Estimation of this model is straightforward. The assumptions we have made correspond to the classic linear model. Efficient estimation proceeds by stacking the data as already shown and using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). The random effects model has this characteristic; individual effect is uncorrelated with explanatory variables. It is important to stress that the substantive assumption that distinguishes this model from the fixed effects model is that the time-invariant person specific effect is uncorrelated with independent variables. In essence, the random effects model is one way to deal with the fact that T observation on N individuals are not the same as observations on NT different individuals. The solution is straightforward. First, we derive an estimator of the covariance matrix of the error term. Second, we use this covariance structure in our estimator of parameters. While fixed effects model has this characteristic; individual effect is correlated with explanatory variables. Because the fixed effects model starts with this presumption, we must estimate the model conditionally on the presence of the fixed effects.
Our results show a significantly negative/positive relationship between competition (concentration) and bank's stability. Among the other variables, bank's assets has the most (significant) powerful effect on stability. Although this paper provides evidence for the competition – fragility hypothesis and the concentration – stability hypothesis, other studies need to be done to explore the mechanisms how competition and concentration in the banking sector affect financial stability. Furthermore, due to the rapid increase in financial interlink ages, measuring competition becomes harder because a single country might not be the relevant banking market.
Conclusion and Suggestion: Although this study provides evidence for the competition – fragility hypothesis and the concentration – stability hypothesis, other studies need to be done to explore the mechanisms through which competition and concentration in the banking sector affect financial stability. According to the results of this paper, the following suggestions are made for policy makers.
[1] Government and central bank should increase their supervision and control on banking.
[2] Policy makers must enact appropriate and effective rules on banks in which they regard minimum requirement of stability.

In this research bank performance was measured, using variables of: economic value added (EVA), average return on assets (ROAA),  and average return on equity (ROAE).This study was causal comparative research (using past data) and the aim is classified on the basis of the nature of the correlation method on the combined data. The population of the study consisted of all member banks at Tehran Stock Exchange for the period of 1387- 1392. Research findings indicates that 95% variable stock market development and competitiveness of banking, with the dependent variable EVA significant relationship is between the Mean monthly returns of stocks and the development of the banking sector with the dependent variable EVA direct link is established. With95% of all variables except for "the development of the banking sector" have a significant relationship with the dependent variable ROAA. Also there is a positive relationship between monthly returns stocks and market development relationship with the dependent variable ROAA. There is also a significant correlation between all variables except "banking competition" with the dependent variable ROEA. There is a negative correlation between stock market development and the dependent variable ROEA. There is a positive and significant relationship between Mean of monthly returns stocks and the development of the banking with the dependent variable ROEA.

One of the first structural adjustments for the Iranian government is the reformation of the banking system and financial markets. In the present study، the dynamic stochastic general equilibrium DSGE model is employed to provide answers to the following questions of economic policy. Firstly، how are macroeconomic variables changed if competition is increased in the banking industry in terms of deposit services? Secondly، how are macroeconomic variables changed if competition is increased in the banking industry in terms of loan services? The results show that an increased competition in deposits and loans service leads to an increase in production، consumption، investment and employment. However، an increase of competition among banks proves to increasesbenefit of both consumers and producers، but economic variables have a higher sensitivity to the increased competition in the loan sector compared to that in the deposit sector.