جستجوی مقالات مرتبط با کلیدواژه "ownership concentration" در نشریات گروه "اقتصاد"

The impact of corruption on economic activity has been widely discussed in the literature. On the one hand, some believe that bribery motivates bureaucracies to give private-sector economic agents the opportunity to overcome cumbersome regulations. In this case, corruption can improve the efficiency of public resource allocation. The second argument is that more bribery distorts the decisions of private sector and reduces allocation efficiency. In recent decades, extensive studies have been conducted in the field of corruption and its effects on various aspects of economic, social and governance, as well as defining indicators of corruption and providing models for its reflection. Researchers have often examined corruption based on perceptual criteria and nationall level. The novelty of this research is to take advantage of the objective documentation and local dimensions in defining the corruption index. This study, using a local and objective variable of corruption, by comparing sample data consisting of selected companies of Tehran Stock Exchange in areas with higher corruption and areas with lower corruption, examines the relationship between corruption, corporate governance and holding the company's cash at the level of selected companies on the Tehran Stock Exchange, using the panel data method. The results show the negative impact of corruption on companies' cash holdings, while board independence and ownership concentration do not have a significant relationship with cash holdings.

Tax authorities continue to face unresolved corporate tax avoidance issues. Changes in tax systems have led to corporate tax avoidance opportunities to the benefit of shareholders. The purpose of this study is to examine the relationship between concentration of ownership and major customer with tax avoidance and corporate governance criteria (board size, board independence, CEO duality, audit committee size, audit committee independence, financial expertise of audit committee members) as moderating factors are considered in this relationship. The statistical population of the study consisted of the companies listed in Tehran Stock Exchange during the period 2012-2016. Samples were systematically eliminated and 82 companies were studied as sample. The TOPSIS method has been used to rank companies based on corporate governance criteria. Data analysis and hypothesis testing were performed using multivariate regression and panel data. The results of the research hypothesis test indicate that there is a positive and significant relationship between ownership concentration and tax avoidance, and corporate governance undermines this connection. There is also a positive and significant relationship between major customer concentration and tax avoidance, and corporate governance has no significant effect on this relationship.

This study aims investigating Impact of corporate governance mechanisms on risk-taking behavior of Listed Companies in Tehran Stock Exchange. Researches show that costs of risk management failure is ignored in private and state enterprises, while risk taking is an essential motive in business and entrepreneurship. Corporate governance must ensure that risks could be identified, managed and timely handled.
corporate governance mechanisms include ownership percentage of institutional shareholders, ownership concentration and duration of CEO’s tenure as well as risk dependent variables (financial risk (long-term leverage) and cash flow risk). Financial information of 86 Listed Companies in Tehran Stock Exchange in 1386-1393 has been used. To test hypotheses, multi-variable regression (EGLS) and mixed data method using Eviews 8 Software has been applied.
In summary, results showed a positive and significant influence between ownership concentration, duration of CEO’s tenure, and risk dependent variables (financial risk and cash flow risk). Also, they showed a negative and significant relationship between ownership percentage of institutional shareholders and risk dependent variables.

