جستجوی مقالات مرتبط با کلیدواژه "انگیزه های مدیریتی" در نشریات گروه "حسابداری"

Considering the important role of managers in the success of firms, the present research investigates the effect of managerial ability and managerial incentives on the firm's performance. Specifically, this study investigates how the managerial ability factor can have a significant impact on the profitability and risk of firms. By doing so, this study can provide several policy implications about how managerial ability can influence a firm's decisions and its related business policies. The statistical population of this research is the firms admitted to the Tehran Stock Exchange during the period of 2015 to 2019 and the sample includes 140 firms. The data of the research was extracted from Rahvard Navin software and the panel data method was used to estimate the model. In this study, the independent research variable is the managerial ability (Demirjan et al. model, 2012) and managerial incentives (CEO cash bonus), and the dependent variable is the firm's performance, where the firm's profitability and risk indicators are considered as performance criteria. The results of the research show that the managerial ability and cash reward of the CEO have a positive and significant relationship with the firm's profitability, in other words, more capable managers with high managerial incentives can have better profitability. Also, the ability of the managers and the CEO's cash bonus has a positive and significant effect on the firm's risk. The coefficients and significance levels related to control variables also show that firm size, sales growth, and firm growth have a positive and significant effect on firm profitability and firm risk. Accordingly, management's ability and motivations can affect the firm's decisions, business policies, and the firm's performance, including the firm's profitability and risk.

According to recent preceding studies, reduction of costs when sales decline, less than the increase in costs when the rate increases sales. This behavior is known as asymmetric costs to cost stickiness. With regard to meeting earnings targets, managers attempt to adjust operation resources when sales fall. This action probably results in cutting slack resources even though managers’ prediction concerning sale reduction is temporary. When there is an incentive to reduce the cost in the current period, the acceleration of removing slack resources is higher compared to the period when there is no incentive. Given this, tendency to meet earnings targets is more likely lead to reduce stickiness cost. The present study, covering 1384 to 1394, consist of 152 firms. The results of this study indicate that in the presence of incentive of earnings targets, cost stickiness cost is reduced by adjusting resources and through the reduction of sale the cost will decrease more aggressively. However, with the presence of incentive, consecutive periods will not affect stickiness cost significantly. In addition, managers’ optimistic (pessimistic) can be an important factor in increasing (decreasing) stickiness cost.