جستجوی مقالات مرتبط با کلیدواژه "regulatory burden" در نشریات گروه "اقتصاد"

In this study, a game-theoretic model is designed according to the corruption index as the main channel for rent-seeking of natural resources and good governance index as a anticorruption by Sambit Bhattacharyya and Roland Hodler's approach. According to this model, we use data of corruption index, good governance index and resource rent and per capita income. We use panel data covering the period 2000–2014 and 50 countries to test this theoretical prediction. The model has been tested twice more by governance effectiveness index and regulatory burden index instead of good governance index again. Our estimates confirm that the relationship between resource rents and corruption depends on the quality of the good governance indexs. In such a way as to meet a minimum level of this index, resource rent's corruption can be controlled. Our main results hold when we control the effects of time varying common shocks, regional fixed effects and various additional covariates.

The public sector is an influential partner of the market economy in many developing countries. In the absence of government’s intervention, economic functioning of these countries could turn into constant disequilibrium without any hope of growth and economic prosperity. On the other hand unlimited government intervention could harm the economic growth by unnatural expansion of public sector and ensuing public corruption. It is known that government has discretionary power in providing public goods and regulating the economy. Corrupt bureacrats with this discretionary power creates and extracts rents by manipulating the public good supply and regulations: I) by attaching excessive red tape to the public good they are providing; II) or by making the regulations difficult for the private agents to comply with. The former type of corruption results in less public input being provided at higher cost to the private agents. The latter increases noncompliance, and results in bribery. Consequently, the overall public sector burden is higher in the environment with corrupt bureaucracy. We show this outcome using a simple theoretical model, and then confront it with empirical evidence. JEL classification: D73, H23, H32, H41, O17, O38, K23

As the size of the informal economy increases, the growth opportunities of the firms reduce, and the government tax revenue decreases. Therefore, increasing the formal business activities is a fundamental priority of policy-makers. This paper hypothesized that by both decreasing tax rates and regulatory burden, agents move into formal economy. Empirical results indicate that (1) reducing tax rate decreases the size of the informal sector, both in high income, and in middle and low income countries; (2) Tariff rate has a significant effect on underground economy only in high income countries; (3) Reducing the costs of starting a business affects informal activities regardless of the income level of the countries; (4) The costs of property registration has a significant effect only on middle and low income countries; and (5) Efficiency of legal system explains the size of the informal sector in high income countries.