According to agency theory¡ structured corporate governance mechanisms should lead to financial reporting with high quality. As ownership concentration is observed as an important factor with in corporate governance (Mashayekh & Abdollahi¡ 2011)¡ it seems that the identity of controlling owners can play a crucial role in audit quality and improvement of information quality. Ownership concentration¡ throughthe increase of supervision and elimination of free riding¡ can create positive switches in the company. On the other hand¡ block holders and managers can use their control rights to achieve personal benefits and this violates the rights of other shareholders (Ebrahimi Kordlor & Erabi¡ 2010). These probabilities and the lack of effect of ownership concentration on different dimensions of company can present different theories regarding the behavior of block holders¡ and contradictory results might be reported by the researchers.
In this study¡ by controlling important factors including qualitative factors of audit (e.g. audit size and auditor’s opinion) and corporate factors (e.g. firm size¡ leverage and profitability) empirically¡ the relationship between corporate ownership concentration is investigated as one of the external mechanisms of corporate governance with the auditor switch among the companies listed in Tehran Stock exchange.
Theoretical Framework: According to the review of literature¡ the high percent of stock held by block holders is that they have great influence on management. There are two contradictory views about the role of great owners in companies.
Active Supervision Hypothesis: Regarding the relationship between major ownership and audit quality¡ Han et al.¡ (2009) state how institutional ownership affects audit quality of financial statements. They believe that institutional investors can affect corporate policies to apply corporate mechanisms to reduce supervision costs. The evidence showed that the companies mostly appoint auditors when there is high long-term institutional ownership. This shows that long-term institutional investors consider high quality audit as a method to improve corporate governance while their supervisory costs are reduced.
Opportunism Hypothesis: The followers of self-interest hypothesis believe that it is highly probable that big investors use special benefits as access to confidential information to be used for trading goals and achieving personal benefits. Fan and Wong (2002) found that the managers with control benefits reported accounting information for their personal goals and claimed that profit does not have reliability for external investors.
In this research¡ the subjects are companies listed in TSE from 2004 to 2011 (8-year period). For the hypothesis test¡ as dependent variables are artificial¡ logistic regression analysis is used. The study data are collected from Rahavard Novin and financial statements of companies from RDIS site¡ and are analyzed using SPSS18 software.
Based on the obtained results¡ there is a positive and significant relationship between internal organizational ownership and negative switch of auditor and the first hypothesis is supported. In other words¡ by the increase of internal organizational ownership¡ the negative switch of auditor is increased (using low quality auditor). The result is consistent with the report of Lin and Liu (2010). They showed that the increase of ownership of the biggest shareholder in the company was associated with the negative switch of auditor. The results of second hypothesis test showed that external organizational ownership had no significant relationship with positive switch of auditor. In other words¡ external organizational ownership had no effects on the type of auditor switch.
Conclusions and Suggestions: The results of the study showed that major internal organizational ownership had a positive and significant relationship with auditor switch decision (negative) in TSE. Based on the evidence¡ internal owners prefer the negative switching of auditor. In other words¡ internal organizational blockholders are less inclined to high quality auditors. One reason is that major internal organizational shareholders can use low quality auditors and achieve personal benefits. The results of the studies by Ebrahimi Kordlor and Erabi (2009)¡ Osta (2011)¡ Feisali (2011) and Truong and Heaney (2007) supported this hypothesis.

The main objective of current study is to investigate the relation between concentration of ownership and degree of control on share value of banks and financial institutes, listed in the Tehran Stock Exchange. For this purpose, we utilized the Tobin's Q model for testing the hypothesis. The sample comprises of 9 active banks and financial institutes listed in the Tehran Stock Exchange during the period 2008-2013. We also used the panel data to analyze the hypothesis. However to accomplish this study, we focussed on 5 variables as criteria for concentration of ownership and subsequently we estimated different equations on cross sectional and at various turning points bases per se. The results prima facie indicate that the degree of control and concentration of ownership variables are carrying significant impacts on the share value of banks and financial institutes and vice versa, implying that the share value of banks and financial institutes are in turn affecting the degree of control sine qua non, while other variables do not play any role on specifying a significant relation between concentration of ownership and share value of banks and financial institutes. Nonetheless the identification of main shareholder bears no significant effect on this variable, quid pro qua.

Shareholders are the original owners of a business unit and due to high sensitivity of investors to the performance of companies; wealth is one of the most important objectives of the companies. The purpose of this research is to discover the relationships between some of the corporate governance aspects with shareholders value added. In this research, the researchers created shareholders value added measured using Gong (2011). The goal of this research is applied and the method of research methodology is correlational. This study statistic population is firms listed in Tehran Stock Exchange. Therefore, the data from 81 firms for a five-year period (1385-1389) were studied. The multivariate paneled regression model is used to test the given hypotheses. The software used to test hypotheses is E-views 7. The results show that there is positive significant relationship between ownership concentration and shareholder value added but the other aspects of corporate governance (percentage of institutional shareholders and chairmanship of the Board and CEO duality posts) there isn't any significant relationship with shareholder value added. Concentration of ownership of a significant correlation with shareholder value involvement of major stakeholders in the market and pricing trends affected the market value of the shares.

To achieve high speed transition to market economy, policy makers in former Soviet Union and East European countries divested state-owned- enterprises to the public. This method, called voucher or mass privatization, was the main method of privatization in these countries. Different studies revealed that reducing ownership concentration through voucher privatization was not promising and deteriorated the enterprise efficiency. In Justice Equity Scheme, Iranian authorities have announced to devolve the ownership of state-owned- enterprises to the public. This paper is an attempt to find the effects of this dispersed ownership. After a brief survey on the experience of privatization in socialist countries, especially Czech republic, we have calculated the ownership concentration in Tehran Stock Exchange Market to compare the gains under different ownership structures. The results show that minor shareholding and small ownership lead to worsened economic performance of the enterprises.