جستجوی مقالات مرتبط با کلیدواژه « طراحی مکانیسم » در نشریات گروه « اقتصاد »

It is a fact that “1 Person 1 Vote” is the most common voting system in democracies worldwide. But, when we ask “How about its efficiency in preference revelation?” the answer is “There are lots of other voting systems with more efficiency”. Two of the most recent studies in this field are “Liquid Democracy” and “Quadratic Voting (QV) Mechanism”. By using “Liquid Democracy” voters can delegate their votes to other voters, and by using “Quadratic Voting Mechanism” voters can buy more votes via spending money. This paper’s contribution is combining the two recent studies and designing “Adjusted Quadratic Voting Mechanism”. In fact, this contribution makes it possible to formulize Liquid Democracy and votes’ delegation in the context of Quadratic Voting (QV) Mechanism.

One of the most challenging issues related to the monetary policy is the causes and origins of inflationary shocks and biases. There are two approaches to the monetary policy in general: first, monetary policy based on discretion, and second, monetary policy based on a specific rule. Economists of New Classical School believe that monetary policy should be based on a monetary rule. Accordingly, the cause of inflationary shocks and biases can be considered as a violation of the monetary rule. They believe that economic agents make their expectations rationally. Therefore, an announced monetary policy will not have a real impact and will only cause inflation. As a result, an economists' effort could be to explain the government's motives for violating the monetary rule and to make policy recommendations based on it. This article tries to provide a new solution to the problem of violation of the monetary rule by using a special type of mechanism so called "Clark mechanism" (pivotal or person-centered mechanism) as well as designing micro-bases for the government behavior and rational agents and relying on the issue of government reputation.

In order to estimate the demand and supply functions of water, this study has used system of simultaneous equations for the period 2001-2012. Hence, real and nominal marginal price of the industry and mining demand was estimated 6532.45 and 12072.2 Rials. Also based on agricultural water demand real and nominal marginal price was estimated 977.21 and 1698.442 Rials. The result of economic value of water in different sections relatively showed that real and nominal economic value of per m3 in residential sector are 4462.34 and 8430.3, in agricultural sector are 620.399 and 1099.813, in industrial and mining sector are 4110.54 and 7727.08, in recreational sector is 1146.38 and finally in environmental sector is 596.739 Rials. This study design a matching based on the long-run supply and aggregate demand equilibrium, marginal prices and economic water value in different sections with use of mechanism design and two sided matching theory. Mechanism based on Gale- Shapley or deferred acceptance algorithm was solved.