Control of natural resource rents efficiency on corruption by good governance indexes

In this study, a game-theoretic model is designed according to the corruption index as the main channel for rent-seeking of natural resources and good governance index as a anticorruption by Sambit Bhattacharyya and Roland Hodler's approach. According to this model, we use data of corruption index, good governance index and resource rent and per capita income. We use panel data covering the period 2000–2014 and 50 countries to test this theoretical prediction. The model has been tested twice more by governance effectiveness index and regulatory burden index instead of good governance index again. Our estimates confirm that the relationship between resource rents and corruption depends on the quality of the good governance indexs. In such a way as to meet a minimum level of this index, resource rent's corruption can be controlled. Our main results hold when we control the effects of time varying common shocks, regional fixed effects and various additional covariates.